Concept
Broad Remedial Power
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power
Broad Remedial Power
Section 5 gives Congress power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”1 The sentence names the act, which is enforcement, and the instrument, which is appropriate legislation. It never says how much freedom Congress has in choosing among statutes that might serve that end. Two readings compete. On the narrow one, Congress may only supply remedies for violations that courts have already identified. On the broad one, Congress may adopt any measure it reasonably judges suited to making the Amendment's guarantees effective, even a measure that reaches further than a court would order in a given case. The traditional view takes the broad reading and treats the power as no less broad than Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.2
The three subsections below follow that reading from its foundation to its outer edge. The first states the standard that makes a statute “appropriate,” a standard drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's formulation in McCulloch v. Maryland. The second shows how “enforce” came to include deterrence and prevention, so that Congress may sometimes reach conduct that is not itself unconstitutional in order to guard against conduct that is. The third examines Katzenbach v. Morgan, the decision that pressed the idea furthest. Each step widens the gap between what a court would order and what Congress may enact.
That gap has a structural explanation. A court decides the case before it, usually after the harm has occurred, and its order runs to the parties in that case. Congress can legislate before the harm, for every State at once, on the strength of a pattern of state conduct it has investigated. A power confined to the remedies a court would grant would leave Congress little to add, which is why the traditional view reads the power broadly. That breadth explains how far Congress could reach, and it is only the first half of the story. Later cases confine what Congress may do with the power, so each broad statement in these subsections describes the traditional view at its widest.
Appropriate Legislation Standard
Section 5 authorizes “appropriate legislation,” and that phrase supplies the measure for every statute Congress passes under it.3 The text does not say what makes legislation appropriate. The Court answered with Marshall's formulation in McCulloch: “let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”4 Morgan called that statement “the classic formulation” of the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court has applied the same test to the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments.5
Section 5 is an affirmative grant of power, and the first call on how to use it belongs to Congress. “It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.”6
The first step ties the statute to a right found in Section 1, which links Congress's power to the state conduct the Amendment prohibits. The second step demands a genuine fit between the statute and the guarantee it invokes. The third step guards against abuse, because a means that the Constitution forbids cannot carry the Constitution into effect. Without that step, the label “enforcement” would let Congress override one guarantee in the name of another.
The third step has teeth when the means contradict the guarantee itself.
The same standard governs the parallel clauses of other amendments. One opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell observed that four amendments, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth, each expressly authorize Congress to “enforce” their prohibitions by “appropriate legislation.”7 The Court treats Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment as the same as its power to enforce the Fourteenth,8 and South Carolina v. Katzenbach accordingly stated the test, as applied to voting, as letting Congress “use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”9 A separate opinion in United States v. Guest joined the two lines. It noted that the language of Section 5 and of the Fifteenth Amendment's enforcement clause is virtually the same, and it rejected a reading that would confine Section 5 to nullifying prohibited state laws and acts, because that reading would reduce Congress's power to that of the judiciary.10 A separate opinion is not a holding, and the statement of the standard that controls is the Court's own in Morgan.
Morgan shows the standard at work. Congress barred New York from enforcing its English-literacy voting requirement against persons who had completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school where the language of instruction was other than English.11 New York argued that such a statute could stand only if a court first determined that the state requirement violated the Amendment. The Court rejected that position and found no support for it in the language or history of Section 5.12 A construction demanding a prior judicial determination, the Court reasoned, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility, and it would confine Congress to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judiciary was already prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.13 The mechanism is easy to see. A statute that could operate only after a court struck down the state law would add nothing a court had not already supplied, and courts act case by case, usually after the harm has occurred. The Court therefore asked whether the federal statute was appropriate legislation to enforce equal protection, and it did not ask whether the state requirement itself violated equal protection.14 The last subsection shows how it answered.
The means Congress selects need not match the means courts may use elsewhere. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer began when the Court of Appeals found that Congress, in the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, had authorized a private suit for back pay by state employees against the State, yet held that a private federal action for retroactive damages was not a “constitutionally permissible method of enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights.”15 The Supreme Court disagreed. In determining what is “appropriate legislation,” it said, Congress may provide for private suits against States or state officials that are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.16 A later section takes up the Eleventh Amendment questions. The point here is that “appropriate” lets Congress choose means that would be unavailable outside the Enforcement Clause.
Congress's capacity to find facts supplies the practical reason for this deference. One opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell reasoned that limits stemming from the nature of the judicial process have no application to Congress. If Congress investigates whether the factual basis for a state's discrimination exists, that opinion said, it need not stop once it determines that some reasonable people could believe the basis exists, because Section 5 empowers Congress to make its own determination.17 That opinion illustrates the deferential strand of the case law, and it does not state settled law.
