209 U.S. 123 (1908)
The legislature of the State of Minnesota, in the year 1905, passed an act fixing the rates of passenger fares to be charged by railroads within the State, and also fixing the rates for the transportation of freight.1
The act was to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1905, and it provided for the appointment of a railroad commission, with power to fix rates, and also provided for the enforcement of the act by penalties and by mandamus.2
Before the act took effect, the railroad companies affected by it filed bills in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, alleging that the act was unconstitutional, in that it was confiscatory, and deprived the companies of their property without due process of law, and also that it was in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, and they asked for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the act. These suits were brought against the railroad commission and the Attorney General of the State.3
While those cases were pending on appeal, the legislature in 1907 amended the law to create a railroad and warehouse commission with authority to set rates and to impose a penalty of one thousand dollars for each violation of charging higher rates, with the Attorney General charged with enforcement.4
After the Supreme Court decided the Minnesota Rate Cases in 208 U.S. 1, stockholders Perkins and Shepard of the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed a new bill in the Circuit Court against the commission members, Attorney General Edward T. Young, and others, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the 1907 act on constitutional grounds.5
The Circuit Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining Young from instituting suits to enforce the penalties. Young appeared specially, moved to dismiss the bill as a suit against the State barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but the motion was overruled; he declined to plead further, resulting in a default decree granting the injunction.6
Subsequently, Young, as Attorney General, commenced a mandamus proceeding in Minnesota state court against the Northern Pacific Railway Company to compel compliance with the 1907 rates.7
Upon learning of the state court action, the Circuit Court issued a rule to show cause why Young should not be held in contempt; after hearing, it found him in contempt, fined him one hundred dollars, and ordered him to dismiss the mandamus suit or remain in custody.8
Young then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the federal court's orders exceeded its jurisdiction.9
Whether the United States Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota had jurisdiction over the bill filed by stockholders against the Attorney General of Minnesota?10
Federal courts possess jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States when the amount in controversy is satisfied.11
Yes. The bill presented multiple federal questions by alleging that the 1907 rates were confiscatory and therefore deprived the railroad of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The penalties were so severe as to deny any meaningful opportunity to test the statute in court.13 The bill also raised a federal question growing out of the assertion that the laws interfered with and regulated interstate commerce.14
The established facts show that the bill was filed after the Minnesota Rate Cases decision and specifically challenged the enforcement provisions of the 1907 act on these constitutional grounds.15 Because the complaint raised substantial questions under the federal Constitution, the Circuit Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the controversy.16
The Circuit Court therefore had authority to entertain the bill and to issue the preliminary injunction.17
Whether the suit against the Attorney General was in substance a suit against the State of Minnesota prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment?18
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by citizens of another state or foreign subjects.19 A suit against a state officer to enjoin the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute is not a suit against the state because the officer is stripped of official character when acting in violation of the federal Constitution.20
No. The bill sought only to restrain Attorney General Young from instituting suits to enforce penalties under a statute alleged to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.2122 It requested no affirmative relief compelling the state to act or to pay funds.23
The established facts demonstrate that Young was charged by the 1907 statute with enforcement duties and that the injunction operated solely against him individually once the statute was challenged as unconstitutional.24 Because the officer enforcing an unconstitutional enactment acts without state authority, the suit remains one against the individual and falls outside the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment.25
The Eleventh Amendment therefore posed no bar to the Circuit Court's exercise of jurisdiction.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the suit was in legal effect one against the State because it sought to prevent the Attorney General, acting solely in his official capacity, from representing Minnesota in its own courts to test the validity of its statutes.27
He emphasized that the relief operated directly upon the State by denying it the services of its chief law officer in judicial proceedings the State itself had initiated, thereby subjecting the State to the coercive process of a federal court in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.28 Harlan maintained that the majority's distinction between suits against officers and suits against the State could not be maintained when the practical result was to exclude the State entirely from its own tribunals on a question of constitutional power.29
Whether the severe penalties imposed by the Minnesota rate acts rendered those acts unconstitutional on their face?30
A statute that imposes penalties so severe that they effectively preclude any reasonable opportunity to test its validity in court denies due process of law and is unconstitutional on its face.31
Yes. The 1907 act imposed a one-thousand-dollar penalty for each violation of charging higher rates.32 Disobedience by officers or employees was made a misdemeanor punishable by up to ninety days in jail.33 Violations of the passenger rate act were classified as felonies carrying fines up to five thousand dollars and imprisonment up to five years.34
The established facts show that these cumulative penalties attached to every sale of a ticket or shipment above the prescribed rates, creating an intolerable risk that no agent would dare disobey the statute even once to create a test case.35 Because the penalties operated to close the courthouse doors before any judicial determination of the rates' reasonableness could occur, the enforcement provisions were unconstitutional on their face regardless of whether the rates themselves proved confiscatory.36
The penalty provisions therefore could not stand.37
Whether a federal court of equity may enjoin a state officer from instituting proceedings to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional state statute?38
A federal court of equity may enjoin a state officer from commencing proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional statute when the federal court has first obtained jurisdiction and the injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury and a multiplicity of suits.39
Yes. The Circuit Court had already acquired jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge when Young instituted the state mandamus action.40 The injunction merely preserved that jurisdiction by preventing enforcement actions that would subject the railroad and its officers to ruinous penalties before the federal questions could be resolved.41
The established facts confirm that the bill alleged ongoing and threatened enforcement that would cause irreparable harm through repeated litigation and potential confiscation.42 No adequate remedy at law existed because testing the rates through disobedience carried unacceptable risks of imprisonment and fines.43 Equity therefore properly acted to maintain the status quo pending final adjudication.44
The injunction against the Attorney General was a permissible exercise of equitable power.45
Whether the Attorney General of Minnesota had a sufficient connection with enforcement of the rate acts to be made a proper party defendant?46
A state officer may be made a defendant in a suit to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute when the officer possesses some connection with enforcement of the statute, whether that connection arises from the statute itself or from the officer's general duties under state law.47
Yes. Minnesota law imposed upon the Attorney General the general duty to institute proceedings against corporations that violated state statutes and made him ex officio attorney for the railroad commission with the obligation to prosecute actions ordered by the commission.48
The established facts show that Young regarded enforcement of the 1907 rates as part of his official responsibilities.49 He commenced the mandamus proceeding immediately after the federal injunction issued.50 He defended his action on the ground that it was required by his office.51 Because these duties supplied the requisite connection, Young was a proper party defendant.52
The Attorney General was therefore properly before the Circuit Court.53