446 U.S. 156 (1980)
In August 1965 the Attorney General designated Georgia a covered jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the state had maintained a literacy test as of November 1, 1964, thereby subjecting all its political units including the city of Rome to the section 5 preclearance requirement.1 In 1970 Rome had a total population of 30,759 that was 76.6 percent white and 23.4 percent Negro, with a voting-age population that was 79.4 percent white and 20.6 percent Negro.2 Its governmental structure was fixed by a 1918 city charter providing for a nine-member City Commission and a five-member Board of Education to be elected at large by plurality vote with one commissioner chosen from each of nine wards and no residency requirement for Board candidates.3
In 1966 the Georgia General Assembly enacted several local laws that reduced the number of wards from nine to three, created numbered posts within each ward, required majority vote with runoff elections, staggered the terms of office, expanded the Board of Education to six members, and imposed a residency requirement for Board candidates. The city never sought preclearance for these changes or for the sixty annexations completed between November 1, 1964, and February 10, 1975.
In June 1974 the city submitted one annexation for review. After the Attorney General discovered the additional changes, the city submitted all sixty annexations and the 1966 electoral amendments.4 The Attorney General interposed objections to the majority-vote, numbered-post, and staggered-term provisions as well as to thirteen of the annexations on the ground that these changes would dilute Negro voting strength in light of the city's majority-white population and history of racial bloc voting.5
In May 1976 the city moved for reconsideration of the objections and supplemented its submission with additional affidavits in July 1976, but the Attorney General denied reconsideration on August 12, 1976.67 The city and two of its officials then filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States and the Attorney General seeking relief from the preclearance requirement and a declaration that the 1975 amendments were unconstitutional.8 A three-judge district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in 1979. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, heard argument in October 1979, and affirmed the district court's judgment in April 1980.9
Whether the city of Rome may independently use the bailout procedure of section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act to exempt itself from preclearance coverage?10
Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act permits bailout only for a covered State or a political subdivision covered as a separate unit under the coverage formula of section 4(b).11
No. The coverage formula of section 4(b) was applied to the State of Georgia as a whole in 1965 because Georgia maintained a literacy test as of November 1, 1964.12 The city of Rome became subject to preclearance solely because it lies within that covered State.13 The statute's plain language therefore requires any bailout action to be brought by and on behalf of the entire State of Georgia rather than by an individual municipality such as Rome.14
The city of Rome may not independently use the section 4(a) bailout procedure.15
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Justice Powell dissented on statutory and constitutional grounds.16 He argued that the Court's interpretation created an irrational distinction between subdivisions in covered and non-covered states.17 The same territorial reading of "State" adopted in Sheffield for preclearance must apply to bailout.18
Denying bailout to compliant localities while imposing preclearance violated the Fifteenth Amendment's remedial limits.19 The District Court had found no voting discrimination for seventeen years.20 This rendered the Act unconstitutional as applied to Rome because preclearance without a bailout option exceeded Congress's enforcement power.21
Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's dissent.22 He emphasized that the District Court's findings showed Rome had not employed any discriminatory barriers to black voter registration in the past seventeen years.23 White elected officials had encouraged blacks to run for office and were responsive to the needs of the black community.
