505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992)
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth.1
The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure.2 It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option.3 It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied.4 The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements.5
Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.6 The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services.7 They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face.8
The District Court entered a preliminary injunction.9 After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania.10
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.11 It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement.12 The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.13
Whether the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and reaffirmed?14
The essential holding of Roe v. Wade has three parts.15 Recognition of the woman's right to choose an abortion before viability without undue state interference forms the first part.16 Confirmation of the state's power to restrict post-viability abortions with exceptions for the woman's life or health forms the second part.17 Acknowledgment of the state's legitimate interests from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the woman's health and the potential life of the fetus forms the third part.18 This holding is retained under stare decisis when the precedent is workable, its core has not eroded, factual underpinnings remain unchanged, and adherence does not undermine judicial legitimacy.19
Yes. The Court applied stare decisis factors to the established facts that the Pennsylvania statute regulates but does not prohibit pre-viability abortions.20 Lower courts had applied an undue burden analysis.21 The Roe framework has not proven unworkable.22
It has served as a workable guide for state regulation and courts.23 The central holding has not been eroded because the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Roe's core.24 No changes in Roe's factual underpinnings have occurred because the basic facts of pregnancy and viability have not changed.25 The trimester framework has provided a workable guide.26
The Court's legitimacy is not undermined by adherence to Roe.27 The facts that petitioners challenged five provisions of the 1982 Act as amended confirm that the essential holding must be retained.28 The District Court and Court of Appeals reached differing conclusions on spousal notification.29 Retention provides stable guidance.30
The essential holding of Roe v. Wade is retained and reaffirmed.31
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices White, Scalia, And Thomas
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, dissented from the reaffirmance of Roe. He argued that the Constitution does not mention abortion. The right to abortion is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.
Therefore, it is not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. He would uphold the Pennsylvania statute in its entirety because the statute is rationally related to legitimate state interests in maternal health and potential life. His view diverges from the majority by rejecting any substantive due process protection for abortion.
He applies only rational-basis review to the regulations.
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justices White And Thomas
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, filed a separate dissent. He argued that Roe v. Wade was an unjustified exercise of raw judicial power. The Court has no authority to invent a right to abortion.
The joint opinion’s undue burden standard is not grounded in the Constitution. It will not provide a stable or predictable rule of law. The people of the States should be allowed to decide the question of abortion through the democratic process.
His position rejects the majority's stare decisis analysis. He insists that the entire Roe framework should be overruled.
Whether the spousal notification requirement of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion?32
A state regulation imposes an undue burden if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.33 A statute with this purpose or effect is invalid.34 The means chosen by the state must inform the woman's free choice rather than hinder it.35
Yes. The spousal notification requirement is an undue burden.36 The District Court findings, adopted in relevant part by the Court of Appeals, established that the requirement would deter a significant number of women from obtaining abortions.37 Deterrence arises due to fear of physical abuse, psychological coercion, or economic retaliation.38
The statutory exceptions for reported spousal assault or reasonable fear of bodily injury do not adequately protect the large fraction of affected women.39 The established facts show that only about one percent of women seeking abortions are married and unwilling to notify their husbands.40 Those women face real risks.41 The provision operates as a substantial obstacle.42
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the requirement.43
The spousal notification requirement imposes an undue burden and is unconstitutional.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of the Court.45 He joined the judgment that the spousal notification requirement is unconstitutional.46 He agreed that the Court's reaffirmation of Roe is correct.47
The woman's right to choose is grounded in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.48 He also joined the judgment that the spousal notification requirement is unconstitutional. It imposes an undue burden.49
His concurrence emphasizes that the right protects decisional autonomy even within marriage.50 The notification provision improperly gives husbands a form of veto power over women's reproductive choices.51
Whether the informed consent requirement, twenty-four-hour waiting period, parental consent requirement with judicial bypass, and reporting requirements of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act impose an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion?52
The same undue burden standard applies.53 Regulations that do not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before viability are constitutional.54 They must be reasonably related to legitimate state interests in potential life or maternal health.55
No. The informed consent provisions do not impose an undue burden.56 The 24-hour waiting period does not impose an undue burden.57 The parental consent provision with judicial bypass does not impose an undue burden.58 The reporting requirements do not impose an undue burden.59
These provisions are reasonably related to the state's interest in potential life.60 They do not place a substantial obstacle in the path of the woman's choice.61 The established facts show that the District Court and Court of Appeals evaluated these provisions under the undue burden standard.62 The Supreme Court agreed they facilitate informed choice without creating substantial obstacles.63
The parental consent requirement includes an adequate judicial bypass.64 The reporting requirements are reasonably directed to maternal health while respecting confidentiality.65
These provisions do not impose an undue burden and are constitutional.66
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joined Parts I, II, III, and IV of the opinion of the Court.67 He agreed that the central holding of Roe must be reaffirmed.68 The spousal notification provision is unconstitutional.69
He wrote separately to express his continued belief that the trimester framework of Roe should be retained.70 The undue burden standard adopted by the joint opinion is not sufficiently protective of the woman's right.71 His separate opinion underscores that strict scrutiny remains the appropriate standard.72
The joint opinion's approach weakens protections for reproductive choice while still correctly invalidating the spousal notification requirement.73
Whether the medical emergency definition in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act is constitutional?74
Yes. The District Court found that the definition was too narrow.77 It excluded conditions such as preeclampsia, inevitable abortion, and prematurely ruptured membrane.78 The Court of Appeals construed the phrase serious risk to include circumstances that could lead to substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily functions.79
The Supreme Court deferred to this construction.80 As construed, the medical emergency definition imposes no undue burden.81 The established facts show that the definition was intended to protect women.82 The Court of Appeals reading aligns with constitutional requirements.83
These facts confirm its validity.84
The medical emergency definition is constitutional.85