Concept
Voting Rights
Fundamental rights
Voting Rights
The Fifteenth Amendment states the right to vote more plainly than any other provision of the Constitution: neither the United States nor any State may deny or abridge the right of citizens to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.1 Its text names three forbidden grounds and stops there, so it does not answer whether a state may exclude voters, or count their ballots unequally, for reasons that have nothing to do with race. Other amendments and scattered references elsewhere in the Constitution speak to voting as well, and beyond that text the Court recognizes a fundamental individual right to vote, which it enforces through the Equal Protection Clause.2 Voting thus joins the short list of interests introduced at the start of this chapter, and a claim that a voting rule burdens it draws the closer review that follows a fundamental right.
Voting earns that treatment for a reason tied to the deference described earlier. Courts defer to a legislature's ordinary choices because people who dislike a law can answer it at the polls, and the ballot is the tool that makes the answer possible. A rule that shrinks the electorate, weights some votes more heavily than others, or lets officials count similar ballots differently attacks that tool directly. People shut out or discounted in this way cannot vote out the officials who shut them out, so the error corrects itself for no one and carries over to every other law those officials enact. Protecting the vote therefore protects the process through which all the other rights in this chapter are defended.
The right is not absolute. The individual right to vote exists alongside a compelling government power to regulate elections, so the decisions go both ways.3 A state must decide who is eligible, how candidates qualify, and how ballots are cast and counted, and the recurring question is whether a given rule is a justified exercise of that power or an unjustified burden on the franchise. The subsections below answer it in five stages: the sources of the right, the rules that decide who may vote, the rules that decide how much each vote weighs, the use of race in drawing district lines, and the standards for counting ballots after an election. Across all five, one principle holds: once a state grants the franchise, it must protect it from arbitrary or unequal treatment.
Voting as a Fundamental Right
Voting is the one fundamental right in this chapter with an express constitutional text behind it. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides that neither the United States nor any State may deny or abridge the right of citizens to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.4 Section 2 gives Congress power to enforce the article by appropriate legislation.5 Procreation, marriage, and travel reached the Court through the general guarantees of liberty and equality, and that textual footing is what sets voting apart from them.6 The footing is narrow, because the Amendment names three grounds of exclusion and nothing else; the first question in any voting problem is therefore which source of law the facts call for.
The Amendment works by forbidding a single reason for exclusion. The Court has described the division of authority this way: the right to vote in the states comes from the states, while exemption from racial discrimination in voting comes from the United States.7 Rice v. Cayetano describes the Amendment as reaffirming the equality of the races at the most basic level of the democratic process, as self-executing, and as protecting all persons rather than members of one race.8 The case itself struck down a Hawaii constitutional provision that limited the vote for trustees of a state agency to descendants of certain races, a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.9 A state cannot escape by choosing neutral vocabulary. In Guinn v. United States, Oklahoma exempted from a literacy test the lineal descendants of people entitled to vote on January 1, 1866, a rule that never mentioned race, and the Court invalidated it because the test served only to perpetuate the old exclusion and to effect a transparent racial one.10 A rule that sorts voters by race, or by a stand-in built to reproduce race, therefore falls to the text without any balancing of state interests.
Three other amendments follow the same pattern for other grounds. The Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920, bars denial or abridgment of the vote on account of sex; the Twenty-Fourth, ratified in 1964, bars denial of the vote in federal elections for failure to pay a poll tax or other tax; and the Twenty-Sixth, adopted in 1971, protects citizens who are eighteen or older from denial on account of age.11 Like the Fifteenth, each prohibits exclusion on a stated ground, and none gives every citizen an affirmative right to vote.12 The reason lies in the original structure, which left voter qualifications to the states and tied voting for Congress to the qualifications for the most numerous branch of the state legislature.13 An amendment written as a ban on a particular ground leaves the states' power over qualifications intact in every direction the ban does not touch. A rule that excludes voters on a ground none of these amendments names, such as wealth in a state election or ownership of property, therefore finds no help in any of them and needs a different source.
