403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx.1
The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment.2 They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.3
Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense.4 Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities.5 His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause.6 Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct.7
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.9 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.10
Whether violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct?11
Yes. On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. They broke open the door and, after handcuffing Bivens in front of his wife and young children, thoroughly searched the apartment. The agents then took Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later, Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense.
Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment. These facts demonstrate that the agents' conduct constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment's command against unreasonable searches and seizures.14 The court reasoned that damages have historically been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.15 There are no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.16 Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment.17
Violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal agents gives rise to a cause of action for damages.18
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Justice Harlan concurred in the result but reached it by a different route from the majority.19 He agreed that the complaint should not have been dismissed.20 Harlan would hold that a federal cause of action for damages may be implied from the Fourth Amendment.21
He emphasized that federal courts have the power to award damages for violation of constitutionally protected interests.22 The status of an interest as constitutionally protected does not divest federal courts of the power to grant damages absent express congressional authorization.23 Harlan concluded that compensatory relief is necessary and appropriate to vindicate Fourth Amendment interests.24
Chief Justice Burger dissented from the creation of a new cause of action for damages against federal officers.25 He contended that the creation of such a cause of action is a legislative function, not a judicial one.26 Congress has not seen fit to create such a remedy.27
Burger maintained that the decision would open the federal courts to a new class of cases.28 It would subject federal officers to the risk of financial liability for actions taken in the course of their duties.29 He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.30
Whether the federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) supports a cause of action for damages for violation of constitutionally protected interests?31
The federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) on federal district courts to hear cases arising under the Constitution supports a cause of action for damages for violation of constitutionally protected interests.32 The statute grants jurisdiction where the complaint states a claim arising under the Constitution.33
Yes. The jurisdiction question is distinct from whether a cause of action exists.34 Yet the statute supports the damages claim because the complaint states a claim arising under the Fourth Amendment.35 The court explained that where legal rights have been invaded and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.36
The present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation.37 The Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power.38 Accordingly, the federal question jurisdiction supports the cause of action for damages.39
The federal question jurisdiction supports a cause of action for damages for violation of constitutionally protected interests.40
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Justice Black dissented, maintaining that Congress is the branch that should decide whether to create a damages remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment by federal officers.41 He viewed the Court's decision as an exercise of judicial legislation that usurps the legislative function.42 Black noted that Congress has created such a remedy against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but has never done so against federal officials.
He expressed concern about the growing number of frivolous lawsuits burdening the federal courts and the potential deterrent effect on honest law enforcement officers performing their duties. Black would leave any decision to create a new federal cause of action to Congress rather than have the judiciary engage in what he saw as legislative activity.
Whether the doctrine of official immunity shields these federal officers from liability for damages arising from Fourth Amendment violations?43
The doctrine of official immunity does not shield federal officers from liability for damages arising from Fourth Amendment violations.44 The qualified immunity recognized for police officers is available only to officials performing discretionary functions.45 These agents are not entitled to such immunity.46
No. The Court of Appeals had held that the agents were immune from suit by virtue of their official positions, but the Supreme Court disagreed.4748 The qualified immunity available to police officers is limited to officials performing discretionary functions.49 The federal agents here are not entitled to such immunity.50 The court noted that high officials require something less than absolute immunity from damages liability.51
The agents' conduct in executing the warrantless search and arrest fell outside the protection of qualified immunity.52
The doctrine of official immunity does not shield these federal officers from liability for damages arising from Fourth Amendment violations.53
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun dissented, joining the opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Black.54 He expressed concern that the judicial creation of a new cause of action would open the door for another avalanche of new federal cases whenever a suspect asserts a Fourth Amendment violation.55 Blackmun believed that other quite adequate remedies have always been available for the truly aggrieved person.56
He noted that the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791 and that neither Congress nor the Court had previously taken this step. Blackmun concluded that if a new remedy is needed, it is the Congress and not this Court that should act to avoid stultifying proper law enforcement efforts.