Concept
Privacy and Truthful Publication
Freedom of the press
Privacy and Truthful Publication
Libel law’s constitutional limits rest on a few fixed points, and a plaintiff who cannot satisfy them has every reason to plead a privacy tort instead. Actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether a statement is false, is a term of art for the standard a state must require before it may let public officials recover for libel.1 A failure to discover a misstatement shows at most negligence, and negligence is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness actual malice demands.2 In libel, Gertz repudiated the Rosenbloom plurality’s subject-matter test and made the plaintiff’s status, not the nature of the issue, control the availability of the Sullivan privilege.3 The worry about an end run around those limits has already surfaced in this chapter. The Court refused to let a state’s interest in sparing public figures emotional distress strip First Amendment protection from patently offensive speech, even speech intended to inflict emotional injury, when no one could reasonably read it as stating actual facts,4 and constitutional malice is likewise required when a public official or public figure sues for intentional infliction of emotional harm.5
Privacy law offers four places for the same maneuver. Every jurisdiction recognizes privacy in some form, and the tort has four branches: intrusion, false light, disclosure, and appropriation. Intrusion targets the unreasonable invasion of another’s seclusion and touches the First Amendment only incidentally, through the protection of newsgathering. Appropriation protects the commercial value of a person’s identity and likeness, a “right of publicity,” and seldom raises First Amendment problems.6 False light and the disclosure of private facts are where the conflict is sharpest, and they pose opposite problems. False light, like libel, depends on a false report, so the fault rules built for libel have a natural claim to apply. Disclosure depends on a true report, so falsity cannot serve as the safeguard, and the Court asks instead whether the information concerned a matter of public significance and how the publisher obtained it. Warren and Brandeis called in 1890 for an “inviolate right of privacy against the exposures of a yellow press.”7 The Court’s modern answer protects truthful, lawfully obtained information on narrow grounds and stops short of declaring truth an absolute defense.8
False Light and Actual Malice
Time, Inc. v. Hill carried the Sullivan standard into privacy law by applying it to a state statute that created no cause of action for libel.9 The statute gave a remedy for unwanted publicity and allowed damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention rather than by factual inaccuracy, yet it treated truth as a complete defense.10 Hill is a false-light case: the story linked a play about a crime to the facts and people involved in the crime, and the Court required constitutional malice.11 False light and defamation protect different interests. Defamation protects reputation, a relational interest, while false light protects a person’s emotional well-being.12 A false-light plaintiff therefore need not show that the publication was defamatory.
The Court set aside the damage award and remanded the case to determine whether the plaintiff could prove actual malice.13 Justice Brennan explained that the case was neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statutory action by a public official, that the Sullivan principles guided the result only as applied in this discrete context, and that it served no purpose to distinguish the facts from those in Sullivan.14 He added that in a libel action the differing opportunities of an official and a private individual to rebut a defamatory charge, and the state’s added interest in protecting reputation, might be germane.15 Hill involved a private figure, yet the Court required knowing or reckless falsehood, not negligence.16
Brennan’s reason was the one that drove Sullivan: liability based on negligence would push the media toward self-censorship.17 Sullivan drew the line concretely, holding that a failure to discover misstatements shows at most negligence and does not show the recklessness actual malice requires.18 On the other side of the balance, Brennan gave the privacy interest little weight. He called exposure of the self “a concomitant of life in a civilized community” and said privacy had to yield “in a society which placed a primary value on freedom of speech and the press.”19 What remains actionable under the standard is the portrayal that the publisher knew was false or published in reckless disregard of the truth.
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., decided after Gertz, applied the same standard and upheld a judgment for the plaintiffs in their false-light action.20 A feature story plainly implied that Mrs. Cantrell had been present during the writer’s visit to her home and that he had observed her wearing “the same mask of nonexpression she wore” at her husband’s funeral. No one disputed that the writer, who did not testify, must have known that a number of the statements were untrue. The Court called these “calculated falsehoods” and held that the jury was justified in finding that the writer had portrayed the family in a false light through knowing or reckless untruth.21 The two cases pose the same question on different records. Hill ended in a remand to see whether the plaintiff could prove actual malice, and Cantrell ended in a judgment for the plaintiffs because the knowing falsity was undisputed.
