521 U.S. 507 (1997)
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas.1 Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history.2 The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish.3 Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses.4
To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.5
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts.6 Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.7
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed.8 City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application.9
The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.10 The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality.11 The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses.14
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith.15 RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.16 Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.17 The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.18
Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeds Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the States?19
Yes. St. Peter Catholic Church's permit denial under Boerne's neutral historic preservation ordinance, enacted after the city council authorized the Historic Landmark Commission, illustrates that RFRA imposes the compelling interest test on every state law regardless of whether the law targets religion or was motivated by religious bigotry.23 The legislative record for RFRA contains no evidence of recent widespread state laws enacted because of religious animus, only incidental burdens from generally applicable rules such as zoning and historic preservation.24 RFRA therefore operates as a substantive redefinition of Free Exercise Clause protections rather than a targeted remedy for unconstitutional conduct, exceeding the enforcement power.25
The District Court correctly held that Congress exceeded its section 5 authority.26 The Fifth Circuit's reversal cannot stand because the statute sweeps too broadly by applying to all federal and state laws without termination dates or geographic limits tied to proven violations.
RFRA exceeds Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the States.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to make clear that RFRA is also unconstitutional as applied to the Federal Government.28 In his view, RFRA violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it provides a legal weapon to religious organizations that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.29 He illustrated this point by noting that if the historic landmark were a museum or art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from the city ordinances forbidding enlargement.30
Because the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, RFRA grants its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally applicable, neutral civil law.31 This governmental preference for religion over irreligion is forbidden by the First Amendment.32
Joined by Justice Breyer (in Part)
Justice O’Connor dissented from the Court's disposition of the case.33 She agreed that the issue is whether RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 However, she would have used the case to reexamine the correctness of Smith rather than striking down RFRA under that precedent.35
In her view, Smith was wrongly decided because the Free Exercise Clause is best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices without impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.36 She would have directed the parties to brief the question whether Smith represents the correct understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and set the case for reargument.37
Justice Souter joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent in part.38 He expressed serious doubts about the precedential value of Smith and its entitlement to adherence.39 These doubts were intensified by the historical arguments presented in Justice O’Connor's dissent concerning the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.40
He contended that the congruence and proportionality test announced by the Court unduly restricts Congress' section 5 power.41 Without full briefing and argument on the merits of the Smith rule, he was not prepared to join in rejecting it or in assuming it to be correct.42 He would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted to permit plenary reexamination of the issue.43
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Scalia concurred in part to respond to the claim in Justice O’Connor's dissent that historical materials support a result contrary to Smith.44 He argued that the material the dissent claims is at odds with Smith either has little to say about the issue or is in fact more consistent with Smith than with the dissent's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.45 The early free exercise enactments cited by the dissent protect only against action taken for or in respect of religion, on account of religion, or discriminatory action.46
He maintained that the historical evidence marshalled by the dissent cannot fairly be said to demonstrate the correctness of any theory other than Smith.47 The historical record supports the conclusion that it shall be the people, through their elected representatives, who control the outcome of concrete cases involving religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.48
Justice Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent except for the first paragraph of Part I.49 He agreed with Justice O’Connor that the Court should direct the parties to brief the question whether Smith was correctly decided and set the case for reargument.50 He did not find it necessary to consider the question whether, assuming Smith is correct, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would authorize Congress to enact the legislation before the Court.51
Thus, while he agreed with some of the views expressed in the first paragraph of Part I of Justice O’Connor's dissent, he did not necessarily agree with all of them.
Whether Congress may enact legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause?52
No. RFRA changes the constitutional standard from Smith by requiring every neutral, generally applicable law, including Boerne’s historic district ordinance that prevented enlargement of St. Peter Catholic Church, to satisfy the compelling interest and least restrictive means test.55 This redefinition of the right itself exceeds the enforcement authority granted by section 5, which is limited to remedial or preventive measures that do not decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment.56
Congress may not enact legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.57
Whether there must be congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted by Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?58
Yes. The sweeping coverage of RFRA, which applies to every agency and official at every level of government and to all laws whether adopted before or after its enactment, bears no congruence or proportionality to any documented pattern of unconstitutional religious discrimination. The permit denial at St. Peter Catholic Church under a facially neutral preservation ordinance is the type of incidental burden that the legislative record does not link to deliberate persecution.61 RFRA’s universal least-restrictive-means requirement is therefore disproportionate to the remedial end.62
There must be congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted by Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.63