Also known as: Ex Parte Young · Ex parte Young exception · Ex parte Young
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine that permits federal courts to entertain suits seeking prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against state officers alleged to be violating federal law. The doctrine treats the officer as stripped of state authority when acting unconstitutionally, thereby allowing the suit to proceed notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Erika Echevarria sues the state superintendent in federal court after the superintendent enforces a directive disbanding student advocacy clubs. She requests only a declaratory judgment and an injunction barring future enforcement of the directive. The court permits the action to proceed because the requested relief targets ongoing conduct rather than past events.
Edith Eberhardt faces state criminal charges for distributing leaflets and files a federal action against the district attorney seeking an injunction against enforcement of the statute. The court considers whether federal intervention is appropriate given the pending state proceeding. It allows the federal suit for prospective relief to continue because the claim challenges ongoing application of an allegedly unconstitutional law.
John Harris, Jr., was indicted in a California state court charged with violation of the California Penal Code §§ 11400 and 11401, known as the Criminal Syndicalism Act. He then filed a complaint in the Federal District Court asking that court to enjoin District Attorney Evelle J. Younger of Los Angeles County from prosecuting him. Harris alleged that the prosecution and the presence of the Act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch, members of the Progressive Labor Party, intervened as plaintiffs claiming that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them from peacefully advocating the program of their party to replace capitalism with socialism. Farrell Broslawsky, an instructor in history at Los Angeles Valley College, also intervened claiming that the prosecution made him uncertain whether he could teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his classwork. None of the intervenors had been indicted, arrested, or threatened with prosecution. A three-judge Federal District Court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 held that it had jurisdiction and power to restrain the District Attorney from prosecuting. The court held that the State's Criminal Syndicalism Act was void for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It accordingly restrained the District Attorney from further prosecution of the pending action against Harris, as reported at 281 F. Supp. 507 (1968). Younger appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. At the time the federal suit was filed, Harris was actually being prosecuted by California for a violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Act. The intervenors claimed only that they felt inhibited by the Act and the pending prosecution of Harris, without alleging any threat of prosecution against themselves.
View caseEsme Ellington receives a warning letter from state officials threatening prosecution under a statute she believes violates the First Amendment. She files a federal action against the officials seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional. The court entertains the suit because the requested relief is prospective and addresses a credible threat of future enforcement.
In October 1970 petitioner Steffel and other individuals distributed handbills protesting American involvement in Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Shopping center employees asked the group to stop and leave. Police officers were summoned and told the handbillers they would be arrested if they did not stop. The group left to avoid arrest. Two days later Steffel and a companion returned to the shopping center and again began handbilling. The manager called the police. Officers warned that failure to stop would result in arrests. Steffel left, but his companion stayed, continued handbilling, and was arrested and charged with criminal trespass under Georgia Code Annotated section 26-1503. Steffel alleged that he wished to return to distribute handbills but had not done so because of concern that he too would be arrested under the same statute. The parties stipulated that if Steffel returned and refused upon request to stop handbilling, a warrant would be sworn out and he might be arrested and charged with a violation of the Georgia statute. Steffel and others filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 United States Code section 1983, and its jurisdictional implementation, 28 United States Code section 1343. The complaint requested a declaratory judgment that the Georgia statute was being applied in violation of petitioner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and an injunction restraining the solicitor of the Civil and Criminal Court of DeKalb County, the chief of the DeKalb County Police, the owner of the shopping center, and the manager from enforcing the statute. The District Court denied all relief and dismissed the action. Steffel appealed only from the denial of declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment refusing declaratory relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseEugene Ellsworth sues the director of a city agency in federal court alleging that an ongoing employment policy violates federal statutory rights. He seeks only an injunction requiring the director to conform future conduct to federal requirements. The court allows the claim to proceed against the officer because the relief is framed as prospective compliance rather than damages.
In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed. The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape. On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations. It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
View caseEmma Erickson sues a state hospital superintendent in federal court seeking an injunction to alter patient-care practices alleged to violate both federal and state law. The court permits the federal-law portion of the claim to proceed under the doctrine but dismisses the state-law portion because the doctrine does not extend to claims seeking to compel compliance with state law.
In 1974 Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst State School and Hospital, filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case became a class action on behalf of all present and future residents of the institution. The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens and the United States joined as plaintiffs. Defendants included Pennhurst and its officials, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and its officials, and county officials from five surrounding counties. The amended complaint alleged that conditions at Pennhurst violated rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966. Both damages and injunctive relief were sought. After a lengthy trial the District Court found in 1977 that conditions were dangerous, with residents often physically abused or drugged by staff, and inadequate for habilitation. Some residents suffered deterioration in physical, intellectual, and emotional skills. The court ordered immediate steps to remove residents from Pennhurst, directed the provision of community living arrangements, and appointed a Special Master with broad supervisory powers. The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the judgment in 1979 but remanded for individual determinations regarding institutionalization. On further remand the District Court established procedures for individual habilitation plans and appointed a Hearing Master. This Court in 1981 reversed the Court of Appeals' reliance on federal statutory grounds and remanded for consideration of state-law, constitutional, and section 504 claims. On remand the Court of Appeals in 1982 reinstated its prior judgment solely on the state Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in In re Schmidt. It rejected Eleventh Amendment and abstention challenges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1982. The District Court had found that the individual defendants acted in good faith within the sphere of their official responsibilities despite staff shortages and limited resources.
View caseElijah Edwards sues federal narcotics agents in their individual capacities seeking damages for an alleged constitutional violation during a search. The court dismisses the action because the requested relief is retrospective monetary compensation rather than prospective equitable relief against a state officer. The distinction confirms that the doctrine does not authorize damages claims against state officers.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseThe doctrine permits only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief that compels future compliance with federal law. It does not authorize retrospective monetary awards payable from the state treasury for past violations.
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A court examines the gravamen of the complaint to identify whether the primary objective is to halt ongoing or future violations. Requests that seek to undo completed state actions or extract compensation for past harms are treated as retrospective and fall outside the doctrine.
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The court may exercise jurisdiction over the prospective components while dismissing the retrospective components. The presence of ancillary retrospective requests does not automatically bar the entire action if the dominant relief remains forward-looking.
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…§ 2710(d)(7) cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued. We further hold that the doctrine of Ex parte Young , 209 U. S. 123 (1908), may not be used to enforce § 2710(d)(3) against a state official. I Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988 in order to provide a statutory…