Actual malice in the Sullivan sense is a term of art, and it differs from the common-law malice that state tort law generally requires to support punitive damages. In a false-light case, common-law malice, often framed as personal ill will or as reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, would focus on the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff’s privacy, not toward the truth or falsity of what was published.22 The inquiry therefore asks what the publisher knew about the truth. A writer who dislikes a family but honestly believes the story is not acting with actual malice; a writer who admires a family but invents a scene is. Because the standard turns on state of mind and the journalistic process, a plaintiff needs access to that information to prove it, and Herbert v. Lando declined to recognize an editorial privilege against pretrial discovery into actual malice.23
Whether Hill still sets the standard for private plaintiffs after Gertz is unsettled. A false-light claim about a matter of public interest is more like a defamation claim, which is why constitutional malice is required.24 One argument for keeping Hill’s demanding standard is that the harm is less serious when the speech is not defamatory, so the state’s interest weighs less in the balance. The response is that the self-help and normative rationale of Gertz appears fully applicable to false light.25 The Court applied knowing or reckless falsity to private figures in Hill and again in Cantrell, after Gertz, so it has not adopted the negligence argument.26 The Second Restatement reflects the uncertainty. Section 652E makes the defendant’s knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the publicized matter a black-letter requirement, with a caveat leaving open that a negligence standard might apply to private figures under Gertz. Without Supreme Court guidance, state courts and lower federal courts have divided on the standard of fault.27
A stem that describes an embarrassing, partly invented magazine account of a private family invites the reflex that negligence suffices because the plaintiff is private. A sound answer starts from Hill: when the account concerns a matter of public interest, the First Amendment requires proof of knowing or reckless falsity, and the answer then notes that the Court has not resolved the effect of Gertz on private plaintiffs. The same stem may tempt a student to demand that the portrayal be defamatory or to treat the publisher’s hostility as proof of malice. Hill answers the first temptation, because the statute there was not a libel statute. Cantrell answers the second, because the inquiry looks to awareness of falsity and not to ill will.
Truthful Information Lawfully Obtained
A libel defendant can be attacked for publishing a falsehood, and the libel cases built their protections around falsity and fault for that reason. A privacy claim over a true statement offers no such handle, because the plaintiff’s complaint is that the facts were disclosed at all. The Court took up that claim in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, which asked whether a state may sanction the accurate publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from judicial records kept in connection with a public prosecution and open to public inspection.29 The Court held that, at the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records.30 It chose that narrow ground on purpose, declining to decide whether truthful publication may ever be punished or whether a state may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity.31
The Court saw the interests on both sides as rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society, but it would not make public records generally available to the media and then forbid publication of what offends the sensibilities of a supposed reasonable person. Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform citizens about the public business and still stay within the law, and it would invite timidity and self-censorship.32 The government controls what it puts in its records. It can protect sensitive information by not releasing it, and a state’s interest in privacy can almost always be served that way.33
Cox rested on a court record, but later decisions widened the principle. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. invalidated a statute that prohibited publishing a juvenile defendant’s name, because the state’s interest in protecting juveniles and ensuring their rehabilitation could not overcome the defendants’ rights of speech and press.34 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia found Virginia’s criminal sanctions unjustified: the publication the Commonwealth sought to punish lay near the core of the First Amendment, and the Commonwealth offered little more than assertion and conjecture to show that sanctions were needed.35
Florida Star v. B.J.F. tied these strands together. It applied Cox and Daily Mail to hold that a state may not impose liability for invasion of privacy when a newspaper truthfully reports information lawfully obtained from public records, at least unless a state interest of the highest order justifies the sanction.36 A reporter had obtained a rape victim’s name from publicly released police records, and a Florida statute made publishing such a name negligence per se.37 The Court overturned the damage award. It accepted that the state had a compelling interest in protecting the privacy and safety of rape victims and in encouraging them to report offenses, and it held that the statute was not narrowly tailored to that interest.38 The opinion faulted the statute for several features, including three that mark what a tailored restriction would have to avoid:
- It allowed liability for information the government itself had released, although the government could take steps to prevent public disclosure.39
- It permitted liability without any scienter requirement and, by making publication negligence per se, prevented a case-by-case determination.40