That source is the Equal Protection Clause. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court struck down Virginia's annual $1.50 poll tax on residents over twenty-one and held that a state violates equal protection whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.14 Justice Douglas's opinion acknowledged that the Constitution nowhere expressly mentions a right to vote in state elections. It reasoned that once a state grants the franchise to the electorate, the lines it draws may not be inconsistent with equal protection, and that wealth, like race, creed, or color, has no relation to a person's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.15 The opinion supported that conclusion by recalling that Yick Wo had called voting a “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.”16
The phrase “preservative of all rights” explains the strictness of review. Voting is how a people chooses a government that will safeguard its other liberties, so an unjustified exclusion from the ballot undermines the legitimacy of representative government itself.17 Ordinary deference rests on the assumption that people who dislike a law can seek its repeal through the political process, and a person shut out of that process cannot do so. The Court has recognized that those burdened by laws distributing the franchise selectively are, by definition, harmed in their access to the political processes that ordinarily bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.18 A law that infringes voting escapes the check that justifies deference to other laws, which is why the Court insists that any alleged infringement of the right to vote “must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”19 Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 applied that standard to a rule confining voting in school board elections to people who owned or leased property in the district or had school-age children, and held that any denial of access to the ballot must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest.20 Set beside Rice and Guinn, Harper and Kramer show the two sources working side by side. A fee or a property test falls equally on every race, so the Fifteenth Amendment gives no footing in a state election, yet each fails under equal protection once the state must show a compelling interest.
The equal protection right is a right to participate on equal terms, and it does not extend to voting for every office. It comes into play only when some other provision of law requires that a particular office be filled by popular election, and then laws that distribute the franchise selectively or unequally are generally subject to strict scrutiny.21 The right is thus fundamental for equal protection purposes but not for due process purposes.22 Bush v. Gore draws the same line for presidential elections. An individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for presidential electors unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election, but when the legislature vests the vote in the people, the right to vote as prescribed is fundamental, in part because of the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.23
Strict scrutiny attaches to laws that declare some group ineligible to vote. The Court applies a lesser standard to evenhanded rules about proving eligibility, such as a photo identification requirement.24 Age, residency, and citizenship rules are the traditional exceptions to the strict review of eligibility laws, and the next subsection takes up how those lines are drawn.
Race claims carry one further burden: the claimant must prove a discriminatory purpose. The Court has extended that requirement to the Fifteenth Amendment's ban on race-based interference with voting, and Mobile v. Bolden is the key case.25 In Bolden, Black voters challenged a city commission whose three members were elected at large, claiming that the system ensured that no Black candidate could win. The challenge failed because they did not prove that the system was created or maintained for a racially discriminatory purpose, and statistics on its impact were relevant but not decisive.26 The cases that go the other way differ in what the record showed about why the rule existed. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Alabama redrew Tuskegee's boundaries from a square into a twenty-eight-sided figure that removed nearly 400 Black voters and no white voters, and the Court held that the redrawing deprived citizens of the vote on the basis of race and violated the Fifteenth Amendment.27 In Rogers v. Lodge, the Court upheld findings that a county's at-large system was maintained so that those holding power could disregard minority interests, evidence that went beyond the fact that no Black candidate had ever been elected.28 Hunter v. Underwood invalidated under equal protection a disqualification for crimes of moral turpitude, because the records of the 1901 convention showed it would not have been adopted but for the purpose of disenfranchising Black persons, and it still fell disproportionately on them.29
The purpose requirement fits the Amendment's wording, since a rule adopted for reasons unrelated to race has not denied the vote on account of race even if it falls unevenly. Disparate impact alone will not invalidate an election rule under the Constitution, although Congress may reach discriminatory impact by statute.30 It did so after Bolden, when it amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit any voting practice that results in the denial or abridgement of the vote on account of race, whether or not the practice has a discriminatory purpose.31 The Bolden dissent had argued that a showing of purpose or of effect should suffice under the Fifteenth Amendment, but that view did not carry the Court.32 An exam answer should therefore separate the constitutional claim, which needs proof of purpose, from the statutory claim, which can succeed on results.
