415 U.S. 651 (1974)
In 1971 respondent John Jordan filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against petitioner Joel Edelman, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, and other state officials.1 The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and challenged the administration of the federal-state Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled program.2 It alleged that applications were not processed within federal time limits and that benefits were authorized only from the month of approval rather than including prior eligibility months.3
Federal regulations required eligibility determinations within 30 days for aged and blind applicants and 45 or 60 days for disabled applicants, with assistance checks required to be received within those periods.4 Illinois officials operated under state regulations in the Categorical Assistance Manual that set a 30-day standard for aged and blind applicants but authorized grants only from the month of approval.5 Jordan alleged that his own application for disability benefits was not acted on for almost four months.6 The District Court later found that Illinois averaged 90 days for AABD applications and 60 days for AFDC applications.7
In its March 15, 1972 judgment the District Court declared the inconsistent Illinois provisions invalid.8 It issued a permanent injunction requiring compliance with federal time limits.9 The court also ordered the state officials to release and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants who applied between July 1, 1968 and April 16, 1971 and were determined eligible, with specific provisions for mailing checks or certified letters to current and former recipients.10
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of violation and the injunction but modified the retroactive award to cover only benefits wrongfully withheld after the filing of the complaint.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1973.12
The plaintiff class consisted of Illinois residents who applied for AABD benefits and whose applications were not processed within the federal time standards.13 The complaint specifically requested a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to the entire class all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld.14
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the retroactive award of benefits to the filing date of the complaint?15
Federal courts may award retroactive benefits only from the date the complaint is filed.16 That filing provides notice to state officials of the claimed violation of federal law, allowing them to take steps to comply.17 Awards reaching back to the date of application would impose a penalty for conduct the officials could not have known was unlawful.18
No. The District Court ordered payment of AABD benefits back to the date of each application for all class members whose applications were not processed within federal time limits. The Court of Appeals correctly modified that order to limit the award to benefits wrongfully withheld after the complaint was filed in 1971.19 The filing of the complaint gave Illinois officials notice that the program was being challenged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal regulations requiring processing within 30 or 45-60 days.20 Prior to that filing the officials had no such notice under the state Categorical Assistance Manual.21
Limiting the award to the post-filing period is consistent with the holdings in Shapiro v. Thompson and Goldberg v. Kelly, both of which approved awards only after the complaint was filed.22
The Court of Appeals did not err in limiting the retroactive award to the filing date of the complaint.23
Whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from ordering state officials to pay retroactive benefits to the plaintiff class even though the payments would come from a state treasury fund allocated for AABD payments?24
The Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from ordering state officials to pay retroactive monetary relief that must be paid from the state treasury.25 Such an award is in practical effect indistinguishable from a judgment for damages against the State itself.26 The distinction between prospective injunctive relief permitted under Ex parte Young and retroactive relief that compensates for past violations is fundamental.27 The former does not implicate the Amendment while the latter does.28
Yes. The District Court ordered Illinois officials to release and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all eligible applicants who applied between July 1, 1968 and April 16, 1971, with payments to be made from state funds.29 Those payments would come from the general revenues of the State of Illinois rather than from the personal resources of the named officials.30 The award is measured by the monetary loss resulting from past delays in processing applications and is therefore in practical effect a money judgment against the State.31
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding that portion of the decree.32 The relief cannot be characterized as mere equitable restitution because it requires compensation for past breaches rather than shaping future conduct to federal standards.33
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from ordering state officials to pay retroactive benefits to the plaintiff class.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the award because the suit is against state officials rather than the State itself.35 The relief is an integral part of enforcing compliance with federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.36 He argued that the majority's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief is artificial.37
Every welfare decision has a financial impact on the state treasury and the nature of that impact is the same whether the decree is prospective or requires payments for periods wrongfully skipped.38 He would have affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment in full, noting that the Court had previously summarily affirmed several judgments ordering retroactive welfare payments over Eleventh Amendment objections.39
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment by its terms applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State.40 Therefore it has no application to a suit by Illinois citizens against Illinois officials.41 He maintained that the question is instead whether Illinois may assert the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity.42
The States surrendered that immunity in the plan of the Convention with respect to powers granted Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, the source of authority for the Social Security Act.43 Because of its surrender, no immunity exists that can be the subject of a congressional declaration or a voluntary waiver.44 He would have affirmed the judgment below in all respects.45
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that participation in the federal-state AABD program constitutes a voluntary waiver of whatever Eleventh Amendment immunity the State might otherwise possess.46 He emphasized that the Social Security Act creates a scheme of cooperative federalism in which States voluntarily assume federal requirements in exchange for matching funds.47 By agreeing to comply with the Act and HEW regulations Illinois consented to § 1983 suits seeking the full range of equitable remedies, including retroactive payments necessary to make recipients whole and to deter future violations.48
He argued that the funding-cutoff sanction is inadequate and that Congress intended the traditional equitable power of federal courts to order complete relief to be available.49