- It applied only to media disclosures, which impermissibly discriminated against the press.41
The principal rule drawn from these cases is that awarding damages for media publication of information in an open public record, or lawfully obtained from the government, violates the First Amendment.42 The Court wrote narrowly, though. It did not hold that truthful publication is automatically protected, that no zone of personal privacy exists within which a state may protect individuals from intrusion by the press, or that a state may never punish publication of a sexual-offense victim’s name. It held only that punishment of truthful, lawfully obtained information may be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.43 That qualification does little work against government-sourced information, because the interest that failed in Florida Star was an important one, and a state can almost always protect its sensitive information by not releasing it.44
Bartnicki v. Vopper carried the principle beyond government sources. A tape of a telephone conversation was given to the president of a local taxpayers’ union that opposed a pay raise for teachers, and the tape went on to a radio talk show host, Fred Vopper, who played it twice on his program. The speakers sued the station and Vopper on various state and federal claims.45 The Court, per Justice Stevens, held 6–3 that the disclosures were protected by the First Amendment and that the wiretap laws, as applied, were unconstitutional. It called the wiretap law a content-neutral regulation but said that it directly regulated speech, not conduct. Relying on Florida Star, it stressed that the information was true, lawfully obtained by the media, and of significant public concern. It recognized the possible adverse effect on privacy interests, but it held that the case implicated “the core purposes of the First Amendment” because it involved sanctions “on the publication of truthful information of public concern.”46 The holding rests on three premises, and a case that lacks one of them falls outside it.
Public significance is a question about the communication and not about the defendant. In a related setting, the Dun & Bradstreet plurality said the critical issue was whether the communication involved a matter of public concern and not whether the defendant was a media defendant. In its view, the Gertz rules apply only to matters of public concern “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection,” and a construction company’s credit rating, communicated only to a very small group, was not one.47
The phrase “lawfully obtained” also limits the protection. A later decision held that the publication cases do not control when a generally applicable law is enforced against the press, because such laws do not offend the First Amendment merely because their enforcement has incidental effects on the press’s ability to gather and report the news. It added that the truthful information sought to be published must have been lawfully acquired.48 The discussion of general laws and newsgathering below returns to that line. For now, the premise shows the shape of the cases: Bartnicki protected a broadcaster that received a tape from another, and a publisher that unlawfully acquired the information itself would not fit the premise.
The first scene tracks Bartnicki: the information is true, the site received it without taking part in the interception, and it concerns public conduct, so the wiretap claim fails as applied.49 The second scene lacks the public concern on which Bartnicki rested, so the decision does not control it. The Court has not held that truthful disclosure of private facts may never be punished,50 and the recorded neighbor can invoke the disclosure tort, under which a defendant is liable for publicity about a private fact only if the fact would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not a matter of legitimate public concern.51 An answer on the second scene should argue both sides and avoid announcing that Bartnicki decides it.
None of these decisions gives the press an absolute privilege to publish the truth. Media advocates have pressed that argument on the Court, and it has so far decided the cases on narrower grounds.52 The tort itself already builds in a public-concern limit, so newsworthiness goes to an element of liability, the absence of legitimate public interest, and operates as no freestanding defense. The circumstances that give an absolute privilege against defamation, such as statements made in judicial proceedings, give an absolute privilege against invasion of privacy as well.53
Truth also fails to carry a defendant when the plaintiff’s claim does not depend on disclosing information. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court held that a state right-of-publicity tort could constitutionally impose liability on a television station for showing on the nightly news the entire act of a circus performer who got shot out of a cannon.54 Zacchini belongs to the appropriation branch of privacy, which protects the commercial or property value of a person’s identity and likeness.55 The station in Cox reported a fact from a public record, and the claim sought to punish that report. The station in Zacchini showed the performer’s entire act, and the claim protects the commercial value of that act.
A stem that describes an accurate, sensitive, and newsworthy report invites two opposite reflexes. One is to conclude that truth ends the case in the publisher’s favor, which Zacchini and the generally applicable law decision refute, since those claims do not turn on falsity. The other is to conclude that a strong privacy interest, such as a rape victim’s, lets the state punish the publication, which Florida Star rejects when the information was lawfully obtained and the sanction was not narrowly tailored. A sound answer asks what kind of claim the plaintiff has brought, where the information came from, and whether it concerns a matter of public significance.