Also known as: child maltreatments · child abuse · child neglect
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An act or omission causing physical, emotional, or developmental harm to a child.
Caitlin Crowley arrives at school with a fresh bruise. Her teacher notices the mark during arrival and questions her privately to determine the source of the harm and ensure immediate safety. The child's identification of the abuser is admitted at trial because the exchange addressed an ongoing risk rather than building a prosecution record.
Clifford Cox faces trial for maltreating his child. The prosecutor uses peremptory strikes to remove male jurors. The court reviews whether the strikes rest on gender stereotypes rather than case-specific concerns about how jurors might view evidence of harm to the child.
The State of Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against J. E. B. on behalf of T. B., the mother of a minor child, in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama. On October 21, 1991, the matter was called for trial and jury selection began with a panel of 36 potential jurors, 12 males and 24 females. After the court excused three jurors for cause, only 10 of the remaining 33 jurors were male. The State then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, while petitioner used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, resulting in an all-female jury. Before the jury was empaneled, petitioner objected to the State's peremptory challenges on the ground that they were exercised against male jurors solely on the basis of gender. The court rejected the objection and empaneled the all-female jury, which found petitioner to be the father of the child and ordered him to pay child support. On postjudgment motion, the court reaffirmed its ruling. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment at 606 So. 2d 156 (1992), and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 508 U. S. 905 (1993) to resolve the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.
View caseClaire Campbell's parental rights are at stake after repeated findings of child maltreatment. The state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence because the interest in preserving the parent-child relationship demands heightened procedural protection before permanent severance.
In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home. About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health. In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody. Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents. The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.
View caseCamila Cervantes suffers ongoing maltreatment while under state supervision. The court examines whether the agency had an affirmative duty to protect the child from private violence once it had knowledge of the risk and had undertaken a custodial relationship.
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1975. In 1980, a Wyoming court granted his parents a divorce and awarded custody of Joshua to his father, Randy DeShaney, who then moved with the child to Winnebago County, Wisconsin. In January 1982, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services became aware that Joshua might be a victim of child abuse after he was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. The examining physician notified DSS. A caseworker interviewed Randy DeShaney and visited the home, observing suspicious injuries on Joshua's head, but concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse to retain him in court custody and returned him to his father while recommending counseling and preschool enrollment. Over the next two years, Joshua was repeatedly treated for suspicious injuries at local hospitals, with physicians notifying DSS on multiple occasions. Caseworkers conducted regular visits, noted additional injuries, received reports from emergency room personnel and neighbors, and at one point convened a Child Protection Team that decided against retaining custody, yet consistently returned Joshua to his father's care after determining insufficient evidence existed for court intervention. In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that the child fell into a coma and suffered permanent brain damage requiring lifelong institutionalization for profound mental retardation. Randy DeShaney was later tried and convicted of child abuse. Joshua and his mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Winnebago County, its Department of Social Services, and two social workers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, claiming a deprivation of liberty without due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseColin Chambers is removed from his home following substantiated maltreatment and placed with foster parents. The court weighs the child's need for stability against any liberty interest claimed by the foster family in maintaining the placement.
In 1976 appellees consisting of individual foster parents and the Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform filed a civil rights class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They acted on behalf of themselves and foster children who had resided in their homes for a year or more. They named as defendants various New York State and New York City child welfare officials. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the pre-removal procedures provided in state statutes and regulations. The District Court appointed independent counsel to represent the foster children to forestall conflicts. It also granted leave to natural mothers to intervene as defendants. The court certified a class of foster parents and children who had lived together for more than one year. A divided three-judge District Court held the existing pre-removal procedures constitutionally defective. It permanently enjoined their enforcement. Four appeals reached the Supreme Court from the New York City officials, New York State officials, independent counsel for the children, and intervening natural mothers. Under New York's foster care system most placements occur through voluntary written agreements. Natural parents and authorized agencies execute these agreements to transfer care and custody of the child to the agency. The agency then places the child in a licensed foster home under a contract allowing either party to terminate at will. Natural parents retain legal guardianship and an obligation to visit and plan for the child's future. Children may also enter foster care by court order following findings of abuse, neglect, or delinquency. When an agency decides to remove a child, state regulations require ten days' written notice to foster parents except in emergencies. Opportunities exist for conference and fair hearing. Additional procedures apply in New York City. Judicial review is available under § 392 after eighteen months. The record showed that the median duration of foster care in New York exceeded four years. Many children experienced multiple placements and limited contact with natural parents.
View caseCassandra Cooper, an eight-year-old maltreated by her caregiver, testifies via one-way video after expert evidence shows face-to-face confrontation would cause severe trauma. The procedure preserves oath, cross-examination, and jury observation of demeanor while protecting the child.
In October 1984, Sandra Ann Craig was charged in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland, with child abuse, first- and second-degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual practice, and battery. The named victim in each count was a six-year-old girl who had attended a kindergarten and day-care center owned and operated by Craig. Before trial, the State moved to invoke Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989). That statute permits a judge to receive the one-way closed-circuit television testimony of an alleged child victim in a child-abuse case upon a finding that live, in-court testimony would cause the child serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate. At a December 12, 1985 hearing, the trial court heard expert testimony that the named victim and three other children expected to testify would suffer serious emotional distress if required to testify in the defendant's presence. The trial court further found that the children would not be able to communicate effectively with the jury or the court in the defendant's presence. The trial court made individualized findings and therefore permitted the four children to testify via one-way closed-circuit television from a separate room. Craig was convicted on all counts. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseStatements are non-testimonial when the primary purpose of the questioning is to address an ongoing emergency and protect the child from further harm rather than to create evidence for prosecution. Courts examine the circumstances including the informality of the setting, the child's age, and whether the interaction focused on immediate safety.
Supporting sources
No. The Clause bars only testimonial statements. When a child speaks to a teacher or caregiver whose main goal is protection from ongoing abuse, the statements remain non-testimonial even if later used at trial.
Supporting sources
The trial court must find that testifying in the defendant's physical presence would cause the child serious emotional trauma beyond ordinary stress. The procedure must still preserve oath, cross-examination, and the ability of the judge and jury to observe demeanor.
Supporting sources
…131, 144 (D. Finkelhor, R. Gelles, G. Hataling, & M. Straus eds. 1983). In families where wifebeating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well. Violence Against Women, supra , at 12. Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.…