384 U.S. 641 (1966)
In 1965 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Section 4(e) provided that no person who had successfully completed the sixth grade in a public school or accredited private school in Puerto Rico where the language of instruction was other than English could be denied the right to vote in any election because of inability to read or write English.1 At the same time New York maintained an English literacy requirement under Article II section 1 of its constitution and sections 150 and 168 of its Election Law.2 The requirement obliged persons who became entitled to vote after January 1, 1922 to demonstrate the ability to read and write English through tests administered by school authorities.3
A substantial number of New York City residents who had migrated from Puerto Rico had completed sixth grade in Spanish-language schools on the island and therefore could not satisfy New York's requirement even though they were otherwise qualified to vote.4 The Attorney General of the United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the State of New York and its election officials.5 The complaint sought a judgment declaring section 4(e) a proper exercise of congressional power and enjoining enforcement of the New York literacy test against persons educated in Puerto Rico.6 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico intervened as a plaintiff.7
Registered voters in New York City who opposed section 4(e) commenced a separate action under section 14(b) of the Act.8 That separate action sought a declaration that the provision was invalid and an injunction against its enforcement or compliance.9 New York admitted the factual allegations but denied that section 4(e) was constitutional.10 A three-judge district court held section 4(e) unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause and usurped powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.11 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on direct appeal from that judgment.12
Whether section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 exceeds the powers granted to Congress by the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?13
The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress broad power to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the provisions of the Amendment.14 That power is measured by the McCulloch v. Maryland standard requiring that the legislation be plainly adapted to a legitimate end and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.15
No. The facts establish that Congress passed section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to suspend New York's English literacy requirement for persons who completed sixth grade in Puerto Rican schools where instruction was in Spanish. The Attorney General sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia to have the provision declared valid and to enjoin the New York requirement as applied to those persons.16 New York admitted the facts of the Puerto Rican migration and the effect of its law but denied the constitutionality of the federal provision.17 The three-judge district court held the provision unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed.18
The legislation is plainly adapted to enforcing the Equal Protection Clause. It prohibits the state from denying the vote to large segments of the Puerto Rican community that needs the protections of the Amendment.19 Congress had before it evidence of discrimination against Puerto Ricans in acquiring an education. It could have concluded that denying the right to vote was not reasonably related to the state's interest in the integrity of its electoral process.20 The practical effect is to give the Puerto Rican minority enhanced political power to obtain nondiscriminatory treatment in public services.21 This application of the McCulloch standard confirms that section 4(e) is within the broad power granted to Congress under the Enforcement Clause.22
Section 4(e) does not exceed the powers granted to Congress by the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice Harlan dissented in part from the majority's reasoning while agreeing with the result as applied to persons educated in Puerto Rico.24 He maintained that the Enforcement Clause does not authorize Congress to prohibit state action that is not itself unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.25 In his view the proper inquiry is whether the state action prohibited by Congress is in fact prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause itself.26
He argued that Congress lacks authority to redefine the substantive scope of the Amendment and that allowing such power would permit Congress to qualify this Court's constitutional decisions.27 Harlan concluded that the majority's approach improperly expands congressional power beyond enforcement into substantive redefinition of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.28
Whether section 4(e) is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?29
Yes. Section 4(e) may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Congress explicitly declared it was to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.32 It is plainly adapted because it prohibits New York from denying the right to vote to the Puerto Rican community.
This enables them to obtain perfect equality of civil rights.33 It is consistent with the Constitution because the limitation to American-flag schools is a permissible reform measure that Congress could adopt one step at a time.34
Section 4(e) is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35
Whether the limitation in section 4(e) to persons educated in American-flag schools constitutes invidious discrimination under the Fifth Amendment?36
A limitation on relief in a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did. A legislature need not strike at all evils at the same time.37
No. The limitation in section 4(e) to persons educated in American-flag schools does not constitute invidious discrimination under the Fifth Amendment.3839 The distinction is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure.40 Congress could have based the choice on its greater familiarity with the quality of instruction in American-flag schools, the unique historic relationship with Puerto Rico, and policies encouraging migration from the Commonwealth.41
The limitation in section 4(e) to persons educated in American-flag schools does not constitute invidious discrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice Harlan would affirm the district court judgments because he concluded that the New York literacy requirement is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.42 He maintained that Congress lacks power under the Enforcement Clause to override an otherwise valid state law through a mere legislative pronouncement unsupported by a record showing actual constitutional violation.43 Harlan emphasized that the question whether a state practice violates equal protection is ultimately for the judiciary to determine and that Congress cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Court in this area.44
He argued that deference to unsupported congressional declarations would upset the separation of legislative and judicial functions and the boundaries between federal and state authority.45