415 U.S. 452 (1974)
In October 1970 petitioner Steffel and other individuals distributed handbills protesting American involvement in Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center.1 Shopping center employees asked the group to stop and leave. Police officers were summoned and told the handbillers they would be arrested if they did not stop. The group left to avoid arrest.2
Two days later Steffel and a companion returned to the shopping center and again began handbilling. The manager called the police. Officers warned that failure to stop would result in arrests. Steffel left, but his companion stayed, continued handbilling, and was arrested and charged with criminal trespass under Georgia Code Annotated section 26-1503.3
Steffel alleged that he wished to return to distribute handbills but had not done so because of concern that he too would be arrested under the same statute. The parties stipulated that if Steffel returned and refused upon request to stop handbilling, a warrant would be sworn out and he might be arrested and charged with a violation of the Georgia statute.4
Steffel and others filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 United States Code section 1983, and its jurisdictional implementation, 28 United States Code section 1343.5 The complaint requested a declaratory judgment that the Georgia statute was being applied in violation of petitioner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and an injunction restraining the solicitor of the Civil and Criminal Court of DeKalb County, the chief of the DeKalb County Police, the owner of the shopping center, and the manager from enforcing the statute.6
The District Court denied all relief and dismissed the action.7 Steffel appealed only from the denial of declaratory relief.8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment refusing declaratory relief.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
Whether declaratory relief is available when a state prosecution has been threatened but is not pending against the federal plaintiff?11
When no state criminal prosecution is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal courts may grant declaratory relief on the constitutionality of a state statute if the plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement, because principles of equity, comity, and federalism have little force in the absence of a pending prosecution and the Declaratory Judgment Act provides a milder alternative to injunctive relief.12
Yes. The established facts establish that Steffel was warned twice by police that he would be arrested for handbilling at the shopping center if he did not stop, his companion was arrested and charged under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1503, and the parties stipulated that if Steffel returned and continued handbilling, a warrant would be sworn out and he might be arrested.13
These facts demonstrate a genuine threat of enforcement without any pending prosecution against Steffel himself.14 The Court of Appeals therefore erred in requiring a showing of bad faith harassment before declaratory relief could issue.15 Congress intended the declaratory judgment procedure to test the constitutionality of state criminal statutes in circumstances where injunctive relief would be unavailable.16
Declaratory relief is available to the petitioner.17
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Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Stewart concurred to emphasize that the decision does not authorize the invocation of federal declaratory judgment jurisdiction by a person who thinks a state criminal law is unconstitutional, even if he genuinely feels chilled in his freedom of action by the law's existence.18 He stressed that the petitioner must objectively show a genuine threat of imminent arrest, corroborated by the actual arrest of his companion, creating an actual concrete controversy between himself and the agents of the State.19 Such cases where a genuine threat can be demonstrated will be exceedingly rare.20
Whether an actual controversy exists under Article III and the Declaratory Judgment Act when the plaintiff has received repeated warnings of arrest for handbilling but faces no pending prosecution?21
An actual controversy exists under Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 when the plaintiff has been twice warned to stop handbilling and told he will be arrested if he continues. His companion has been arrested under the statute. This shows the threat is not imaginary or speculative. The controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant declaratory judgment.22
Yes. The established facts show that Steffel and others were distributing handbills on October 8, 1970, were warned by police, left to avoid arrest, returned two days later, were warned again, and his companion was arrested.23 Steffel alleged he desired to return but refrained due to fear of arrest, and the stipulation confirms the threat.24 This creates a substantial controversy between parties with adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy to warrant declaratory judgment, although the District Court on remand must determine whether subsequent events have rendered the controversy moot.25
An actual controversy exists in this case.26
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Justice White offered views on the impact of a later filed state prosecution on a pending federal action.27 He anticipated that a final declaratory judgment holding particular conduct immune on constitutional grounds should be accorded res judicata effect in any later prosecution of that conduct.28 He also indicated that the federal court could enjoin a later state prosecution for conduct declared immune.29
Ordinary considerations of judicial economy could warrant refusal to dismiss the federal case solely because a state prosecution has subsequently been filed.30
Whether principles of equity, comity, and federalism preclude federal declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of a state criminal statute in the absence of a pending state prosecution?31
Principles of equity, comity, and federalism do not preclude federal declaratory relief when no state prosecution is pending, because federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system and the plaintiff should not be placed between the Scylla of flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing constitutionally protected activity.32
No. In the established facts, no prosecution is pending against Steffel, only threatened, so the considerations that led to Younger v. Harris and Samuels v. Mackell do not apply with the same force.33 The Court of Appeals erred in treating requests for injunctive and declaratory relief as a single issue and in requiring irreparable injury for declaratory relief.34 The Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted to provide an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction and to be utilized to test the constitutionality of state criminal statutes where injunctive relief would be unavailable.35
Principles of equity, comity, and federalism do not preclude the requested declaratory relief.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist concurred but emphasized that the decision deals only with declaratory relief and threatened prosecutions.37 He noted that the case provides no authority for injunctive relief or relief when prosecutions are pending.38 He stressed that a federal plaintiff cannot avoid the principles of Samuels by filing a complaint and continuing to violate the statute, as an arrest prior to resolution would constitute a pending prosecution barring declaratory relief.39
He also indicated that a declaratory judgment should not automatically lead to an injunction, as that would obscure the distinctions between the remedies and undermine federalism principles.40 State authorities may choose to be guided by the judgment but are not compelled to follow it by threat of contempt.41