538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003)
In 1994 California enacted its three strikes law providing an indeterminate term of 25 years to life for any defendant convicted of a felony who had previously been convicted of two or more serious or violent felonies.1
On March 12, 2000, Gary Albert Ewing entered the pro shop at the El Segundo Golf Course in Los Angeles County while on parole from a nine-year prison term.2 He left with three golf clubs priced at $399 each concealed in his pants leg.3 A shop employee alerted police, and officers apprehended Ewing in the parking lot.4
Ewing had a long criminal history.5 In 1984 at age 22 he pleaded guilty to theft and received six months suspended jail time, three years probation, and a fine.6 Between 1988 and 1993 he accumulated convictions for grand theft auto, petty theft with a prior, battery, burglary, drug paraphernalia possession, unlawful firearm possession, and trespass.7
In October and November 1993 Ewing committed three residential burglaries and one robbery at a Long Beach apartment complex over five weeks.8 A jury later convicted him of first-degree robbery and three counts of residential burglary.9 He received a sentence of nine years and eight months before being paroled in 1999.10
A jury convicted Ewing of one count of felony grand theft for the golf-club theft.11 At sentencing the prosecution alleged and the trial court found four prior serious or violent felony convictions arising from the Long Beach crimes.12 At the sentencing hearing, Ewing asked the court to reduce the grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor or to dismiss some or all of the prior strike allegations. The trial court declined both requests and imposed the mandatory 25-years-to-life term under the three strikes law.13
The California Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion rejecting Ewing's claim that the sentence was grossly disproportionate.14 The California Supreme Court denied review.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the three strikes law for felony grand theft?17
The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.18 In determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, courts examine the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.19 A sentence is not grossly disproportionate simply because it is more severe than sentences for similar crimes in other jurisdictions, and recidivism provides a legitimate basis for enhanced punishment under recidivist statutes.20
No. Ewing's current offense of felony grand theft was committed while he was on parole from a nine-year prison term for robbery.21 His long criminal history included two prior robbery convictions that qualified as strikes under the three strikes law along with additional convictions for burglary and other offenses.22 In light of Ewing's criminal history and the seriousness of his current offense, the sentence is not grossly disproportionate.23
Ewing's sentence is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons.24 California has a reasonable basis for deciding that repeat offenders who have committed at least two violent or serious felonies should be incapacitated.25 The State was entitled to focus on Ewing's long criminal history, which included convictions for robbery and burglary in addition to the current offense and two prior strikes for robbery.26 Any other approach would not give the State adequate power to incapacitate dangerous recidivists.27
Ewing's sentence is consistent with the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for similar recidivists, as many States have enacted three strikes laws or habitual offender statutes that provide for enhanced sentences for repeat offenders.28
Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life under California's three strikes law does not violate the Eighth Amendment.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concluded that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was aimed at excluding certain modes of punishment and was not a guarantee against disproportionate sentences.30 The proportionality argument has no foundation in the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment and has been a total failure.31
Proportionality is inherently tied to the penological goal of retribution.32 Once deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation receive significant weight, it becomes difficult to speak intelligently of proportionality.33 Scalia concurred in the judgment because he agreed that the sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.34
Justice Thomas concluded that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle at all.35 He agreed with Justice Scalia's view that the proportionality test announced in Solem v. Helm is incapable of judicial application.36 Even if Solem's test were perfectly clear, Thomas would not feel compelled by stare decisis to apply it.37
In his view the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle whatsoever.38 Thomas therefore concurred in the judgment that Ewing's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.39
Justice Stevens concluded that the California three strikes law as applied to Ewing imposes a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to his crime and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.40 He emphasized that proportionality review is not only capable of judicial application but also required by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive sanctions.41
Stevens noted that the Amendment directs judges to apply their best judgment in determining the proportionality of fines, bail, and other forms of punishment, including imprisonment.42 It would be anomalous to apply proportionality review to bail and fines but not to prison terms.43 He therefore dissented.44
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's sentence of at least twenty-five years is grossly disproportionate to the theft of three golf clubs worth approximately $1,200. He placed the case between Rummel and Solem, noting that the length of the real prison term places Ewing closer to Solem than to Rummel.45
Breyer found that the sentence raises a serious disproportionality question, that objective evidence suggests many experienced judges would consider it disproportionately harsh, and that no special criminal justice concerns related to California's three strikes policy justify including Ewing's theft within the class of triggering conduct.46 Breyer therefore dissented.47