Concept
Abrogating State Immunity
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power
Abrogating State Immunity
A State that has not consented to suit is shielded by the Eleventh Amendment from private actions for money damages, so a statute that gives a state employee a damages claim accomplishes little unless Congress can also override the shield.1 Overriding it is called abrogation, and whether abrogation works depends on the constitutional power behind the statute. Section 5, which authorizes Congress “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,” can support it; the powers listed in Article I cannot.2
This unit takes the immunity as given and asks what Section 5 adds to it. It proceeds in three steps: the decision that established the Section 5 power, the reason Article I lacks the same power, and the two showings a statute must make before a court will treat it as a valid abrogation. The limits taught earlier in this chapter carry over. A Section 5 statute must enforce the Amendment’s guarantees rather than redefine them, and a provision that reaches beyond the judicially defined right must be congruent and proportional.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
In the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress, acting under Section 5, authorized federal courts to award money damages against a state government found to have discriminated in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 The question in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer was whether the Eleventh Amendment’s shield defeated that authorization.4
The employees who sued under Title VII obtained prospective injunctive relief against the responsible state officials. The district court refused two further items, retroactive retirement benefits for losses the discrimination had caused and attorney’s fees, because both would be paid from the state treasury and so were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and by Edelman v. Jordan.5 The court of appeals found that Congress had intended to authorize a private backpay suit against the State. It nonetheless held that a private federal action for retroactive damages is not a constitutionally permissible method of enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights, although it reversed as to fees on the ground that they would have only an ancillary effect on the treasury.6
The injunction and the benefits fell on opposite sides of a familiar line. Ex parte Young lets a suit for an injunction proceed against a state official, because an official who acts unconstitutionally does not act as the State when the Supremacy Clause overrides the unconstitutional state law.7 Money from the treasury is another matter, and the lower courts treated Edelman as controlling it.
Edelman had treated congressional authorization to sue the State as a threshold fact, and the plaintiffs there lost because none of the statutes they invoked supplied it. Section 1983 had been held to exclude municipal corporations and so could not be read to include States, and the Social Security Act provisions authorized suit against no one.8 Title VII did supply the authorization. Fitzpatrick therefore began where Edelman ended, and the remaining question was whether Congress had the power under Section 5 to supply it.9
The Court found that power in the history of the Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia had said that “every addition of power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.”10 Reading the line of cases that followed, the Court saw Congress intruding, under those Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States, and it found nothing improper in that. The Framers intended the expansion of congressional power and the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty, and the States accepted both when they ratified the Amendments.11
From that history the Court concluded that, in determining what is “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may “provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”12 The Eleventh Amendment therefore did not bar the retroactive award. Attorney’s fees followed. Because Title VII expressly authorized them, it followed necessarily that Congress’s exercise of power in that respect was not barred either, and the Court did not need to decide whether fees would count as an ancillary effect on the treasury.13 The practical stakes were concrete: the employees already had their injunction, and the holding is what allowed them to recover for losses already caused.
The timing of the Amendments explains why Section 5 can do what other grants cannot. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, seventy years after the Eleventh, and it altered the balance of state and federal power that Article III and the Eleventh Amendment had achieved.14 That the Amendment limits state sovereignty did not set it apart, because the Impairments (Contracts) Clause also limits state sovereignty and the Court had long held that sovereign immunity limits that Clause. The Court thought that the Fourteenth Amendment’s later adoption made the difference.15
The holding has an edge that exams exploit. Fitzpatrick did not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of its own force dissolves state immunity; it rested on Congress’s express abrogation in Title VII.16 Without a statute, the State is immune even when the claim rests on the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not change that, because it does not expressly authorize suits against States and States and their officials acting in an official capacity are not “person[s]” under it.17 The employees in Fitzpatrick and the plaintiffs in Edelman reached opposite results for exactly that reason: Title VII authorized suit against the State, and the statutes in Edelman did not.
Fitzpatrick settled that Section 5 can override immunity. It did not settle that every statute invoking Section 5 does. The Court has reaffirmed the power on numerous occasions since,18 and it has also policed its use. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, Congress had made its intent to subject States to suit unmistakably clear in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, yet the Court held that the Act was not appropriate Section 5 legislation, because Congress had identified no pattern of age discrimination by the States amounting to a constitutional violation.19
Article I Cannot Abrogate
Two statutes with the same goal can meet opposite fates, because the source of Congress’s power decides whether state immunity can be overridden. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Congress had used the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I to authorize suits for money damages by Indian tribes against States in federal court. A 5–4 Court held that Congress, legislating under the Commerce Clause, cannot abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity, and it struck the statute down while excepting legislation enacted under Section 5.21 Seminole Tribe overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a short-lived decision in which a bare majority had ruled that Congress may abrogate under any of its lawmaking powers, Article I included.22
The reasoning starts from the limits on federal courts. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction: a case must come within some provision of Article III defining the judicial power, and a jurisdictional statute must also reach it.23 The Eleventh Amendment sits inside that structure, which the Court has described as a balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.24 A statute that opens federal court to private suits against non-consenting States tries to move that balance, and an Article I power, which belongs to the original arrangement, cannot do so.
