Concept
Enforcement Powers
Other powers
Enforcement Powers
Each of the three Reconstruction Amendments ends by handing Congress the job of enforcing it. The Thirteenth Amendment, adopted in 1865, prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime, and Section 2 provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”1 The Fourteenth, adopted in 1868, makes citizens of all persons born or naturalized in the United States and bars the states from abridging citizens’ privileges or immunities, depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process, or denying equal protection; Section 5 gives Congress power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”2 The Fifteenth forbids denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and its Section 2 repeats the enforcement grant.3
Each clause is a grant of legislative power in its own right, which matters because Article I, Section 1 vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted.”4 A statute defended under one of these clauses must therefore be tied to the guarantee it enforces. The Court measures that tie by the broad standard it uses for the commerce and spending powers: so long as Congress could reasonably conclude that the legislation furthers the constitutional guarantee, Congress may legislate.5 The standard comes from McCulloch v. Maryland, which reads the Necessary and Proper Clause as a grant of power and not a limitation, and which lets Congress use any means the Constitution does not prohibit to carry out its authority.6
Deference on means leaves two questions open, and the enforcement clauses raise both. Whom may Congress regulate: only government action, or private conduct as well? And how far may Congress go in enforcing guarantees whose content the courts define? The Court first answered the first question narrowly. In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, it held that Congress, acting under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 5 of the Fourteenth, could regulate only state and local government action, not private conduct, and it refused to sustain the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which broadly prohibited racial discrimination by hotels, restaurants, transportation, and other public accommodations.7 The Court recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to private conduct, yet it limited Congress’s power under that Amendment to ending slavery and would not let Congress use it to eliminate discrimination.8 The subsections below follow the answers from there: first the standard for Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then its remedial limit, and last the Thirteenth Amendment’s reach over private conduct.
Fourteenth Amendment Standard
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court read Section 5 as granting Congress “the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”9 That reading brings McCulloch’s method with it. A government with a right to do an act must be allowed to select the means, and anyone who insists that one means is excepted carries the burden of establishing the exception.10 Under Section 5, the guarantees of Section 1 play the part of the granted powers: they fix the ends, and Congress chooses the means. The drafting history fits this reading. Earlier drafts of the Amendment used the words “necessary and proper,” and the later substitution of “appropriate legislation” was never thought to diminish the power.11
The test is McCulloch’s formula: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”12 The Court described Section 5 as “a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”13 “Positive” means affirmative: Congress holds a power of its own and does not merely supplement what courts decide. Applied to Section 5, the formula yields three questions. Is the measure a means of enforcing a guarantee? Is it plainly adapted to that end? And is it free of any constitutional prohibition and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution?14
Morgan arose under Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided that no person who had completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school, where the predominant classroom language was not English, could be denied the vote because of an inability to read or write English. To that extent the statute barred enforcement of a New York law that required the ability to read and write English as a condition of voting.15 The question was whether Congress could bar enforcement of the state law under Section 5 regardless of whether the Court would itself find that the Equal Protection Clause nullified New York’s requirement.16
The question assumes a competing reading of Section 5: that it reaches only state laws a court would itself condemn. That reading leaves Congress nothing to do that courts do not already do, because courts void state laws that violate Section 1, and a Section 5 limited to the same laws would add nothing to judicial review. The Court rejected it and refused to reduce Congress to “the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.”17 The question carried weight because the Court had earlier declined to strike down literacy tests on their face; in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, a unanimous Court rejected a black citizen’s attack on North Carolina’s test.18 Nor does a state’s authority over voter qualifications shield them from the Amendment. The Constitution, once adopted by the people, “was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties.”19
On the merits, the Court applied McCulloch’s formula. Section 4(e) could be regarded as a reasonable means of securing nondiscriminatory treatment by government for the Puerto Rican community in basic public services.20 The fit between means and end is easy to see: a community that can vote can press officials for equal treatment in those services, so the vote is a means plainly adapted to the end. Whether the added political power of that community justified the intrusion on the state’s authority to set voter qualifications was for Congress to weigh, not the Court.21 The Court was also willing to uphold the law because it “perceived a basis” on which Congress might reasonably judge the New York literacy requirement to be invidiously discriminatory.22
Morgan also fixes the direction in which Congress may move. Its own footnote says that Section 5 gives Congress no power to “restrict, abrogate, or dilute” the guarantees, and that an enactment authorizing the states to run racially segregated school systems would not be a measure “to enforce” the Equal Protection Clause, because that clause of its own force prohibits such laws.23 The dissent had feared that a power to interpret the Amendment could be turned toward diluting rights, and the footnote was the majority’s reply.24 The limit lives in the verb. To enforce a guarantee is to secure something already there, and a statute that lowers the guarantee secures nothing. The Constitution’s supremacy over federal statutes points the same way, because mere statutory law cannot alter the scope of constitutional liberty.25 The literacy statute and the hypothetical segregation statute rest on the same section and differ only in direction: the first adds protection against a state practice, and the second would withdraw protection the Amendment already gives.