Denying the Franchise
Harper gave the right to vote its equal protection source, and its answer set the question asked of every rule that sorts people into voters and nonvoters. Virginia charged each resident over twenty-one an annual poll tax of $1.50 and made payment a condition of voting.34 Justice Douglas conceded that the Constitution nowhere mentions a right to vote in state elections and then treated the concession as beside the point, because once a state grants the franchise, the lines it draws may not be inconsistent with equal protection.35 The state's interest in voting, he explained, is limited to the power to fix qualifications, and wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to a person's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.36
That reasoning gives the poll-tax holding its shape. A qualification is a screen that decides who takes part, and a screen is defensible only to the extent that it sorts people by something connected to taking part. A fee sorts people by money, which makes it a “capricious or irrelevant factor” as a measure of a voter's qualifications, so the amount of the fee and the challenger's ability to pay drop out of the analysis.37 The Court gave the same answer to the state's analogy to driver's license fees: a state may charge for a license, but when it comes to the ballot its interest reaches only qualifications.38 Justice Harlan's dissent argued that a small tax could rationally promote civic responsibility by weeding out voters who care little about public affairs.39 The Court's later account of Harper answers him directly, because a restriction can have a rational justification and still be invidious when it is unrelated to voter qualifications.40 Rationality of purpose therefore never carries a poll tax through, which is why the standard applied in Harper is a precursor of modern strict scrutiny.41
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 applied the same logic to a rule that looked more defensible, because it tied the vote to a plausible stake in the outcome. New York limited voting in certain school district elections to residents who owned or leased taxable real property in the district or who were parents of children enrolled in its public schools, and the challenger was a thirty-one-year-old stockbroker who lived in his parents' home and fell into neither group.42 Chief Justice Warren called for a “close and exacting examination,” since statutes that distribute the franchise are the foundation of a representative society.43 The reason runs through the presumption that ordinarily protects legislation. Courts presume a law valid on the assumption that state institutions fairly represent all the people, but a challenge to who counts among the people attacks that assumption itself, so the presumption cannot decide the case.44 The state must therefore show that the exclusion is necessary to promote a compelling interest.45
The Court did not decide whether a state may confine a school election to those primarily interested in school affairs. It assumed the answer was yes and struck the statute down for lack of fit.46 The classifications had to be tailored so that excluding the challenger and others like him was necessary to the state's goal, and the issue was not whether the legislature's judgment was rational, since a more exacting standard applied.47 The lines failed because they admitted many people with at best “a remote and indirect interest” in school affairs while shutting out others with a distinct and direct one.48 The opinion's footnote shows the mismatch with two residents: the stockbroker pays state and federal taxes and is affected by school board decisions, yet has no vote, while an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no such taxes can vote because he rents an apartment in the district.49 A line that leaves out people who share the interest and admits people who lack it cannot be necessary to the goal it claims to serve.
Harper and Kramer lose at different steps, and an exam answer should say which one is in play. In Harper the criterion, wealth, bears no relation to voting qualifications at all, so the state loses before any tailoring question arises. In Kramer the criterion, a stake in school affairs, is one the Court was willing to assume could be legitimate, and the state loses on the means. A fee is a defect in the line itself, while an ownership or parenthood test is a defect in how well the line matches its purpose.
