392 U.S. 409 (1968)
In September 1965 Joseph Lee Jones and his wife, who are Negroes, sought to purchase a home in the Paddock Woods subdivision of St. Louis County, Missouri, from the Alfred H. Mayer Company and one of its officers.1 The company refused to sell them a house solely because the Joneses are Negroes.2
Subsequently, on September 2, 1965, the Joneses filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.3 The complaint alleged the refusal to sell and sought injunctive relief together with damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1982.4 The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the questions presented.6 While the case was pending, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1968 containing a Fair Housing Title, but that statute did not cover the respondents' development until January 1, 1969, and had no effect on the pending litigation.7 The provision invoked by the petitioners originated as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was re-enacted in 1870.8
Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits racial discrimination by private sellers of residential property?9
Section 1982 reaches beyond state action and prohibits private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property.10 The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.11 It states that all citizens shall have the same right to purchase property as is enjoyed by white citizens.12 The right to purchase is a right to purchase from any willing seller, and the statute therefore prohibits any private seller from refusing to sell for racial reasons.13 The legislative history of § 1982 supports this construction.14
Yes.
In September 1965 Joseph Lee Jones and his wife, who are Negroes, sought to purchase a home in the Paddock Woods subdivision of St. Louis County, Missouri, from the Alfred H. Mayer Company and one of its officers. The company refused to sell them a house solely because the Joneses are Negroes. The facts establish that the refusal was solely because the petitioners are Negroes, which the statute prohibits as private racial discrimination in the sale of property.15 The District Court and the Court of Appeals held that it is not applicable to private conduct.16 We disagree because the statute guarantees the same right to purchase from any willing seller regardless of race.17
Section 1982 prohibits the private racial discrimination alleged in this case.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White
Justice Harlan dissented from the holding that § 1982 reaches purely private refusals to sell residential property.19 He argued that the statutory language referring to rights enjoyed by white citizens suggests an intent to secure equality only as against the state rather than to regulate private conduct.20 The legislative history of the 1866 Act is at best ambiguous on whether Congress intended to reach private discrimination.21
Harlan further contended that construing the statute to regulate private conduct would raise serious constitutional questions under the Thirteenth Amendment because that Amendment does not grant Congress power to regulate purely private conduct in this manner.22 He would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.23
Whether Congress possessed authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as a prohibition on private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property?24
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery and to translate that determination into effective legislation.25 The Thirteenth Amendment is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist.26 The Amendment empowers Congress to eradicate all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.27
Yes.
The provision invoked by the petitioners originated as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was re-enacted in 1870. The Amendment abolished slavery and empowered Congress to eradicate its badges and incidents.28 Racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing is one of those badges.29 The history of the 1866 Act confirms that Congress meant to reach private as well as public discrimination.30 The facts of the refusal by the Alfred H. Mayer Company to sell to the Joneses solely because they are Negroes fall within the badges and incidents of slavery that Congress may address.31
Congress had authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact § 1982 to prohibit private racial discrimination in property transactions.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment because he viewed § 1982 as a valid exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment.33 The Amendment abolished slavery and empowered Congress to eradicate its badges and incidents. Racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing constitutes one of those badges.34
Douglas emphasized that the history of the 1866 Act confirms Congress intended to reach private as well as public discrimination.35 He catalogued numerous ongoing badges of slavery including segregated housing, exclusion from unions, and denial of equal facilities to illustrate that the forces of discrimination remain strong and that the 1866 statute was designed to remove some of those customs.36
Whether the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 impaired the operation or remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1982?37
No.
While the case was pending Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1968 containing a Fair Housing Title.41 That statute did not cover the respondents' development until January 1, 1969 and had no effect on the pending litigation.42 The 1968 Act does not mention 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and we cannot assume that Congress intended to effect any change in the prior statute.43 The existence of the 1968 Act does not diminish the force of § 1982 in this case.44
The Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not impair the operation or remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1982.45