Alden v. Maine carried the rule into a State’s own courts. The Court held that “the States’ immunity from private suits in their own courts” is likewise “an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation,” because otherwise “the National Government would wield greater power in the state courts than in its own judicial instrumentalities.”25 The rule therefore does not depend on the forum.
Fitzpatrick escapes the rule because of when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. In the Court’s later words, Fitzpatrick “was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.”26 That is why Kimel could reduce the case to a single question. Reaffirming Fitzpatrick, it held that private ADEA suits against Alabama and Florida could proceed “if, and only if,” the Act was appropriate legislation under Section 5.27
An exam question about a damages suit against a State should therefore begin with the source of power. A statute with an admirable purpose still fails to abrogate when only an Article I power stands behind it, and a statute resting on Section 5 has cleared only the first screen before it meets the other limits on that power. A separate opinion would have drawn no line among the commerce, bankruptcy, patent, and Section 5 powers on whether they may expand federal jurisdiction, and it found no language in the constitutional text that authorizes Congress to expand Article III jurisdiction or to limit the Eleventh Amendment’s coverage.28 The Court has not adopted that view, and it continues to treat Section 5, rather than Article I, as the source of abrogation power.29
Valid Abrogation Requirements
A statute abrogates state immunity only if two questions are answered in its favor: did Congress unmistakably express its intent to abrogate, and did it act under a valid exercise of constitutional power?31 The questions differ in kind. A court answers the first by reading the statute and the second by testing the statute against the Fourteenth Amendment, and passing one says nothing about the other.
The first question is one of statutory interpretation. Congress is held to have abrogated state immunity only where it has made that intent unmistakably clear in a statute.32 A general authorization to sue in federal court does not meet that standard, as Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon held for the Rehabilitation Act. The standard forces Congress to choose, in the text, to expose a state treasury to private damages, and it keeps courts from inferring that choice from a statute written for employers and service providers generally. The ADEA cleared this hurdle, because Congress spoke clearly when it applied the Act to the States and abrogated their immunity.33 A clear statement shows what Congress intended, and it says nothing yet about what Congress had power to do.
The second question asks whether Congress acted under a valid power. For private damages suits against States only Section 5 can supply one, because Article I cannot abrogate.34 Invoking Section 5 does not complete the answer, because Section 5 is a remedial power: Congress “does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”35 It may remedy unconstitutional action but may not make a substantive change in the governing law.36 The federal law must therefore enforce a right the Amendment guarantees, and a provision that reaches beyond the judicially recognized right must show “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end,”37 supported by a record of unconstitutional conduct by the States themselves.38
Tying abrogation to that test keeps the Section 5 route from swallowing the Article I rule. If reciting Section 5 sufficed, Congress could take a measure whose real aims lie in Article I, add the recital, and strip the States of immunity. The treatment of a statute aimed at patent infringement shows the point: its basic aims were a uniform remedy for infringement and equal footing for States and private parties, which are proper concerns under Article I but were insufficient to support abrogation after Seminole Tribe.39
Kimel shows a statute that passes the first question and fails the second. State employees in Alabama and Florida sued under the ADEA, and the Court held that their suits could proceed if, and only if, the ADEA was appropriate legislation under Section 5.40 It was not. Given the indiscriminate scope of the Act’s substantive requirements and the lack of evidence of widespread unconstitutional age discrimination by the States, the Court held that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Section 5 power and that its purported abrogation is invalid.41 The clear statement could not rescue the Act, because the two questions are independent.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) shows the same two questions producing different answers within one statute. Congress made clear that States could be sued under it, and in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs the Court upheld the abrogation for the FMLA’s family-care provision.42 The difference from Kimel lies in the right being enforced. Sex-based distinctions draw heightened scrutiny and age-based distinctions only rational basis review, so more state conduct is unconstitutional in the first setting, and Congress could more readily point to a pattern of state violations. The same statute then lost on its self-care provision. In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, a plurality held that suits for money damages under that provision are barred, because there was no evidence that States had facially discriminatory self-care leave policies or administered them discriminatorily, and the legislative history concerned the economic burden of illness-related job loss and discrimination based on illness, not sex.43 The second question is therefore asked provision by provision. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act validly abrogates immunity in the same way, but only insofar as it creates a private cause of action against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment.44
A failed abrogation closes the private damages route and leaves others open. Kimel held only that Congress did not validly abrogate immunity from suits by private individuals under the ADEA, and it noted that state employees are protected by state age discrimination statutes and may recover money damages from their state employers in almost every State.45 A court may also order prospective relief against a state official sued in an official capacity under Ex parte Young, even when compliance costs the State money, so long as the order looks forward only; after Coleman, the Sixth Circuit held that an employee may seek such relief for a self-care leave violation by alleging an ongoing violation of federal law.46 The immunity also leaves untouched money damages recovered by the federal government, and the EEOC may still bring ADEA claims against state governments, because the States consented to suit by the federal government when they ratified the Constitution.47 These doctrines govern suits by individuals, and the federal government has sometimes sued to compel state compliance.48 They matter here because they show that an invalid abrogation does not make state discrimination lawful.