The McCulloch measure governs the Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause as well, and those decisions show how much room it leaves Congress. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, stated that “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”26 In City of Rome v. United States, the Court recognized that Congress may prohibit practices that do not themselves violate Section 1, so long as the prohibitions are “appropriate” as McCulloch defines the term.27 Congress could rationally conclude that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact. The means need not copy the right, so long as they are rationally related to securing it.
The Remedial Limit
Morgan stressed how broadly Congress may choose its means under Section 5; City of Boerne v. Flores stressed what those means must serve. The Court there adopted a very different view of Section 5’s scope from the one a majority took in Katzenbach.29 In the Court’s view, the standards of McCulloch do not vest Congress with unreviewable authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 gives Congress a discretion, albeit quite broad, to select the “means” of enforcing the underlying guarantees, but the definition of those guarantees remains largely a judicial prerogative. Congress may enact measures designed to remedy or prevent violations of rights that judicial review ultimately defines; it may not define the scope of the rights themselves.30
The statute that tested the limit was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a direct response to Employment Division v. Smith. Under earlier precedents, government actions burdening religion were upheld only if necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. Smith changed that rule by holding that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be used to challenge neutral laws of general applicability, so Oregon’s ban on peyote, a neutral law of general applicability, survived a challenge by Native Americans whose rituals required the drug.31 Congress overwhelmingly adopted RFRA in response, and President Clinton signed it. The Act said expressly that it aimed to overturn Smith and restore the earlier test, so that courts uphold government action burdening religion, even through a neutral law of general applicability, only if the action is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.32 Its stated purposes were to restore the compelling-interest test of Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to give persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened a claim or defense.33
Boerne invalidated RFRA as applied to the states, and that holding has stood only as to state laws.34 The limit just described explains the result. Smith had fixed what the Free Exercise Clause requires: a neutral law of general applicability may be enforced against religious objectors. RFRA demanded the opposite for every such law that substantially burdens religion, whatever the lawmakers’ motive. A statute that prescribes a different substantive standard from the one the Court has set for the right does not enforce the right; it replaces the Court’s definition with Congress’s own.35
The limit does not require the targeted conduct itself to be unconstitutional. The Court has upheld the suspension of literacy tests and similar voting requirements as a measure against racial discrimination in voting, even though the tests were facially constitutional, and it has upheld other voting-rights measures despite the burdens they placed on the States.36 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Congress answered a recognized injury with a remedy aimed at the practices through which the injury occurred, and the facial validity of the tests did not stand in the way. Because enforcement can reach that far, the Court needs a way to separate remedy from redefinition.
Its answer is that a congressional remedy must be “congruent and proportional” to the state violations Congress has identified. The phrase comes from the law of equity, where it limits the scope of injunctions: the remedy must relate to the violations (congruence) and must not be too over- or underinclusive in relation to them (proportionality).37 Where the remedy encompasses all elements of the judicially recognized right, the enforcement is parallel and the test is rational basis: could Congress rationally conclude that the mechanism, such as a private action for money damages, is an appropriate means of redressing or preventing violation of the right?38 Whether congruence and proportionality demands more than McCulloch’s rationality is unsettled. One commentator argues that the test lacks support in the Amendment’s text or history and that McCulloch’s rational-relationship test should govern.39
The state-action boundary is older than Boerne. The Civil Rights Cases held that Congress could not use Section 5 to regulate private conduct.40 In United States v. Morrison, the Court applied the same idea to a federal remedy for gender-motivated crimes. Section 13981, it observed, was not aimed at official discrimination that the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it was directed not at any State or state actor but at individuals who had committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias, and it visited no consequence on any state official. That made it unlike any Section 5 remedy the Court had previously upheld.41 A dissent answered on the facts. The majority had stressed that Congress found inadequate state remedies did not exist in all or even most States, but Congress had before it task force reports from at least 21 States documenting constitutional violations, along with its own findings about gender-based stereotypes hampering many state legal systems.42 The exchange shows that the congruence test leaves room for disagreement about how to measure the injury.
Boerne leaves a good deal standing. Congress responded to it with that Act, which restored the compelling-interest test against state and local governments for land-use regulations and prison regulations, whenever the burden on religion affects interstate commerce or arises in a program that receives federal funding.43 The Court has also stayed wary when Congress uses Section 5 to benefit non-suspect classes or to protect non-fundamental rights.44 RFRA itself survives against the federal government, because Congress’s power to override other federal laws rests on whatever Article I power supports those laws, together with the power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying out other powers, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which governs only states and their subdivisions, is not the source.45 That result fits the rule of Article I, Section 1: every federal statute needs a granted-power footing, and for RFRA as applied to federal law the footing is the one that already supports the underlying federal statute.46 Two later decisions, O Centro and Hobby Lobby, applied RFRA to bar federal action without questioning its validity.47
The same insistence that a remedy fit a real and current injury appears in the Fifteenth Amendment cases. If Congress wants to use its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers to prevent future violations and not to punish past ones, it must adjust its measures to current voting conditions rather than rely on historical ones.48 In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court held that the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act conflicted with federalism, state sovereignty, and equal sovereignty among the states. The formula was justified in 1964, but the conditions that justified it no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions, and it rested on old data and practices that no longer exist. The Court struck down only Section 4(b); it left the permanent nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting in Section 2 untouched and issued no holding on the Act’s Section 5.49 The case concerns the Fifteenth Amendment, but it shows the same premise at work: a remedy answers an injury, and an injury has a date.
