663 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 2008)
Tavaris Smith was indicted for the malice murder of his wife on August 26, 2003.1 The crime occurred on June 5, 2003.2 A jury found Smith guilty of malice murder on August 15, 2005.3
The evidence showed that Smith and his wife had marital difficulties.4 Smith had threatened to kill her.5 Smith had put a gun to her head on a previous occasion.6 Ms. Smith was thinking of divorcing Smith.7
Before trial, Smith indicated his intent to present evidence, including expert testimony.8 He had a physiological sleep disorder that caused him, while asleep or in a state of confusional arousal due to the disorder, to shoot his wife without any intent to do so and without any awareness that he was doing so.9 Smith did not file notice of an intent to assert an insanity defense under OCGA § 17-7-130.1.10 The trial court concluded that Smith was asserting a claim of not guilty by reason of insanity.11 The court appointed an expert under OCGA § 17-7-130.1 to examine him over Smith's objection.12
At trial, when the court-appointed expert witness was called to testify, the court instructed the jury that it had classified Smith's defense as an insanity defense.13 At the end of the trial, the court charged the jury on the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.14 The court specifically charged the jury that Smith had the burden to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.15 Smith again objected to the imposition of the insanity defense.16
Smith's own expert testified that he did not meet the legal definition of insanity.17 He may have committed the crime in question during a period of unconsciousness due to sleep disorders from which he was suffering.18 The court-appointed expert also testified that Smith did not suffer from any psychiatric problems.19 He may have possibly suffered from narcolepsy and confusional arousal.20
After the guilty verdict, Smith moved for a new trial on August 29, 2005.21 The trial court denied the motion for new trial on July 16, 2007.22 Smith filed a notice of appeal on August 15, 2007.23 The appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court of Georgia on October 16, 2007.24 The Supreme Court of Georgia heard oral argument on February 11, 2008.25
Whether the trial court erred when it required Tavaris Smith to present his claim that he shot his wife while sleepwalking pursuant to the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity instead of pursuant to the defense that he was unaware of his actions and lacked the intent to kill her?26
A defense of unconsciousness or automatism arising from a sleep disorder is distinct from the insanity defense.27 It negates the requirement of a voluntary act rather than asserting a lack of mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong.28 Under Georgia law a crime requires the joint operation of an act and intention or criminal negligence.29 Courts and commentators recognize that sleepwalking and similar disorders do not involve the permanent mental incapacity associated with insanity.30 Therefore they should not trigger the procedural burdens or jury instructions that accompany an insanity plea.31
Yes. The trial court erred when it required Tavaris Smith to present his claim that he shot his wife while sleepwalking pursuant to the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court should have permitted the defense that he was unaware of his actions and lacked the intent to kill her.32 Smith filed no notice of an insanity defense under OCGA § 17-7-130.1.33 The trial court nevertheless concluded that the claim constituted an insanity defense, appointed an expert pursuant to the statute, and overruled Smith's objections.34
The facts of the case establish that Tavaris Smith was indicted for malice murder on August 26, 2003, after the shooting death of his wife on June 5, 2003.35 Evidence showed marital difficulties, prior threats by Smith, and the victim's consideration of divorce.36 Before trial Smith notified the court of his intent to offer expert testimony that a physiological sleep disorder caused him to shoot his wife while asleep or in confusional arousal, without intent or awareness.37 During trial the court instructed the jury that it had classified the defense as insanity and, at the close of evidence, charged the jury on not guilty by reason of insanity while placing the burden of proof on Smith by a preponderance of the evidence.38
The rule requires that unconsciousness be treated as a separate defense negating voluntariness.39 Applied to the facts, Smith's proffered evidence and expert testimony addressed a physiological disorder producing action without awareness or intent, not a mental disease affecting moral cognition.40 The court-appointed expert confirmed the absence of psychiatric problems while noting possible narcolepsy and confusional arousal, and Smith's own expert expressly stated that Smith did not meet the legal definition of insanity.41 By imposing the insanity framework the court required Smith to shoulder a burden of proof and permitted jury instructions that undermined his actual theory of involuntariness.42
The misclassification was prejudicial because the expert testimony supported the unconsciousness defense yet was presented through an insanity lens that the evidence itself contradicted.43
The trial court erred in classifying and instructing on Smith's defense as insanity, requiring reversal of the conviction.44
Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that it may infer that the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are the product of that person's will?45
Yes. The trial court did not err in giving the challenged instruction.49 The rule permits an inference of intent from voluntary acts by a person of sound mind without shifting any burden of proof.50 The instruction merely informed the jury of a logical inference it could, but was not required to, draw from the evidence of Smith's actions.51 Because the charge is permissive and does not alter the allocation of burdens, it comports with established precedent approving identical language.52
The trial court did not err in charging the jury on the permissive inference of intent.53