436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)
In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.1 They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities.2 The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.3 The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave.4
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed.5 The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.6 It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape.7
On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants.8 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations.9 It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.11
Whether local governing bodies and municipal corporations are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983?12
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 shows that Congress intended municipalities and other local bodies to be included within the term “person” under § 1983.13
Yes. Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all sued in their official capacities.14 The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The District Court found the policy unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment but held the municipal defendants were not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 based on Monroe v. Pape.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed that holding.16 Upon thorough review of the legislative history, including references to the failure of local governments to protect citizens and the Dictionary Act of 1871 defining “person” to include bodies politic and corporate, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to subject local governing bodies to suit under § 1983 for deprivations caused by official policy or custom.17
Local governing bodies and municipal corporations are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus are subject to suit for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.18
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Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court.19 He wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s decision today does not subject municipalities to liability for every constitutional violation committed by their employees.20 As the Court makes clear, a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only where its own policy or custom is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.21
He also agreed with the Court that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities.2223 The 42d Congress was well aware of the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, yet there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to incorporate that doctrine into § 1983.24
Justice Stevens concurred in part.25 He joined only Parts I, III, and V of the opinion because Parts II and IV are merely advisory and are not necessary to explain the Court's decision.26 In his view, the discussion in Parts II and IV concerning the contours of municipal liability and the rejection of respondeat superior went beyond the narrow question presented and the facts necessary to resolve the dispute.
He therefore declined to join those portions while agreeing with the core holding that local governments are persons suable under § 1983 when official policy causes the constitutional injury.
Whether this Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871?27
Stare decisis does not bar overruling Monroe v. Pape because the legislative history demonstrates that the 42d Congress intended municipalities to be included among the “persons” to whom § 1983 applies.28
Yes. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The legislative history reveals that the rejection of the Sherman amendment reflected constitutional objections to imposing an obligation on municipalities to keep the peace rather than an intent to immunize them from liability for their own constitutional violations.29
Congress was aware that municipal corporations had been held liable in prior cases and intended § 1983 to provide a broad remedy against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.30
Monroe v. Pape is overruled insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983.31
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Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist dissented.32 In Monroe v. Pape, this Court held that Congress did not intend that municipalities be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.33 The Court reached this conclusion after a careful review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Today the Court overrules Monroe and holds that municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.34 He could not agree with the Court’s decision to overrule Monroe.35 The legislative history of the 1871 Act shows that Congress did not intend to include municipalities within the term “person.”36 The House of Representatives rejected an amendment that would have explicitly made municipalities liable under the Act.37 This rejection demonstrates that Congress did not intend to subject municipalities to liability under § 1983.38 The Court’s decision today will have far-reaching consequences.39 Municipalities will now be subject to suit under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by their employees.40 This will impose a heavy financial burden on local governments and will interfere with their ability to govern effectively.41 He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.42
Whether a local government may be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents?43
A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.44 Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.45
No. The language of § 1983 imposes liability on any “person” who “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” another person to a deprivation of constitutional rights.46 This language cannot be read to impose liability vicariously on a municipality for the acts of its employees.47 The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities.
In this case petitioners alleged that the city of New York and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.48 Because the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation, the city can be held liable under § 1983.49 Liability does not extend to injuries inflicted solely by employees or agents without official policy or custom.50
A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Liability attaches only when execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury.51
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Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court. He wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s decision today does not subject municipalities to liability for every constitutional violation committed by their employees. As the Court makes clear, a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only where its own policy or custom is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
He also agreed with the Court that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities. The 42d Congress was well aware of the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, yet there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to incorporate that doctrine into § 1983.
Whether the city of New York and the municipal agencies sued here are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983?52
Local governing bodies, including cities and school boards, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the action alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.53
Yes. The city of New York and the municipal agencies sued here are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 because they are local governing bodies whose official policy caused the constitutional deprivation.54 Petitioners alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.55 The District Court found the policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment.56
Because the action implements or executes a policy officially adopted by the city’s officers, the city and its agencies are subject to suit under § 1983 for the resulting injury.57
The city of New York and the municipal agencies sued here are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.58