Kramer left room for a narrower category, and the cases that fill it show how far a state can go. A limited-function unit of government whose operations fall disproportionately on one group may confine the franchise to that group, and a challenger must then show that the restriction is wholly unrelated to the election's purpose.50 In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, a water storage district with limited authority, whose operations affected land and not residents as residents, could limit its elections to landowners, and the Court required only a reasonable basis for such a special-interest election.51 Bond elections show where that room ends. In Cipriano v. Houma, the Court unanimously invalidated a Louisiana rule that let only property owners vote on municipal utility bonds paid from utility revenue, and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski extended the point to general obligation bonds that did draw on property taxes, finding the differences between owners and nonowners too slight to justify excluding the others.52
The scene follows the Harper line: a failure to pay is irrelevant to whether a person may take part in the election, so the state may not use the ballot as a collection device. For federal elections the Twenty-Fourth Amendment separately forbids conditioning the vote on a poll tax, which leaves equal protection to supply the rule for state and local elections.53
Strict scrutiny governs the exclusion of otherwise qualified residents, and the Court has marked off the ground where it gives way. The general formula is that a classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless the state shows that it serves a compelling interest.54 Residence and citizenship requirements receive only rational basis review because they track a stake in the community; without them, the fate of a town could be decided by outsiders who arrive on election day just to cast ballots.55 The same logic supports Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, which upheld denying the city vote to people who lived outside the city limits but inside its police jurisdiction.56 A durational residency rule differs from a bona fide residence rule, because it temporarily shuts out people who are in fact residents, and it draws strict scrutiny, as this chapter's earlier discussion of Dunn v. Blumstein showed.57
Two recognized exceptions lie outside that group. Literacy tests survived Harper's logic because a reading test has some relation to the intelligent use of the ballot, which a fee never could, and Harper itself distinguished Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections on that ground.58 That survival has a boundary, since a literacy requirement or an exemption built to carry forward a racial exclusion violates the Fifteenth Amendment, as the preceding subsection showed. Convicted felons are the other exception. A state may disenfranchise them under Richardson v. Ramirez, even though the compelling interest test has otherwise produced the invalidation of almost every restriction on access to the ballot.59 That exception stands apart from the reasoning of Harper and Kramer, which would treat an eligibility ban as a classification demanding a compelling interest, so it is best memorized as a recognized exception. It has its own limit as well: a facially neutral disqualification for crimes of moral turpitude was struck down under equal protection because it was adopted with a racially discriminatory purpose.60
Rules about how eligible voters prove who they are come out differently from rules that exclude a class. Strict scrutiny governs laws that say persons of a described kind may not vote, and a lesser standard governs laws that tell every voter how to establish eligibility.61 Crawford v. Marion County Election Board upheld Indiana's requirement that in-person voters show government-issued photo identification, rejecting a facial challenge with six Justices voting to uphold the law and no majority opinion.62 The lead opinion applied the balancing approach of Anderson v. Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi, weighing the character and magnitude of the burden on voters against the precise interests the state offers, so that severe burdens draw strict scrutiny while reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions are justified by the state's important regulatory interests.63
Both sides of that scale were filled in on the record. Indiana pointed to deterring and detecting voter fraud, cleaning registration rolls that listed deceased or departed voters, and safeguarding voter confidence, and the lead opinion accepted those interests even though the record showed no instance of in-person impersonation in the state, because such fraud had occurred elsewhere and could affect a close election.64 On the burden side, the identification cards were free, and a voter without one could cast a provisional ballot that counted after a trip to the circuit court clerk within ten days to sign an affidavit, so the lead opinion saw no substantial burden for most voters.65 The price of the cards carries the contrast with Harper. The lead opinion said that the fact that most voters already held a license would not have saved the statute under Harper if the state had charged a fee for a new photo identification.66 A fee is an electoral standard unrelated to qualifications, while a free card is a way of proving a qualification the voter must already meet.
The separate opinions show where the real dispute lay. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred in the judgment and treated the law as a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory regulation whose effects on individual voters do not bear on the severity of the burden.67 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, accepted the balancing framework but found nontrivial burdens on tens of thousands of citizens and no adequate factual showing by the state.68 No justice who sustained the law suggested that the state must show a compelling interest for an eligibility-proof rule, so the argument concerned how heavy the burden was.69 The lead opinion added that even if the burden could not be justified for a few voters, that would not establish a right to facial invalidation.70
The two standards differ because the two kinds of rule do different things to the electorate. A rule that declares a class ineligible removes that class from the process through which an unwelcome law can be repealed, which is the condition Kramer identified for setting aside the presumption of validity. A rule that asks every voter to establish eligibility leaves the electorate intact and aims at the reliability of the count that every voter depends on, so the Court weighs its burden against its benefit instead of demanding necessity.71 The reasoning has a ceiling: a verification rule that in practice shuts voters out, or that charges them money, moves up the scale toward strict review.
