100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1880)
J. D. Coles served as judge of the county court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia, for several years.1 Under Virginia law, the judge was required to prepare annually a list of inhabitants qualified to serve as jurors and to place their names on ballots in a box from which grand and petit jurors were drawn.2 In 1878, while performing this duty, Coles excluded from the jury lists all citizens of African race and black color who possessed the qualifications prescribed by law, doing so on account of their race, color, and previous condition of servitude.3
A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia indicted Coles for violating section 4 of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875.4 The indictment charged that, as an officer charged with the selection of jurors, he had excluded qualified citizens from jury service on racial grounds. The district court issued a bench warrant, and Coles was arrested and held in custody by the marshal.5
Coles petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari to the district court, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the charged conduct.6 The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a parallel petition seeking his discharge so that he could perform his state judicial duties.7 Both petitions were considered together by the Court.8
The 1875 statute declared that no citizen possessing the requisite qualifications shall be disqualified for jury service in any court of the United States or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and it made any officer or person charged with jury selection who excluded a citizen for those reasons guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine.9
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to review a commitment order issued by a federal district court under an indictment charging a state judge with violating the Civil Rights Act of 1875?10
The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction extends to the review of orders by inferior federal courts, including bench warrants and commitments, via habeas corpus and certiorari when the petitioner alleges the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the charged conduct.11
Yes. The district court issued a bench warrant directing the marshal to arrest and hold J. D. Coles under an indictment charging violation of section 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 for excluding qualified citizens from jury service on racial grounds while serving as judge of the county court of Pittsylvania County.12
Coles and the Commonwealth of Virginia petitioned the Supreme Court alleging the district court lacked jurisdiction.13 The Court exercised its appellate power to examine whether the district court exceeded its authority in issuing the process.14
The Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus petitions and review the district court's action.15
Whether a state judge may be indicted and held in federal custody for excluding qualified citizens from jury service on account of race in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875?16
A state judicial officer charged with the duty of selecting jurors is an officer subject to the prohibitions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The selection of jurors constitutes a ministerial rather than judicial act that does not exempt the officer from federal criminal liability for racial discrimination.17
Yes. J. D. Coles, as judge of the county court of Pittsylvania County, was charged by Virginia law with preparing the annual jury list and selecting qualified inhabitants for grand and petit jury service in 1878, yet he excluded all citizens of African race and black color possessing the qualifications prescribed by law solely on account of race, color, and previous condition of servitude.18
The 1875 statute expressly applies to any officer charged with jury selection duties and imposes misdemeanor liability for such exclusions, rendering Coles subject to federal indictment and custody.19
A state judge may be indicted and held in federal custody for the described conduct.20
Whether the Civil Rights Act of 1875 validly enforces the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to the conduct of state judicial officers in selecting jurors for state courts?21
Congress possesses authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation enforcing the equal protection guarantee against state action of every kind.22 This includes official acts by judicial officers that deny citizens the equal protection of the laws through racial discrimination in jury selection.23
Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.24 It empowers Congress to enforce that prohibition by appropriate legislation directed at state action through its officers and agents in whatever department they serve.25 J.
D. Coles's exclusion of qualified black citizens from the jury lists of Pittsylvania County while performing his state-law duty constituted state action denying equal protection.26 The 1875 statute's criminal prohibition on such exclusions is appropriate legislation to secure the amendment's guarantee.27
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 validly enforces the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to state judicial officers selecting jurors.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Clifford
Justice Field dissented on the ground that the selection of jurors is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion and judgment under Virginia law.29 This renders a state judge immune from federal prosecution for the manner in which he discharges that duty.30 He contended that the 1875 statute, insofar as it applies to jurors in state courts, is unconstitutional because it subjects state judicial officers to federal supervision and control.31
This destroys the independence of the state judiciary and the autonomy of the states in matters reserved to them.32 Field further argued that the indictment was defective for failing to allege specific traversable facts.33 He maintained that the amendments were not intended to authorize Congress to interfere with the internal administration of state justice.34