528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000)
In 1967 Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which initially applied only to private employers.1
In 1974 Congress amended the Act through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments to extend its substantive requirements to the States.2 Congress redefined the term employer to include a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State.3 The same legislation also amended the incorporated Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement provision to authorize suits against any employer including a public agency in federal or state court.4
In December 1994 Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz, associate professors ages 57 and 58 at the University of Montevallo in Alabama, filed suit alleging age discrimination, retaliation for filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and disparate impact from an evaluation system.5 In April 1995 J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., and other current and former faculty and librarians over age 40 at Florida State University and Florida International University filed suit against the Florida Board of Regents alleging that the failure to allocate previously agreed market-adjustment salary funds had a disparate impact on employees with longer service records.6 In May 1996 Wellington Dickson filed suit against the Florida Department of Corrections alleging failure to promote him because of his age and in retaliation for grievances concerning age discrimination.7
The District Court in the MacPherson case granted the university's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds.8 The District Courts in the Kimel and Dickson cases denied the state defendants' motions to dismiss.9 The United States intervened in all three cases.10 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and held that the ADEA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.12
Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity?13
Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.14
Yes. The ADEA as amended in 1974 redefines the term employer to include a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State.15 It also incorporates the FLSA enforcement provision authorizing suits against any employer including a public agency in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.16 In the cases before the Court, the plaintiffs MacPherson and Narz sued the University of Montevallo, the plaintiffs including Kimel sued the Florida Board of Regents, and Dickson sued the Florida Department of Corrections, all proceeding under the ADEA.17
The statutory text therefore supplies the required clear statement of abrogation.18
The ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Kennedy
Justice Thomas dissents from the majority's conclusion on the clear statement issue.20 He maintains that the sequence of amendments creates ambiguity because the ADEA incorporates an FLSA provision amended in the same 1974 legislation that extended the ADEA to the States.21 Congress did not directly address the abrogation consequences for the ADEA itself.22
He would require an unequivocal declaration within the four corners of the statute without reliance on incorporation of later-amended provisions.23 The ADEA's own enforcement provision already exists in section 626(c)(1) and renders any incorporation theory less than unmistakable.24
Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is a valid exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?25
Section 5 legislation must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented or remedied and Congress may not decree the substance of Fourteenth Amendment restrictions.26
No. Age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.27 State age classifications survive rational basis review if rationally related to a legitimate state interest as held in Murgia, Bradley, and Gregory.28 The ADEA prohibits substantially more employment decisions than would be unconstitutional under that standard.29 Its legislative record consists only of isolated sentences and anecdotes that fail to demonstrate any pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination by the States.30
Application of the congruence and proportionality test to the facts of the MacPherson, Kimel, and Dickson suits therefore shows that the ADEA exceeds Congress's section 5 authority.31
The ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, And Breyer
Justice Stevens concurs in the finding of a clear statement but dissents from the section 5 holding.33 He contends that Congress possesses broad power under section 5 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee.34 The ADEA constitutes appropriate prophylactic legislation because it targets arbitrary age discrimination while remaining congruent and proportional to the constitutional injury.35
He would reverse the Eleventh Circuit judgment and remand for further proceedings.36 The Framers assigned structural safeguards for state interests to the legislative process rather than to judicially created immunity doctrines.37