Step three is where poll-tax and property problems end, and step five is where photo identification problems begin. Demanding a compelling interest from a rule that only verifies eligibility, or accepting a rational explanation for a fee, is the usual way to misanalyze a voting question.
One Person, One Vote
A vote can be diminished by the way it is weighted as surely as by being refused at the polls, and Reynolds v. Sims supplies the baseline rule for that injury. The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned on a population basis, so that an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted compared with the votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.73 The last subsection concerned rules that decide who may cast a ballot. Here everyone votes, and the question is how much each ballot counts once the district lines are drawn. Individual vote dilution is one of the recognized ways the equal right to vote can be infringed, and like the others it draws strict scrutiny.74 Reynolds also serves as the reference point for the two subsections that follow, since race-based districting and unequal counting of ballots are different injuries to the same right, and each is easier to understand against the plain numerical rule stated here.
Before the 1960s many state legislatures were badly malapportioned, meaning that one district could hold far more people than another that elected the same number of legislators. The usual cause was that the lines were never redrawn after people moved to the cities, and the legislators who benefited from the old lines were unlikely to change them.75 That feature left the voters on the losing end with no ordinary political remedy, which is the condition that justifies close judicial review. Federal courts nonetheless stayed out at first. In Colegrove v. Green, a plurality refused to reach the merits of a challenge to Illinois's congressional districts and urged that courts ought not to enter the political thicket.76 Baker v. Carr reversed that posture in 1962, holding that voters who allege that their votes were debased in comparison with voters in favored counties have standing, and that an equal protection challenge to a state apportionment statute presents no political question merely because it seeks protection of a political right.77
Baker settled only that courts could hear these claims. Gray v. Sanders then announced the principle that districts for a legislative body must be about the same size, and Reynolds gave the most elaborate account of it.78 The Alabama scheme in Reynolds shows what the principle forbids. The legislature was still apportioned on the 1900 census, and under 1960 figures only 25.1% of the state's population lived in districts that elected a majority of the Senate.79 Population-variance ratios reached about 41 to 1 in the Senate and 16 to 1 in the House, so Jefferson County, with 634,864 people, had a single senator, exactly as Lowndes County did with 15,417.80 A Jefferson County voter therefore had roughly one forty-first of the say in choosing a senator that a Lowndes County voter had. Alabama's own procedures offered no escape, because amending the state constitution began with a three-fifths vote of both houses or a convention call by a majority of both houses, so either route started with the very legislature whose composition was in dispute.81
The Court's reasoning runs in a chain. The franchise is fundamental in a free society and preserves other basic civil and political rights, so any alleged infringement of it “must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”82 Legislators, in the Court's words, “represent people, not trees or acres,” and because legislators are elected by voters rather than by farms, cities, or economic interests, the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where the citizen lives.83 A scheme that weights votes by residence also hands control of the legislature to a minority, which the Court regarded as a denial of majority rights that far surpasses any denial of minority rights it might prevent.84 The minority that gains from the old lines writes the new ones, so the legislature cannot be expected to correct itself, and the courts become the only available check.
Justice Harlan dissented in the reapportionment cases on the ground that the majority ignored the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in his account showed that neither its proposers nor its ratifiers believed the Equal Protection Clause limited how states apportioned their legislatures, and that the Court's argument reduced to the claim that equal means equal.85 The majority answered that a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection, and that the judicial oath and office require no less, whatever the danger of entering a political thicket.86 The disagreement concerns whether the Clause reaches apportionment at all, and the rest of this subsection applies the majority's answer.
