401 U.S. 37 (1971)
John Harris, Jr., was indicted in a California state court charged with violation of the California Penal Code §§ 11400 and 11401, known as the Criminal Syndicalism Act.1 He then filed a complaint in the Federal District Court asking that court to enjoin District Attorney Evelle J. Younger of Los Angeles County from prosecuting him.2 Harris alleged that the prosecution and the presence of the Act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3
Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch, members of the Progressive Labor Party, intervened as plaintiffs claiming that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them from peacefully advocating the program of their party to replace capitalism with socialism.4 Farrell Broslawsky, an instructor in history at Los Angeles Valley College, also intervened claiming that the prosecution made him uncertain whether he could teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his classwork.5 None of the intervenors had been indicted, arrested, or threatened with prosecution.6
A three-judge Federal District Court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 held that it had jurisdiction and power to restrain the District Attorney from prosecuting.7 The court held that the State's Criminal Syndicalism Act was void for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.8 It accordingly restrained the District Attorney from further prosecution of the pending action against Harris, as reported at 281 F. Supp. 507 (1968).9
Younger appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.10 At the time the federal suit was filed, Harris was actually being prosecuted by California for a violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Act.11 The intervenors claimed only that they felt inhibited by the Act and the pending prosecution of Harris, without alleging any threat of prosecution against themselves.12
Whether a federal district court may enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution when the prosecution is brought in good faith and without harassment?13
Federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions absent a showing that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury that is both great and immediate, such as bad faith or harassment by state officials.14 Equity principles require an adequate remedy at law.15 Comity demands respect for state functions within the federal system.16 The normal costs and anxiety of defending a single good-faith prosecution do not qualify as irreparable injury sufficient to justify federal intervention.17
No. The prosecution of Harris was already pending in state court when the federal suit was filed.18 There is no suggestion that this single prosecution was brought in bad faith or as part of repeated harassing actions.19 The only injury identified is that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.20 Under the settled doctrine the district court therefore lacked authority to issue the injunction.21
A federal district court may not enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution brought in good faith and without harassment.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice Harlan
Justice Stewart concurred to stress that the holding applies only to federal-court intervention by injunction or declaratory judgment in a criminal prosecution contemporaneously pending in state court.22 He noted that the Court did not decide the independent force of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 or whether an injunction is expressly authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 He observed that the decision leaves open the standards governing intervention in state civil proceedings.24
He also noted that the Court does not resolve problems raised by requests for relief from future state prosecutions.25 He agreed that intervention is proper only in exceptional and extremely limited circumstances, such as when the statute is patently and flagrantly unconstitutional on its face or when bad faith and harassment in enforcement are shown.26
Joined by Mr. Justice White And Mr. Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment of reversal.27 He stressed that appellee Harris had been indicted for violations of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act before he sued in federal court.28 Brennan noted that Harris had not alleged that the prosecution was brought in bad faith to harass him.29
He explained that Harris's constitutional contentions may be adequately adjudicated in the state criminal proceeding.30 Brennan concluded that federal intervention at Harris's instance was therefore improper.31 He pointed out that even though Harris had raised his constitutional claim in state courts through motions and petitions for writs of prohibition, that did not justify federal intervention at the interlocutory stage.32
Justice Douglas dissented.33 He argued that Dombrowski v. Pfister recognizes an exception for overbroad statutes that chill First Amendment rights.34 He maintained that federal intervention is warranted when the state statute is unconstitutional on its face.35
He contended that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 expressly authorizes suits in equity to redress deprivations of constitutional rights by state officers.36 He concluded that section 1983 therefore supplies the express authorization required by 28 U.S.C. § 2283.37 He viewed the Criminal Syndicalism Act as the prototype of the statute held unconstitutional in Brandenburg v. Ohio and concluded that the federal court properly exercised its equity powers.38
Whether intervenors who have not been indicted, arrested, or threatened with prosecution under a state statute have standing to seek federal injunctive relief against enforcement of that statute?39
Persons who have not been threatened with prosecution and who merely allege that they feel inhibited by the existence of a statute or by a prosecution against another lack standing to seek federal injunctive relief.40 A genuine controversy exists only when the intervenors allege and the court finds that they would be prosecuted for the conduct they plan to engage in.41
No. The rule requires a live controversy between each plaintiff and the state.42 Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky have not been indicted, arrested, or threatened with prosecution.43 They allege only that they feel inhibited by the Act and the prosecution of Harris.44 The district court expressly declined to find any danger of prosecution against them.45 This speculative and imaginary fear is insufficient to invoke federal equitable jurisdiction or to create a justiciable case or controversy.46
Intervenors who have not been indicted, arrested, or threatened with prosecution lack standing to seek federal injunctive relief against enforcement of the statute.47
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice White And Mr. Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan separately addressed the intervenors and concluded they lacked standing.48 He noted that none had asserted any ground for a reasonable expectation of prosecution.49 He observed that Dan and Hirsch had not claimed their advocacy would be of the same genre as Harris's.50
He pointed out that the district court had declined to find any danger of prosecution.51 He emphasized that a live controversy under Article III is required even when a statute is vague.52