Blacks often held the balance of power in Rome elections.24 Continued federal oversight without a finding of constitutional violation exceeded Congress's enforcement power under the Civil War Amendments.25 The result effectively allowed Congress to amend the Constitution by legislative act.26
Whether the Attorney General's denial of reconsideration of objections to the city's electoral changes was timely under the Act and implementing regulations?27
The sixty-day period for the Attorney General to act on a request for reconsideration under 28 CFR section 51.3(d) commences anew when the submitting jurisdiction voluntarily supplements its submission with additional information.28
Yes. The city filed its motion for reconsideration on May 21, 1976.29 It then supplemented the record with additional affidavits on its own initiative in July 1976.30 The Attorney General denied reconsideration on August 12, 1976. This denial occurred within sixty days of the supplemental filing.31 The approach is consistent with the logic of Georgia v. United States, which upheld tolling when additional information is needed, and it serves the Act's purpose of allowing full consideration of relevant materials.32
The Attorney General's denial of reconsideration was timely.33
Whether section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may be applied to prohibit voting changes that have a discriminatory effect but were not adopted for a discriminatory purpose?34
Section 5 requires preclearance only when a voting change lacks both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect.35 Congress may prohibit changes with a discriminatory effect alone as an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment even if section 1 prohibits only purposeful discrimination.36
Yes. The District Court found that the 1966 electoral changes and the thirteen annexations were not adopted for a discriminatory purpose.37 Yet the Attorney General and the District Court correctly concluded that these changes would have a discriminatory effect.38 The changes would dilute Negro voting strength in light of Rome's majority-white population, at-large system, and history of racial bloc voting.39
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Oregon v. Mitchell establish that Congress may ban practices with a discriminatory effect because the ban prevents the perpetuation of past intentional discrimination.40
Section 5 may be applied to prohibit voting changes that have a discriminatory effect but were not adopted for a discriminatory purpose.41
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Justice Stevens concurred to stress the statewide nature of the remedy authorized by Congress in 1965.42 The remedy permits application of section 5 to every political unit within a covered State even if that unit has never engaged in purposeful discrimination.43 If Congress could validly impose a statewide remedy, the fact that Rome itself may have been innocent is irrelevant.44
The critical questions are whether Congress prescribed a statewide remedy and whether that remedy exceeds enforcement powers, and both questions are answered in favor of the Act's constitutionality.45
Whether the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act exceed Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment?46
No. The 1975 amendments extended the Act for seven years, expanded coverage to additional states, and retained the preclearance requirement.49 Congress had ample evidence of continuing discrimination in covered jurisdictions and rationally concluded that the preclearance mechanism remained necessary to prevent new discriminatory devices. This exercise of power falls well within the standard articulated in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. Morgan.50
The 1975 amendments do not exceed Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.51
Whether the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act violates principles of federalism by intruding on state and local authority over electoral systems?52
No. The preclearance requirement was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach against a federalism challenge.55 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer confirms that the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments authorize intrusions on state sovereignty that would otherwise be impermissible.56 The 1975 amendments therefore do not violate federalism principles.57
The preclearance requirement does not violate principles of federalism.58
Whether the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act remained a valid means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment given improvements in minority voter registration since 1965?59
Congress may extend the Voting Rights Act when it finds that, despite progress, the risk of retrogression through new discriminatory devices continues to exist in covered jurisdictions.60
Yes. Although Negro voter registration had improved dramatically by 1975, Congress found that progress remained modest and spotty with significant disparities persisting between white and Negro registration rates.61 Section 5 had been essential to preserving minority gains, and the House and Senate reports documented the continuing need for preclearance.62 The seven-year extension was a rational response to the risk that covered jurisdictions would adopt new measures to dilute minority voting strength.63
The 1975 extension remained a valid means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.64
Whether the District Court clearly erred in finding that the city's 1966 electoral changes and thirteen annexations would have a discriminatory effect on Negro voters?65
No. The District Court found racial bloc voting in Rome and determined that the shift from plurality to majority vote with runoffs, numbered posts, and staggered terms would eliminate the opportunity for single-shot voting by Negro voters, forcing head-to-head contests in which white voters would prevail.68 The court also found that the thirteen annexations added far more white than Negro residents and voters, diluting the relative strength of the existing Negro electorate.69 These findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.70
The District Court did not clearly err in finding discriminatory effect.71
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joined the Court's opinion but noted an anomalous result from the holding on the annexations.72 The ruling placed annexed residents within the school board's jurisdiction but outside the city commission's jurisdiction.73 He accepted the District Court's ruling as close but emphasized that the city could still seek approval.74
The city could alter its residency requirement or ward structure to restore single-shot voting opportunities, following the remedial device approved in City of Richmond v. United States.75