One proposed Alabama plan, the 67-Senator Amendment, gave each county a single senator, which at a glance resembles the two Senate seats the Constitution gives each state regardless of population.87 The Court rejected the comparison. Representation in Congress grew out of a compromise among formerly independent states that gave up part of their sovereignty to form a union, whereas counties, cities, and other political subdivisions have never been sovereign and are subordinate instrumentalities that the state created to carry out its functions.88 The U.S. Senate departs from one person, one vote and survives only because the Constitution itself embeds it.89 The same reasoning explains why the rule reaches both houses of a state legislature. If one chamber were exempt, its unrepresentative membership could obstruct the laws pressed by the representative chamber, and the guarantee would accomplish little.90
The rule has practical limits, and the Court stated them in the same opinion. Identical populations in every district are a practical impossibility, so the Equal Protection Clause demands an honest and good faith effort to construct districts in both houses as nearly equal in population as is practicable, and mathematical exactness is not required.91 Some deviation is permissible when it rests on legitimate considerations incident to a rational state policy.92 Respect for political subdivision lines is the consideration the Court found of substance, since much legislative activity is local legislation directed at particular subdivisions and fidelity to existing boundaries deters gerrymandering.93
The same opinion closes the doors that history and self-interest might push open. Neither history alone, nor economic or other group interests, nor area alone can justify a disparity from population-based representation, because citizens and not land or pastures cast the votes.94 Even a clearly rational policy of giving subdivisions some voice fails when it submerges population as the controlling consideration.95 Alabama's county-based senate and its 1900 lines fall on this side of the line, while the commission's small, explained deviation falls on the other, and the gap between them is the reason for the deviation and its size.
What if the voters themselves approved the malapportioned plan? In Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, the defenders of Colorado's scheme argued that the voters had adopted it by statewide referendum after rejecting a plan that apportioned both houses by population, and the Court held that the approval has no federal constitutional significance when the plan fails the requirements of Reynolds.96 The right to an equally weighted vote belongs to the individual, and a citizen's constitutional rights cannot be infringed simply because a majority chooses that they be.97 A referendum is the majority speaking, and a right that the majority could waive on behalf of the voters it wished to outweigh would protect none of them.
The numerical standard is stricter for the United States House than for state legislatures. Wesberry v. Sanders applied the same logic to congressional districts under Article I, Section 2, which requires apportionment according to respective Numbers, and held that as nearly as is practicable one person's vote in a congressional election must be worth as much as another's.98 The districts there ranged from 394,312 to 823,680 people.99 Karcher v. Daggett adds that congressional districts have no de minimis level of permissible malapportionment and must reach absolute mathematical equality so far as it is attainable, while White v. Regester shows a little more leeway for state legislative districts.100 The difference follows the shape of the two standards. The congressional rule is a textual command that votes in different districts be worth the same, whereas the state rule asks for a good-faith effort and tolerates gaps that serve a rational state policy.
The equal-population rule reaches beyond legislatures, because it applies to the election of any public official by popular vote, as Hadley v. Junior College District held.101 Departures from it receive strict scrutiny, with a limited exception for special-purpose bodies: a governmental unit with a strictly limited purpose that disproportionately affects one group may confine the vote to that group and receives only rational basis review, as in Ball v. James. That is the exception the previous subsection described for water storage districts, and it stays narrow because an ordinary legislature's decisions reach everyone. A separate question is what population must be equalized. In Evenwel v. Abbott, the Court held only that states are at least free to equalize total population and refrained from deciding whether they may equalize voter-eligible population, and Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, argued that Wesberry and Reynolds were mistakes and that the Constitution imposes no equal representation principle.102
Equal numbers do not guarantee fair lines. Partisan gerrymandering, in which the majority party redraws districts to favor itself, is not justiciable under Rucho v. Common Cause, so a plan with equal populations can still concentrate or scatter an opposing party's voters without offending the rule taught here.103 Other harms to the right to vote fall under different tests, and the next subsections take up two of them: Miller v. Johnson subjects a plan in which race is the predominant factor in drawing lines to strict scrutiny, and Bush v. Gore holds that a recount using varying, standardless procedures treats similarly marked ballots differently.
Step four does most of the work in state cases, because the numbers are seldom in dispute and the contest is over whether the stated policy explains the gap. Step five is the rare exception and should be reached only when the facts describe a body with a narrow function, such as a district that taxes and serves only a particular class of landowners.
