511 U.S. 127 (1994)
The State of Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against J. E. B. on behalf of T. B., the mother of a minor child, in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama.1 On October 21, 1991, the matter was called for trial and jury selection began with a panel of 36 potential jurors, 12 males and 24 females.2 After the court excused three jurors for cause, only 10 of the remaining 33 jurors were male.3
The State then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, while petitioner used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, resulting in an all-female jury.4 Before the jury was empaneled, petitioner objected to the State's peremptory challenges on the ground that they were exercised against male jurors solely on the basis of gender.5 The court rejected the objection and empaneled the all-female jury, which found petitioner to be the father of the child and ordered him to pay child support.6
On postjudgment motion, the court reaffirmed its ruling.7 The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment at 606 So. 2d 156 (1992), and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari.8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 508 U. S. 905 (1993) to resolve the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.9
Whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges?10
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state actors from exercising peremptory challenges in a manner that intentionally discriminates on the basis of gender, as gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.11 Gender-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny and require an exceedingly persuasive justification to survive constitutional review.12
Yes. The facts establish that the State of Alabama, a state actor, used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to remove male jurors from the venire in a paternity action, resulting in an all-female jury.13 This practice relies on the stereotype that men would be more sympathetic to a male defendant in such cases, which is precisely the type of archaic and overbroad generalization that the Equal Protection Clause condemns.14 The State's action does not further a substantial interest in fair and impartial juries because it is based on assumptions about how men and women will vote rather than on individual qualifications.15
Applying the rule to these facts, the gender-based strikes violate the petitioner's and the excluded jurors' equal protection rights.16
The Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor concurs in the judgment but stresses that the prohibition should apply only to the government's use of gender-based peremptory strikes.18 She notes that extending Batson to gender adds burdens to the trial process, erodes the peremptory challenge by requiring explanations for intuitive decisions, and diminishes litigants' ability to act on accurate gender-based assumptions about juror attitudes in cases such as rape or child custody.19 She maintains that private civil litigants and criminal defendants are not state actors and thus should remain free to exercise peremptory challenges without the same constitutional constraints.20
Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment and explains that the Equal Protection Clause protects the rights of individuals rather than groups.21 He observes that an individual denied jury service because of a gender-based peremptory challenge suffers an injury to personal dignity and the right to participate in the political process equivalent to exclusion by statute.22 Heightened scrutiny applies to gender classifications, and the Clause's neutral guarantee to any person confirms that discrimination on the basis of sex in jury selection is unconstitutional, just as it is for race.23
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents and argues that sufficient differences exist between race and gender discrimination to preclude extending Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges.24 Race triggers strict scrutiny while gender receives only heightened review; racial groups are numerical minorities while the population divides evenly by sex.25 He concludes that the State has demonstrated that gender-based strikes substantially further the legitimate interest in an impartial jury and that the costs of the majority's rule, including lengthier trials and reduced ability to rely on gender-based assumptions, are not constitutionally required.26
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissents and contends that the majority's reasoning is largely irrelevant because the case involves alleged discrimination against men rather than women.27 He maintains that the peremptory challenge system as a whole is evenhanded, with each side striking the other gender in this very case, and that requiring explanations for strikes destroys the arbitrary and essential character of the peremptory.28 Extending the rule invites endless collateral litigation, lengthens voir dire, and imperils a practice essential to fair jury trials since the common law without any genuine denial of equal protection.29