420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975)
In August 1971, appellee Cohn's 17-year-old daughter was raped and murdered in Georgia.1 Six youths were indicted for murder and rape.2
Although there was substantial press coverage of the crime and of subsequent developments, the identity of the victim was not disclosed pending trial, perhaps because of Ga. Code Ann. § 26-9901 (1972).3
In April 1972, during court proceedings in which five defendants entered guilty pleas, reporter Wassell for petitioner Cox Broadcasting Corporation examined the indictments made available in the courtroom.4 Wassell obtained the victim's name from those public records and broadcast it on WSB-TV that day and again the following day.5
In May 1972, Cohn filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County against Cox Broadcasting and Wassell.6 The complaint alleged invasion of privacy arising from the television broadcasts that named his deceased daughter and sought money damages.7
The trial court granted summary judgment to Cohn on the issue of liability.8
The Georgia Supreme Court initially held that the complaint stated a common-law claim for public disclosure.9 On rehearing the court sustained the constitutionality of the state statute prohibiting publication of a rape victim's name.10
The United States Supreme Court postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits and reviewed the case after the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenge to liability.11
Whether the Georgia Supreme Court's decision constitutes a final judgment or decree reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1257?12
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 this Court may review a state court judgment when the federal constitutional issue has been finally decided by the highest state court even if further proceedings remain below.13 Reversal on the federal question would terminate the litigation or immediate review is required to prevent erosion of federal policy.14
Yes. The Georgia Supreme Court on rehearing upheld both the common law privacy claim and the constitutionality of the statute prohibiting publication of a rape victim's name.15 The federal issue was conclusively resolved against the broadcasters.16 Reversal by this Court would end the case without any trial on damages because the constitutional bar would preclude liability entirely.17
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the Georgia Supreme Court's decision.18
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Justice Rehnquist dissented on the question of finality under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.19 He maintained that the majority fashioned a formless and unworkable exception to the final judgment rule by looking to the merits to decide jurisdiction.20 This approach would force premature examination of constitutional questions and seriously disrupt state adjudicatory processes.21
Counsel would be compelled to seek immediate Supreme Court review in every similar case simply to preserve federal claims, producing unnecessary docket additions and delays in state litigation.22 Rehnquist stressed that the finality requirement carries added force in state court appeals because of federalism concerns and the need to minimize federal interference with state judicial functions.23
Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to impose civil liability for broadcasting the name of a rape victim obtained from public court records open to inspection?24
The First and Fourteenth Amendments command that the States shall not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection.25
No. Reporter Wassell obtained the victim's name directly from the indictments that were made available for public inspection in the courtroom during the guilty plea proceedings.26 The subsequent television broadcasts accurately reported that name taken from those public judicial records.27 The Georgia statute and the common law privacy action both seek to impose liability precisely for this publication of truthful information already placed in the public domain by the State itself.28
The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar the State from imposing civil liability for the broadcasts.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to clarify his understanding of the role of truth in defamation and privacy actions.30 He agreed that the First Amendment bars civil liability for truthful publication of matters in open judicial records.31 Powell explained that Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. largely resolves the open question identified by the majority.32 He required that truth operate as a complete defense whenever a state seeks to protect reputational or privacy interests of private individuals.33
Because the Gertz fault standard cannot be satisfied by true statements, Powell viewed the opinion as mandating recognition of truth as a full defense in this context.34
Justice Douglas concurred in the result but would have rested the decision on a broader ground.35 He maintained that the First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth, prohibits government from using state law to impose damages for the publication of news of the day or discussion of public affairs.36 Douglas analogized the case to his prior dissent in New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States and insisted there is simply no governmental power to suppress or penalize such publication regardless of the privacy interests asserted.37