Race and Districting
The Equal Protection Clause's central mandate is racial neutrality in governmental decision making, and Miller v. Johnson carries that mandate into the drawing of district lines.105 The Court held that a redistricting plan violates equal protection when race is the predominant factor in drawing the lines, subordinating traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. Such a plan must satisfy strict scrutiny and is invalid unless it is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. The last subsection showed that equal-population districts protect the weight of each vote, yet a plan can meet that standard and still assign voters to districts according to their race. That separate injury is the fourth way the right to vote may be infringed, after selective denial of the franchise, individual vote dilution, and group vote dilution.106 Challengers call such a plan a racial gerrymander, meaning a map in which race, rather than other districting principles, organized the lines. Miller belongs in this chapter because it protects equal treatment in the exercise of the franchise, even though no voter in the case lost a ballot or saw one discounted.
The claim is analytically distinct from a vote dilution claim. A dilution claim alleges that the state adopted a voting scheme as a purposeful device to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial minorities, while the claim in Miller is that the state used race as a basis for separating voters into districts.107 A district built so that a minority group forms its majority cancels out no one's strength, because the districts are of equal size and the majority group typically keeps at least its proportional share of the seats.108 Strict scrutiny applies anyway, because the sorting itself does harm. Assigning voters by race rests on the assumption that voters of a particular race “think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”109 It also tells the elected official that the primary obligation is “to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole,” and it threatens to “balkanize us into competing racial factions.”110 Those harms come from using race as the sorting tool, so they arise whichever race is burdened or benefited, and a remedial motive does not remove a plan from strict scrutiny.111
The doctrine began with Shaw v. Reno, which involved a North Carolina district about 160 miles long that for much of its length was no wider than the I-85 corridor.112 The Court held that a plaintiff states a claim by alleging that a plan, on its face, has no rational explanation save as an effort to separate voters on the basis of race.113 Because that holding rested on a bizarre shape, it left open how much shape mattered and whether any race-motivated plan would draw strict scrutiny.114 Miller answered that bizarreness is not a prerequisite. Shape is relevant because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that “race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.”115 A challenger may therefore prove predominance through circumstantial evidence of shape and demographics or through more direct evidence of legislative purpose. In either case the challenger must show that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral principles to racial considerations, including compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, and communities defined by actual shared interests.116
Georgia's Eleventh District shows predominance proved without extreme irregularity. Georgia, which had to obtain Justice Department approval of any redistricting plan under the Voting Rights Act, enacted a plan with three majority-black districts. The dense population centers of the Eleventh, including Atlanta, Augusta, and Savannah, were all majority-black and sat at the district's periphery, tied to a sparsely populated rural core by thin land bridges. The district covered 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic and split eight counties and five municipalities.117 Five white voters who lived in the district sued, and the lower court found race to be the overriding and predominant force in the plan.118 The Supreme Court acknowledged that by comparison with other districts the shape might not seem bizarre on its face, but shape considered together with racial and population densities and with evidence of a predominant desire to assign black populations to the district was enough.119
The direct evidence carried the most weight. Georgia's own Attorney General had objected to the Justice Department's demand for three majority-black districts on the ground that the state would have to “violate all reasonable standards of compactness and contiguity,” and the Court called that statement powerful evidence that traditional principles had been subordinated to race.120 The state's fallback, that the district joined communities of interest, also failed, because the evidence showed no tangible communities of interest across hundreds of miles and fractured political, social, and economic interests among the district's black residents.121 A state remains free to recognize communities that have a particular racial makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common thread of relevant interests. Assuming that voters share political interests because of their race is the stereotype the Equal Protection Clause forbids.122
Awareness of race does not trigger strict scrutiny. Legislatures drawing lines nearly always know the racial demographics, just as they know age, economic status, and political persuasion, and the Court has said that such awareness does not mean race predominates.123 In Bush v. Vera, the plurality put the point directly: “Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race.”124 Nor does it apply to every intentional creation of a majority-minority district, because the plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate districting principles were subordinated to race.125 The reason lies in how the test is built. If awareness sufficed, nearly every map would face strict scrutiny and the state would have to justify routine choices about where lines fall, so the predominance requirement screens for the plans in which race displaced the other principles. Until a challenger makes that showing, the legislature's good faith is presumed.126 Vera itself applied strict scrutiny to the Texas districts, because the evidence showed that racial motivations had a qualitatively greater influence on the lines than political motivations.127
