531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, served as Director of Nursing for OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital.1 In 1994 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy that required substantial leave from work.2 Upon returning in July 1995, her supervisor informed her that she would have to relinquish the director position, leading Garrett to apply for and accept a transfer to a lower-paying nurse manager role.3
Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services.4 At the outset of his employment, Ash notified the department of his chronic asthma and, on his doctor's recommendation, requested modifications to minimize exposure to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke.5 After later being diagnosed with sleep apnea, Ash sought reassignment to daytime shifts pursuant to medical advice.6 The department denied all requested accommodations.7 Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his performance evaluations declined below previous levels.8
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, each seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers.9 The state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ADA exceeds Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.10 In a single opinion, the district court granted the motions and dismissed both cases.11 The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed based on its prior decision in Kimel v. State Board of Regents holding that the ADA validly abrogates state immunity.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding whether individuals may sue states for money damages in federal court under the ADA.13
Whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover money damages by reason of the State's failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?14
The Eleventh Amendment bars private suits for money damages against nonconsenting states in federal court.15 Congress may abrogate this immunity only by unequivocally expressing its intent and acting pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.16
No. Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash each filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers.17 The district court granted summary judgment to the state defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds.18 The Eleventh Circuit reversed.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that such suits are barred.20
The rule requires both clear intent, which exists in 42 U.S.C. § 12202, and valid section 5 authority.21 That authority is absent here because the ADA is not appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the states.22
Employees of the State of Alabama may not recover money damages under Title I of the ADA because the Eleventh Amendment bars such suits against nonconsenting states.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Justice Kennedy concurred that an equal protection violation has not been shown with respect to the states.24 He explained that prejudice against persons with impairments may arise from insensitivity or insecurity rather than malice, yet states as governmental entities stand apart from the citizenry and act as neutral entities.25 The failure of a state to revise policies under a new understanding of proper policy does not always constitute the purposeful action required for an equal protection violation.26
The predicate for private money damages against an unconsenting state has not been established.27
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg
Justice Breyer dissented from the conclusion that the states enjoy immunity.28 He maintained that section 5 grants Congress broad power to enforce the equal protection guarantee by appropriate legislation.29 Congress reasonably could have concluded that the ADA remedy constitutes an appropriate way to enforce the basic equal protection requirement that state action be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.30
The court's approach improperly subjects congressional action to a judicially created evidentiary standard that does not apply to the legislative branch.31
Whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled?32
Section 5 legislation must be responsive to a pattern of unconstitutional state action.33 Under rational basis review established in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, states are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled so long as their actions are rational.34
No. The established facts involve only two individual claims by Garrett and Ash against Alabama employers.35 The legislative record of the ADA fails to show that Congress identified a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.36 Congress assembled only minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination despite the states employing more than 4.5 million people.37 The handful of examples cited, such as refusals to hire blind applicants or lower pay for deaf workers, fall far short of suggesting a pattern when measured against the large numbers involved.38
Most incidents in the record concern local governments or private actors rather than states themselves.39
Congress did not identify a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled sufficient to support section 5 abrogation.40
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg
Justice Breyer dissented on the evidentiary question.41 He argued that Congress compiled a vast legislative record documenting massive society-wide discrimination against persons with disabilities.42 The task force held hearings in every state attended by more than 30,000 people.43 There are roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments themselves in the legislative record.44
Congress could reasonably have concluded that these examples represented signs of a widespread problem of unconstitutional discrimination.45 A legislature is not a court and may draw general conclusions from anecdotal evidence without the extensive investigation the majority demands.46
Whether the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States are congruent and proportional to any pattern of unconstitutional discrimination?47
No. Even assuming a pattern existed, the ADA's requirements far exceed what is constitutionally required under rational basis review.50 The reasonable accommodation duty makes unlawful a range of responses that would be reasonable but fall short of imposing an undue burden.51 The Act also shifts the burden to the employer to prove undue hardship rather than requiring the complaining party to negate reasonable bases for the decision.52 The disparate impact prohibition applies without regard to whether the conduct has a rational basis.53
These provisions are not congruent and proportional to any targeted constitutional violation.54
The rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States are not congruent and proportional to any pattern of unconstitutional discrimination.55
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion and added that the question whether states must be held in violation of the Constitution on the assumption that they embody misconceived perceptions of some citizens is of a different order.56 There is no extensive litigation and discussion of constitutional violations in the decisions of state and federal courts that would confirm a pattern of unconstitutional state action.57 The new awareness of proper treatment for those with impairments does not establish that an absence of state statutory correctives was a constitutional violation.58
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg
Justice Breyer dissented on the congruence and proportionality question as well.59 He maintained that what is reasonable in the statutory sense may exceed what is necessary to avoid a constitutional violation, yet that is precisely the power section 5 grants to Congress.60 The court has repeatedly confirmed that Congress may prohibit a somewhat broader swath of conduct than the amendment itself forbids.61
The majority's analysis deprives its declarations of deference to Congress of practical significance.62