All of this describes the traditional view. Under it, Congress has power to legislate so long as it could reasonably conclude that the legislation furthers the constitutional guarantee.18 City of Boerne v. Flores recognized Section 5 as an affirmative grant of power and, in the same decision, held that Congress had gone beyond it.19 The later sections of this chapter show how the Court polices that limit.
Prophylactic Reach
Under the traditional view, the power “to enforce” covers prevention as well as punishment.21 A measure aimed at stopping harm before it occurs is called prophylactic, and the cases accept that such a measure may prohibit some conduct that is not itself unconstitutional. The Court has described the power as one both to remedy and to deter violations by prohibiting “a somewhat broader swath of conduct,” including conduct the Amendment's text does not forbid.22 Because that reach can sweep in lawful activity, the justification for any prophylactic measure has to rest on its connection to violations likely to occur. This subsection shows what that connection looked like in the paradigm case and where it was missing.
A power limited to remedying proven violations would fall short because of how courts work and how discrimination adapts. A court decides the case before it, usually after the harm has been done, and its order reaches the practice and the parties in that case. In voting, case-by-case litigation proved inadequate in part because States merely switched to other discriminatory devices.23 A federal power that could act only after a court had labeled each practice unconstitutional would always be one step behind. Authority to reach the practices that carry a violation forward closes that gap.
The paradigm is the Voting Rights Act's ban on literacy tests. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections had treated a literacy test as a permissible exercise of state supervision over the franchise,24 and a test that is fair on its face and fairly administered is not itself a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress nonetheless suspended such tests in the covered jurisdictions, and the Court upheld the ban. City of Rome v. United States explained the result: Congress may, under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though not itself a violation of Section 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.25 The mechanism is easy to follow. Where the voter rolls were built under a discriminatory regime, voters already registered never faced the test, while those excluded earlier would face it now. A neutral test applied from then on would rebuild the old disparity.
Those decisions arose under the Fifteenth Amendment, but its enforcement power is the same as the power to enforce the Fourteenth.26 The ban was not a license to reach any neutral rule, and two features tied it to likely violations. The first was the record. Congress had before it thousands of pages of testimony, reports, and statistics showing that literacy tests and similar devices had been used to discriminate against Black voters, together with evidence that case-by-case litigation had failed to combat the evil.27 The second was the coverage formula, which reached only places that shared two characteristics: the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a 1964 presidential-election turnout at least twelve points below the national average. Tests and devices have a long history as a tool of voting discrimination, and a low turnout is pertinent because widespread disenfranchisement must affect the number of actual voters, so the Court found the formula rational in both practice and theory.28 Boerne later described the Act's remedies as aimed at areas where voting discrimination had been most flagrant, and it said legislation of this kind is judged against the “historical experience” it reflects.29
Prophylactic measures reach into matters the States would otherwise control, and the traditional view accepts that cost. Fitzpatrick described the Civil War Amendment cases as sanctioning intrusions by Congress into “the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.”30 The reason is structural. The legislation in those cases rested on an expansion of Congress's powers, with a corresponding diminution of state sovereignty, that the Framers intended and the States accepted by ratifying the Amendments, a change the Court has described as a “carv[ing] out.”31 That explains why the Tenth Amendment objection failed in Morgan, where the Court reversed a ruling that § 4(e) usurped powers reserved to the States and held that Congress had not exceeded the Enforcement Clause.32
The prophylactic power has limits, and City of Boerne v. Flores marks the clearest failure. The Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not appropriate legislation under Section 5.33 Congress had uncovered only anecdotal evidence, which standing alone did not reveal a widespread pattern of religious discrimination, and the Act was so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it could not be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.34 The contrast with the literacy-test ban lies in the connection to likely violations. The ban rested on thousands of pages of evidence about a practice with a documented history as a discriminatory weapon, and it targeted the places where that history was concentrated. The Boerne record offered only anecdotes, and the statute was out of proportion to its stated object. The formal measure of that connection, congruence and proportionality, comes in later sections. Here it is enough to see that the label “prophylactic” does not justify a statute by itself.
Time also limits prophylaxis. In Shelby County v. Holder, a Fifteenth Amendment case, the Court held the Voting Rights Act's coverage formula unusable. Exceptional conditions must justify the Act's “extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government,” the Court said, and Congress must ensure that its remedial legislation “speaks to current conditions.”35 Congress remained free to draft another formula based on current conditions, and the Act's permanent nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting stayed in place.36 The Court issued no holding on the Act's own Section 5 preclearance requirement, and the case did not turn on the congruence-and-proportionality test that later sections describe. It supports only a narrower point: the link between a preventive measure and likely violations must hold when the measure operates, and not merely on the day Congress enacts it.