Thirteenth Amendment Power
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress power to enforce the Amendment “by appropriate legislation.”51 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court read that grant as clothing “Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”52 The idea builds on the Civil Rights Cases, which accepted that Congress may legislate directly against the badges and incidents of slavery and not simply against the institution itself.53 The Court has described the “inseparable incidents” of slavery as compulsory service for the master’s benefit, restraint of movement except by the master’s will, and disabilities to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, and to be a witness against a white person.54 This grant differs from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in whom it lets Congress regulate, and the difference traces to what each Amendment itself forbids.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits people from being or owning slaves, so it applies to private conduct, as the Court recognized even in the Civil Rights Cases.55 A power to enforce a prohibition can run as far as the prohibition runs. The Court therefore accepted that the power may be exercised through “legislation of a direct and primary character, for the eradication, not simply of the institution, but of its badges and incidents.”56 Jones drew the consequence: if Congress may eradicate conditions that keep Black citizens from buying and renting property because of race, no federal statute calculated to achieve that objective exceeds Congress’s power merely because it reaches beyond state action to regulate private individuals.57
Jones concerned a federal statute that, in its plain language, prohibited all racial discrimination, public and private, in the sale or rental of property.58 That reading left one constitutional question: whether the authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation” includes the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property. The Court’s answer was “plainly yes,” and it reversed.59
The standard of review is deferential. Congress has the power “rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery” and the authority “to translate that determination into effective legislation,” and the Court could not say that Congress’s determination was irrational.60 The scope of the power is thus measured by the rationality of Congress’s determination that the regulated activity is a badge or incident of slavery, a standard designed to recognize the broad latitude that Section 2 vests in Congress.61 The stakes were the Amendment’s promise. If Congress could not assure that a dollar in a Black buyer’s hands purchases what a dollar in a white buyer’s hands does, the freedom the Amendment promised would be “a mere paper guarantee.”62 The freedom Congress may secure includes the freedom to buy whatever a white person can buy and to live wherever a white person can live.63
The reasoning has McCulloch’s shape. In the debates over the bill, one legislator asked who decides what appropriate legislation is and answered that Congress does, so long as the legislation is a means to accomplish the end.64 Another argued that the end is legitimate because the Constitution itself defines it as the maintenance of freedom, and that a person who enjoys the civil rights in the bill cannot be reduced to slavery, which settles the measure’s appropriateness and so its constitutionality.65 A court reviewing a Thirteenth Amendment statute therefore defers to Congress’s determination and does not substitute its own view of what slavery’s incidents were.66
Both enforcement clauses draw on the McCulloch template, yet they differ in what the underlying Amendment forbids, and that difference decides whom Congress may regulate. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the states: no state may abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens, deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process, or deny equal protection.67 The Civil Rights Cases reasoned from that text that the wrong the Amendment targets is one “for which the States alone were or could be responsible,” so the remedy “must necessarily be predicated upon that wrong.”68 Morrison applied the same reasoning to a modern federal remedy that was directed “not at any State or state actor, but at individuals,” and that was therefore unlike any Section 5 remedy previously upheld.69 An exam hypothetical in which a private owner refuses to sell a home because of the buyer’s race asks the question Jones answered, and the Amendment you name decides the outcome. Under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress may reach the owner directly, because it can rationally find the refusal to be a badge of slavery. Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment alone, the owner is no state actor, and the statute finds no footing.
The reasoning of Jones has carried into other private settings. In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court upheld under Section 2 a ban on discrimination against Black children in the ability to contract on the same basis as white citizens, applying it to private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools. It rejected the claim that the ban violated freedom of association: parents remained free to send their children to schools that teach racial segregation, but the Constitution did not protect a school’s practice of excluding racial minorities.70 In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Court held that Congress acted wholly within its Section 2 powers in creating a statutory cause of action for Black citizens who were victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights the law secures to all free persons.71 Each decision follows the same chain: private conduct restrains a basic right of free members of society, so Congress may rationally call it a badge of slavery.
The label “badge or incident of slavery” does not stretch to every grievance. In 1883 the Court accepted that Congress may act directly against badges and incidents, yet it limited the Thirteenth Amendment power to ensuring an end to slavery and would not use it to eliminate discrimination in public accommodations.72 Jones later placed the judgment about what counts as a badge with Congress, subject to rational review.73 Review still has bite. In Memphis v. Greene, the Court rejected a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to an official closing that fell more heavily on Black citizens. There was no showing of racially discriminatory motivation, and the closing’s disparate impact could not be fairly characterized as a badge or incident of slavery; a contrary holding would “trivialize the great purpose of that great charter of freedom.”74 The Court has also yet to hold that the enforcement power may be exercised beyond the context of racial discrimination, although it has read statutes enforcing the Amendment to cover groups other than African Americans.75