497 U.S. 836 (1990)
In October 1984, Sandra Ann Craig was charged in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland, with child abuse, first- and second-degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual practice, and battery.1 The named victim in each count was a six-year-old girl who had attended a kindergarten and day-care center owned and operated by Craig.2
Before trial, the State moved to invoke Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989).3 That statute permits a judge to receive the one-way closed-circuit television testimony of an alleged child victim in a child-abuse case upon a finding that live, in-court testimony would cause the child serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.4
At a December 12, 1985 hearing, the trial court heard expert testimony that the named victim and three other children expected to testify would suffer serious emotional distress if required to testify in the defendant's presence.5 The trial court further found that the children would not be able to communicate effectively with the jury or the court in the defendant's presence.6 The trial court made individualized findings and therefore permitted the four children to testify via one-way closed-circuit television from a separate room.7
Craig was convicted on all counts.8 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions.9 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.10 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial outside the defendant's physical presence by one-way closed-circuit television?12
The Confrontation Clause's literal guarantee of a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is not absolute.13 It does not preclude the use of one-way closed-circuit television testimony in child abuse cases when such use is necessary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.14
Yes. Sandra Ann Craig was charged with various sexual offenses against a six-year-old child who attended her day care center.15 The State invoked the Maryland statute allowing one-way closed-circuit television testimony upon a finding of serious emotional distress preventing reasonable communication.16 Expert testimony established that the victim and three other children would suffer such distress in the defendant's presence.17 The trial court made individualized findings and permitted the testimony via the special procedure.18 The children testified under oath, subject to cross-examination, with their demeanor observable on video.19 These procedures preserved the core elements of confrontation.20
The Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial.21 That preference is not absolute and may be compromised in appropriate cases when necessary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.22 The trial court heard expert testimony that the named victim and three other children would suffer serious emotional distress if forced to testify in Craig's presence and would be unable to communicate effectively.23 The court made individualized findings that each child would suffer such distress.24 The children testified under oath subject to cross-examination by defense counsel and their demeanor was observable by the jury and defendant via video monitor with Craig in electronic communication with counsel.25 These procedures assured the reliability of the testimony while serving the state's interest in protecting child witnesses from trauma.26
The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting between the defendant and the witnesses against him at trial and the procedure used in this case was constitutional.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Scalia dissented.28 He argued that the Confrontation Clause provides an unqualified right to face-to-face confrontation that cannot be balanced away by policy interests.29 The majority's approach subordinates explicit constitutional text to current public policy.30 Scalia emphasized that the Clause guarantees specific trial procedures thought to assure reliable evidence.31 Exceptions for hearsay do not extend to denying literal face-to-face confrontation when the witness is available but unwilling due to the defendant's presence.32
He viewed the majority's interest-balancing as illegitimate judicial amendment of the Constitution.33
Whether Maryland's interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case justifies the use of one-way closed-circuit television testimony when the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured?34
Maryland's interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.35
Yes. The statute requires a finding that the child's testimony in the courtroom will result in serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.36 That finding was met here through expert testimony and court findings.37 The procedure preserved oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor, ensuring reliability.38
The trial court heard expert testimony that the named victim and three other children would suffer serious emotional distress if forced to testify in Craig's presence and would be unable to communicate effectively. The court made individualized findings that each child would suffer such distress. The children testified under oath subject to cross-examination by defense counsel and their demeanor was observable by the jury and defendant via video monitor with Craig in electronic communication with counsel. These procedures assured the reliability of the testimony while serving the state's interest in protecting child witnesses from trauma.
The use of the one-way closed-circuit television procedure did not violate the Confrontation Clause.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Scalia dissented. He argued that the Confrontation Clause provides an unqualified right to face-to-face confrontation that cannot be balanced away by policy interests. The majority's approach subordinates explicit constitutional text to current public policy. Scalia emphasized that the Clause guarantees specific trial procedures thought to assure reliable evidence. Exceptions for hearsay do not extend to denying literal face-to-face confrontation when the witness is available but unwilling due to the defendant's presence.
He viewed the majority's interest-balancing as illegitimate judicial amendment of the Constitution.