504 U.S. 689 (1992)
In September 1989 Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of her daughters L. R. and S. R. against Jon A. Richards and Debra Kesler, both citizens of Louisiana.1
The complaint alleged that Richards, the divorced father of the children, and Kesler, his female companion, had committed acts of sexual and physical abuse against the daughters and sought monetary damages.2 Federal jurisdiction rested solely on the diversity-of-citizenship provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.3
One month earlier, on August 9, 1989, a juvenile court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, had entered a judgment under state child-protection statutes that permanently terminated Richards' parental rights on account of the alleged abuse and permanently enjoined him from any contact with the children.4
On December 10, 1990, the District Court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss.5 The court cited In re Burrus for the proposition that the whole subject of domestic relations belongs to the laws of the States and invoked the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction.6 It also relied on the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.7
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to three questions concerning the existence and scope of any domestic relations exception and the propriety of Younger abstention in the case.9
Whether there is a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction?10
The domestic relations exception is a statutory limitation on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 that prevents federal courts from issuing divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees.11 It rests on Congress's acquiescence in the historical construction of the 1789 Judiciary Act's phrase 'suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity'.12 Congress reaffirmed the exception when it replaced that phrase with 'all civil actions' in 1948 without indicating any intent to alter the exception.13
Yes. The Court first frames the exception as statutory rather than constitutional because Article III contains no subject-matter limitation on domestic relations cases and because the Court has exercised appellate jurisdiction over territorial divorce decrees.14 It then traces the exception to the Barber majority's acceptance of the dissent's equity-based reading of the 1789 Act and to the absence of any congressional correction in the 1948 revision.15
Therefore the statutory exception does not divest the district court of jurisdiction.16
A domestic relations exception exists as a matter of statutory construction but does not bar this tort action for damages.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurs in the judgment that jurisdiction exists but rejects the majority's construction of the diversity statute as containing a domestic relations exception.18 He argues that the diversity statute unambiguously extends to all civil actions between diverse parties.19 Barber did not squarely interpret the statutory text.20
Subsequent decisions such as Simms, De la Rama, and Popovici undermine any inference of congressional acceptance of such an exception.21 The longstanding practice of declining domestic relations cases is best understood as discretionary abstention rather than a mandatory jurisdictional bar.22
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment on the narrow ground that whatever domestic relations exception may exist, it plainly does not reach this tort suit.23 He declines to resolve the broader questions of the exception's existence or scope.24 The result is the same under any plausible understanding of eighteenth-century chancery practice or the 1789 Judiciary Act.25
He emphasizes that this should be an exceedingly easy case, as demonstrated by each of the opinions.26 For that reason, he would leave for another day consideration of whether any domestic relations cases necessarily fall outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and of what, if any, principle would justify such an exception to federal jurisdiction.27
Whether such an exception, if it exists, permits a district court to abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort action for damages?28
Even when a case touches domestic relations, the exception applies only to suits that seek the issuance or modification of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.29 It does not extend to tort claims for damages when the domestic status of the parties has already been determined by a state court and the federal suit does not require relitigation of that status.30
No. The Court limits the exception to the narrow class of cases identified in Barber and Burrus.31 Enforcement of a previously entered state decree or adjudication of independent tort claims does not implicate the core concerns of issuing family-status orders.32 On the established facts, Ankenbrandt's complaint alleges only common-law torts committed against the children and seeks money damages.33 The Jefferson Parish juvenile court had already terminated Richards's parental rights one month before suit was filed.34
Because the federal action neither requests nor requires a federal court to enter or alter any divorce, alimony, or custody decree, the domestic relations exception supplies no basis for abstention or dismissal.35
The domestic relations exception does not authorize abstention or dismissal of this tort damages action.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun agrees that the case lies outside any domestic relations exception because it is a peripheral tort claim.37 He classifies the suit as one that does not seek a declaration of status or obligations arising from status.38 The suit does not upset any prior state determination of status or obligations appurtenant to status.39
It presents no risk of conflicting with ongoing state proceedings.40 Petitioner's state-law tort claims for money damages are easily cognizable in a federal court.41 All these considerations favor the exercise of federal jurisdiction over petitioner's claims.42
Whether the District Court erred in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris?43
Younger abstention is appropriate only when a federal plaintiff seeks to enjoin an ongoing state proceeding that implicates important state interests.44 Absent a pending state action, the federal courts' obligation to exercise jurisdiction is virtually unflagging, although Burford abstention may still apply in rare cases presenting difficult questions of state policy that transcend the immediate controversy.45
Yes. The Court holds that Younger requires a pending state proceeding and that the lower courts clearly erred by invoking it when none existed.46 On the established facts, the Jefferson Parish juvenile court had already entered its final judgment terminating parental rights before the federal complaint was filed, and respondents alleged no ongoing state proceeding.47 The Court further concludes that Burford abstention is likewise inappropriate because the domestic relationship's status has been fixed by state law and has no bearing on the underlying tort claims.48
Consequently the district court had no proper ground for abstaining under either doctrine.49
The District Court erred in abstaining under Younger v. Harris.50
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurs that Younger abstention is inappropriate because no state proceeding was pending.51 He notes that the presence of a federal question or statute would counsel even more strongly against abstention.52 He agrees that the state-law tort claims here are readily cognizable in federal court once the domestic-status issues have been resolved by the state.53
In his view, the suit is a peripheral tort claim that does not seek any declaration of status or obligations arising from status and presents no risk of conflicting with ongoing state proceedings.