431 U.S. 816, 862-863
In 1976 appellees consisting of individual foster parents and the Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform filed a civil rights class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.1 They acted on behalf of themselves and foster children who had resided in their homes for a year or more.2
They named as defendants various New York State and New York City child welfare officials.3 The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the pre-removal procedures provided in state statutes and regulations.4
The District Court appointed independent counsel to represent the foster children to forestall conflicts.5 It also granted leave to natural mothers to intervene as defendants.6 The court certified a class of foster parents and children who had lived together for more than one year.7
A divided three-judge District Court held the existing pre-removal procedures constitutionally defective.8 It permanently enjoined their enforcement.9 Four appeals reached the Supreme Court from the New York City officials, New York State officials, independent counsel for the children, and intervening natural mothers.10
Under New York's foster care system most placements occur through voluntary written agreements.11 Natural parents and authorized agencies execute these agreements to transfer care and custody of the child to the agency.12 The agency then places the child in a licensed foster home under a contract allowing either party to terminate at will.13 Natural parents retain legal guardianship and an obligation to visit and plan for the child's future.14 Children may also enter foster care by court order following findings of abuse, neglect, or delinquency.15
When an agency decides to remove a child, state regulations require ten days' written notice to foster parents except in emergencies.16 Opportunities exist for conference and fair hearing.17 Additional procedures apply in New York City.18 Judicial review is available under § 392 after eighteen months.19 The record showed that the median duration of foster care in New York exceeded four years.20 Many children experienced multiple placements and limited contact with natural parents.21
Whether New York's pre-removal procedures for foster children who have lived in a foster home for a year or more satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?22
When a liberty or property interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection, due process requires procedures appropriate to the nature of the case.23 The court determines the required procedures by weighing the private interest affected by the official action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards, and the government's interest including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional requirements, as articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976).24
Yes. The established facts describe a system in which most foster placements occur through voluntary written agreements.25 These agreements transfer care and custody to an agency.26 The agency places the child in a licensed foster home under a contract terminable at will by either party.27 Natural parents retain legal guardianship and an obligation to visit and plan for the child's future. Court-ordered placements follow findings of abuse, neglect, or delinquency.28
Upon an agency's decision to remove a child, state regulations require ten days' written notice to foster parents except in emergencies.29 An opportunity follows for a conference with a social services official who has had no previous contact with the case.30 A subsequent fair hearing is available under Social Services Law § 400.31 Additional trial-type hearing procedures exist in New York City under SSC Procedure No. 5 for transfers to another foster home.32 Judicial review is available under Social Services Law § 392 for children in care eighteen months or longer.33
These procedures address the private interest in avoiding removal by allowing foster parents to present information and be advised of reasons.34 They reduce the risk of error by providing multiple levels of review.35 Independent officials participate, and judicial orders may keep the child in the foster home.36 They serve the government's interest in efficient child welfare administration without imposing excessive burdens.37 The record shows only twenty-six foster parents requested hearings out of approximately twenty-eight hundred transfers per year in New York City during the relevant period.38
The median duration of foster care exceeding four years and the prevalence of multiple placements are accounted for by the availability of § 392 review after eighteen months.39 The legislature reasonably selected this cutoff over the one-year threshold used for class certification.40 The time required for emotional attachments to develop varies with the child's age and prior attachments.41 The District Court certified a class of foster parents and children who had lived together for more than one year after appointing independent counsel for the children and granting intervention to natural mothers.42 Four appeals reached the Supreme Court from the judgment permanently enjoining enforcement of the challenged statutes and regulations.43
The Supreme Court reversed the District Court because the procedures provided by New York State in § 392 and by New York City's SSC Procedure No. 5 are adequate to protect whatever liberty interests appellees may have.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment on the ground that no liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause exists in the foster family relationship.44 That relationship is wholly a creation of the state.45 It is intended only as a temporary way station until the child can be returned to natural parents or placed for adoption.46
New York law and judicial decisions have made unmistakably clear that third-party custodians acquire no squatter's rights in another's child.47 He would have held squarely that the interests asserted by the appellees are not of a kind that the Due Process Clause protects.48 New York confers no right on foster families to remain intact defeasible only upon proof of specific acts or circumstances.49
Any emotional attachments that develop represent a failure of the temporary foster care system rather than a relationship that must be frozen in existence by the Constitution.50
Whether foster parents and foster children possess a liberty interest in the continuation of their relationship that is protected by the Due Process Clause?51
Freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 This protection encompasses a private realm of family life that the state cannot enter.53 The existence of such an interest in the foster family context must be determined by reference to the origins of the relationship in state law and contractual arrangements rather than solely in intrinsic human rights.54
No. The established facts show that the foster family relationship originates in voluntary placement agreements or court orders.55 These instruments transfer care and custody to an agency while reserving the agency's right to remove the child at will.56 Natural parents retain legal guardianship and an absolute right to return of the child absent court order.57 Any emotional ties that develop have their source in an arrangement in which the state has been a partner from the outset.58
The District Court did not reach the question whether the foster home is entitled to the same constitutional deference as the biological family.59 Instead it rested its holding on an asserted right of the foster child to be heard before suffering grievous loss.60 The Supreme Court assumed without deciding that a protected liberty interest might exist.61 It concluded that the existing procedures were adequate even on that assumption.62
The record establishes that the median time in foster care exceeds four years and that many children develop deep emotional ties.63 Yet the statutory scheme divides parental functions among agency, foster parents, and natural parents.64 It expressly contemplates that foster care is temporary and transitional.65
The existence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the foster family relationship need not be resolved because the procedures satisfy due process even assuming such an interest.66
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart would have held squarely that the interests asserted by the appellees are not of a kind that the Due Process Clause protects. New York confers no right on foster families to remain intact defeasible only upon proof of specific acts or circumstances.
Any emotional attachments that develop represent a failure of the temporary foster care system rather than a relationship that must be frozen in existence by the Constitution. He emphasized that the foster parent-foster child relationship is wholly a creation of the State under New York law. That law defines the circumstances of placement, prescribes the obligations of foster parents, and provides for removal at the agency's discretion.
The New York Court of Appeals has particularly rejected the notion that third-party custodians may acquire squatter's rights in another's child.67
Whether foster parents have standing to assert the due process rights of the foster children they represent?68
A party with a sufficient Art. III case or controversy against state officials may assert the rights of children in their care when the children lack capacity to make litigation decisions for themselves and when all parties share some portion of guardianship responsibility, provided an independent representative has been appointed to protect the children's interests.69
Yes. The established facts show that the foster parents brought suit on behalf of themselves and the foster children who had resided in their homes for a year or more.70 The District Court appointed independent counsel for the children to forestall any possibility of conflict between their interests and those asserted by the foster parents.71 The natural mothers were granted leave to intervene as defendants.72
Although the independent counsel opposed the relief requested by the foster parents, the Supreme Court held that the foster parents have standing to raise the children's rights.73 The children cannot decide for themselves how best to protect their interests.74 All parties share guardianship attributes.75 It is imprudent to leave the choices entirely to court-appointed counsel.76
The District Court certified the class after finding that the pre-removal procedures were constitutionally defective.77 The four appeals presented the standing question along with the merits.78
Foster parents have standing to assert the due process rights of the foster children in their care.79