433 U.S. 562 (1977)
Hugo Zacchini performs a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet away, with each performance occupying some 15 seconds.1 In August and September 1972, Zacchini was engaged to perform his act on a regular basis at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio.2 He performed in a fenced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds, and members of the public attending the fair were not charged a separate admission fee to observe his act.3
On August 30, a freelance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the operator of a television broadcasting station, attended the fair carrying a small movie camera.4 Zacchini noticed the reporter and asked him not to film the performance, and the reporter did not do so on that day.5 On the instructions of the producer of the station's daily newscast, the reporter returned the following day and videotaped the entire act.6 This film clip, approximately 15 seconds in length, was shown on the 11 o'clock news program that night, together with favorable commentary.7
Zacchini then brought this action for damages against Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.8 He alleged that the station showed and commercialized the film of his act without his consent.9 Such conduct was an unlawful appropriation of his professional property.10 The trial court granted summary judgment for the broadcaster.11 The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed.12 The Supreme Court of Ohio gave judgment for the broadcaster.13
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent from damages for its alleged infringement of petitioner's state-law right of publicity?15
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media from damages when they broadcast a performer's entire act without consent.16 A state may protect the right of publicity to encourage entertainment by allowing the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors in a manner closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law.17
No. The rule requires that a state's interest in protecting the proprietary interest in a performance be weighed against press freedoms.18 The balance favors compensation when the entire act is appropriated.19 Zacchini's 15-second cannonball performance was the product of his talents and effort, and its economic value lies in exclusive control over publicity.20 Broadcasting the full act on the evening news allowed the public to view it without payment at the fair.21 This directly threatened that value in the same way that unauthorized filming of a copyrighted work or sporting event would.22 This case differs from false-light privacy claims because Zacchini sought only damages for the appropriation of the performance itself rather than an injunction against any publication.23 Respondent knew of his objection yet proceeded.24
The Ohio court's privilege therefore exceeded what the First and Fourteenth Amendments require.25
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed because the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not compel the state to privilege the broadcaster's use of the entire performance.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Powell dissented on the ground that routine television news coverage of a concededly newsworthy event should receive First Amendment protection absent a strong showing that the broadcast served as a subterfuge for private commercial exploitation.27 He viewed the 15-second news clip as an ordinary exercise of the press's informing function rather than an appropriation comparable to keeping profits from a full commercial broadcast of a performance.28 Powell warned that the majority's emphasis on whether the footage captured an entire act would invite media self-censorship, causing editors to forgo coverage of local events or limit reports to verbal descriptions, thereby harming the public interest in full news reporting.29
Justice Stevens dissented separately, concluding that the Ohio Supreme Court's privilege ruling appeared to define the substantive limits of the state-law tort of appropriation rather than to announce a federal constitutional immunity.30 Because the state court's opinion could be read as resting on its own common-law development of the right of publicity, influenced but not compelled by First Amendment precedent, Stevens would have remanded the case for clarification of the precise state-law holding before addressing the federal question.31