Katzenbach v. Morgan
Katzenbach v. Morgan pressed the enforcement grant furthest.38 The statute under review, § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, provided that no person who had completed the sixth grade in a public school in Puerto Rico, or in a private school the Commonwealth accredited, where the language of instruction was other than English could be denied the vote because of an inability to read or write English.39 As Justice Harlan observed in dissent, the statute was framed in general terms but in actual effect applied only to citizens of Puerto Rican background, and the Court treated it that way.40 It operated directly on New York law: Congress decided to prohibit enforcement of New York's literacy test against those persons.41
The district court invalidated the provision, ruling in part that it usurped powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Congress had not exceeded the powers the Enforcement Clause grants.42 Voting qualifications are ordinarily a matter of state supervision,43 so the question became whether § 4(e) enforced the Amendment against the State or intruded on a power the State legitimately held. The Court gave two lines of reasoning, and they need to be learned separately, because later cases treated them very differently.
The first rationale was remedial, and it is the conventional one. The Court reasoned that § 4(e) was rationally related to securing for Puerto Ricans in New York nondiscriminatory treatment in the provision and administration of governmental services.44 Discrimination in public services was already clearly unconstitutional under judicially developed equal protection doctrine, so on this theory Congress was implementing rights the courts had already defined.45 The route from the vote to those services is indirect, so state each step. A community that cannot vote has little leverage over the officials who run its schools and police. A community that can vote can reward and punish them. Barring the State from withholding the franchise therefore attacks the discrimination through the political process, which is how the measure met the standard's requirement that means be plainly adapted to the end.
This rationale leaves the meaning of equal protection with the courts. It offers no support for legislation that would restrict the reach of the guarantee, because a court still determines whether discrimination exists and whether the legislative remedy is reasonably related to the proper goal.46
The second rationale asked more of the Court. As an alternative ground, the Court said it could perceive a basis for Congress to conclude that the English-literacy requirement was itself an invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.47 That ground sat uneasily beside Lassiter, which had treated a literacy test as a permissible exercise of state supervision over the franchise.48 Under it, Congress arguably made the initial determination that an English-literacy test in these circumstances was unconstitutional, which is a statement about the substantive content of rights under Section 1 and not only about how to remedy a violation.49 The previous subsection showed that Section 5 legislation need not wait for a court to condemn the state law. This ground applies that principle at full stretch, because the kind of state law at issue had survived judicial review.
One prominent theory defended the second rationale as authorizing no substantive reinterpretation of the Amendment. On that theory, the decision merely acknowledged Congress's special institutional competence to find facts pertaining to remedies for judicially declared rights.50 Even Justice Harlan granted that Congress is well equipped to investigate legislative facts and that its determinations deserve due respect.51 On that reading, Congress applies the Court's definition of the right to facts the Court never found. The alternative ground left room for a broader reading, in which Congress itself defines the right, and Harlan's dissent read it that way.52
Harlan drew his line at the sequence in Ex parte Virginia. There the Court first held, as a matter of constitutional law, that the Fourteenth Amendment secures an impartial jury chosen without discrimination because of color, and only then upheld the federal criminal statute that enforced that holding.53 Section 4(e), Harlan argued, was different. Given Lassiter, he saw no room for Congress to limit that decision, and he said the Court in effect read Section 5 as giving Congress “the power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment.”54 The concern ran in both directions. A power to decide that a state law denies equal protection could be exercised the other way, producing statutes that, in Harlan's words, “dilute [the] equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.”55 A dissent states no holding, but it identifies the pressure point that later cases addressed.
The majority answered the dilution worry in a footnote. Congress's power under Section 5, it said, is “limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment,” and Section 5 gives Congress “no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”56 The Court's own example was a statute authorizing the States to establish racially segregated school systems, which could not be a measure “to enforce” equal protection because the Equal Protection Clause of its own force prohibits such state laws.57 The reason is structural. A power to enforce presupposes a guarantee to be enforced, so a statute that shrinks the guarantee no longer carries it into effect.
An exam question built on Morgan usually asks whether Congress may bar a State from applying a rule the Court has already upheld, and the answer depends on which rationale the statute can invoke.
That broad reading is the one Harlan feared, and City of Boerne narrowed it. The Court noted that language in Morgan could be read as acknowledging a power to enact legislation expanding the rights in Section 1, but it called that reading neither necessary nor the best one.58 It read Morgan as purely remedial and gave a negative answer to whether Congress has substantive interpretive competence under the Fourteenth Amendment.59 The later sections on enforcement versus redefinition teach that narrowing in detail. For now, remember that the first rationale is the settled core of Morgan, because Congress identifies discrimination that courts recognize and chooses a reasonable means of preventing it. The second is the part later cases confine.