489 U.S. 189 (1989)
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1975.1 In 1980, a Wyoming court granted his parents a divorce and awarded custody of Joshua to his father, Randy DeShaney, who then moved with the child to Winnebago County, Wisconsin.2
In January 1982, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services became aware that Joshua might be a victim of child abuse after he was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions.3 The examining physician notified DSS.4 A caseworker interviewed Randy DeShaney and visited the home, observing suspicious injuries on Joshua's head, but concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse to retain him in court custody and returned him to his father while recommending counseling and preschool enrollment.5
Over the next two years, Joshua was repeatedly treated for suspicious injuries at local hospitals, with physicians notifying DSS on multiple occasions.6 Caseworkers conducted regular visits, noted additional injuries, received reports from emergency room personnel and neighbors, and at one point convened a Child Protection Team that decided against retaining custody, yet consistently returned Joshua to his father's care after determining insufficient evidence existed for court intervention.7
In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that the child fell into a coma and suffered permanent brain damage requiring lifelong institutionalization for profound mental retardation.8 Randy DeShaney was later tried and convicted of child abuse.9
Joshua and his mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Winnebago County, its Department of Social Services, and two social workers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, claiming a deprivation of liberty without due process.10 The district court granted summary judgment for the respondents.11 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the State to protect an individual from harm inflicted by a private actor?14
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.15 It is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act and does not impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that life, liberty, or property interests do not come to harm through other means.16 Nor does history, precedent, or contemporary conceptions of the State's role support such a duty.17
No. The Clause forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of protected interests without due process but cannot fairly be read to require the State to protect those interests from invasion by private actors.18 In the established facts, Randy DeShaney, a private actor and Joshua's father, inflicted the repeated beatings that caused permanent brain damage.19 The Winnebago County Department of Social Services merely received reports, conducted visits, and returned Joshua to his father's custody after finding insufficient evidence for court intervention.20 The State played no part in creating the danger or restraining Joshua's liberty through incarceration or institutionalization.21
Its failure to prevent the private harm does not constitute a deprivation under the Clause.22
The Due Process Clause imposes no affirmative duty on the State to protect an individual from harm inflicted by a private actor.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Blackmun
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that Wisconsin's child-protection program actively intervened in Joshua's life by channeling all abuse reports to DSS.24 He noted that the State assumed control over custody decisions.25 The State acquired detailed knowledge of the danger through repeated investigations and visits.26
This intervention cut off private sources of aid.27 It created a duty to protect that the majority's action-inaction distinction ignored.28 The case falls within the Estelle-Youngberg tradition where the State assumes responsibility after rendering an individual dependent.29
Whether the State's knowledge of the risk of harm to a child and its temporary assumption and return of custody create a special relationship that triggers a constitutional duty to protect?30
A special relationship triggering an affirmative constitutional duty to protect arises only when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him against his will through incarceration, institutionalization, or similar restraint of personal liberty.31 The duty does not arise from the State's mere knowledge of an individual's predicament, expressions of intent to help, or temporary custody followed by return to a private custodian.32
No. The established facts show that DSS took Joshua into temporary custody only once after the January 1983 hospital admission.33 The agency convened a Child Protection Team and then returned him to Randy DeShaney's custody after determining insufficient evidence of abuse existed.34 Subsequent monthly visits and reports of injuries did not involve ongoing physical restraint by the State.35 The final March 1984 beating occurred while Joshua remained in his father's custody.36
Because the State did not impose a limitation on Joshua's freedom to act on his own behalf at the time of the injury, no special relationship existed that would trigger a constitutional duty.37
The State's knowledge and temporary custody actions do not create a special relationship imposing a constitutional duty to protect.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun dissented separately.39 He contended that the majority's rigid action-inaction line was formalistic.40 The State's repeated decisions to return Joshua to his father's custody after learning of severe abuse effectively placed the child in a dangerous predicament.41
The facts demonstrated active state intervention.42 This intervention triggered a fundamental duty to aid once the danger became known.43 Compassion and a sympathetic reading of the Fourteenth Amendment required recognizing liability rather than denying any constitutional protection.44
Whether the State's failure to protect a child from known abuse by his father violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause?45
The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary government action that shocks the conscience.46 It does not transform every tort by a state actor into a constitutional violation.47 The State's failure to protect against private violence does not violate substantive due process when the State neither created the danger nor restrained the individual's liberty.48
No. The established facts establish that DSS caseworkers received multiple notifications from physicians and neighbors.49 They observed suspicious injuries during home visits.50 They yet consistently concluded there was insufficient evidence to retain custody, returning Joshua to his father each time.51 These omissions, while tragic, did not involve the State affirmatively abusing its power or restraining Joshua.52
The harm was inflicted solely by Randy DeShaney, a private actor.53 The State's inaction therefore does not shock the conscience in a manner that violates substantive due process.54
The State's failure to protect Joshua from his father's abuse does not violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.55