The commission and the Georgia legislature both knew the racial makeup of the district they were drawing, and the difference lies in what happened to the traditional principles. Justice O'Connor, whose vote supplied the fifth in Miller, described the standard as one requiring a state to have relied on race in “substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices,” and she observed that it does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the nation's congressional districts even though race may well have been considered.128 Predominance also asks which criterion actually placed voters in the district, and the legislature's ultimate goal does not answer that question. If race was the predominant criterion for placing a significant number of voters within or without a district, strict scrutiny applies even when the end goal was partisan advantage, because sorting voters by race remains suspect even when race serves as a proxy for political characteristics.129 The opposite result appears in Easley v. Cromartie, where the Court reversed a finding of racial predominance because the legislature's focus had been to keep a district reliably Democratic and its sizable African American population was largely a byproduct of including Democratic precincts.130
Once race predominates, the state must show a compelling interest and a narrow fit. Remedying the effects of past discrimination can be a compelling interest, but maximizing the number of majority-minority districts under a Justice Department policy is not. The remedial interest carries its own limit, because the state needs a strong basis in evidence for concluding that remedial action is necessary, so the remedy reaches only as far as the wrong it repairs.131 A policy of maximization has no comparable stopping point, since its target is a number of districts, and each additional district can be demanded without any showing about the discrimination being cured. Georgia could point only to the Justice Department's demands, and the Court concluded that those demands were not necessary for eliminating past discrimination in the state. The Voting Rights Act itself does not require the maximum possible number of majority-minority districts, and reading it that way would require the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.132 Courts reviewing such a defense must keep in mind the difference between what a federal statute permits and what it requires.133
Four justices dissented, and their objection went to the nature of the injury. The dissenting argument was that affirmative action in voting differs from affirmative action in employment or education. A white applicant who is passed over for a job or a school seat arguably loses something to the preference, but in voting every person still gets to vote and every vote is counted equally.134 Justice Ginsburg added that “to accommodate the reality of ethnic bonds, legislatures have long drawn voting districts along ethnic lines.”135 She also argued that majority voters do not lack means to press their legislators, so they need no special judicial solicitude, and she warned that the new standard opens the way to federal litigation whenever traditional principles arguably receive less weight than race.136 The majority answered that an argument excusing districting from ordinary equal protection rules because it always involves race assumes that individuals of the same race share a single political interest.137 The two sides disagree about what counts as injury. For the dissent it is exclusion or dilution of a group's votes, and for the majority it is the state's assignment of voters to districts by race.
Steps one and two do most of the work, because the racial data is seldom in dispute and the contest is over whether other principles gave way. A bizarre shape helps at step one but is not required, as the compact-looking but race-driven Georgia district shows.
Standardless Recounts
Bush v. Gore holds that a statewide recount of presidential votes, run under varying and standardless procedures for deciding what each ballot shows, violates the Equal Protection Clause because it treats similarly marked ballots differently.138 The decision adds one more way to infringe the equal right to vote: counting similar ballots unequally.139 The earlier subsections concern who may vote, how much a ballot weighs, and which district a voter is assigned to. A recount claim attacks the moment after the ballot is cast, when officials decide whether and how it counts, and it applies the same principle at that later stage.
The case begins with a limit before it reaches a rule. A citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for presidential electors unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the way to appoint them, and a legislature that prefers may select the electors itself.140 That limit has the same structure as the attorney general example earlier in this chapter, where the equal protection right to vote arose only because some other provision of law called for an election. Once the legislature vests the vote in the people, the right to vote as the legislature prescribed is fundamental, in part because of the equal weight each vote carries and the equal dignity each voter is owed.141 That status follows the vote through the counting stage, because equal protection governs the manner of exercising the right as well as the initial grant of the franchise. A state that has granted the vote on equal terms may not, the Court said, “by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.”142 The Court tied this to Reynolds v. Sims, which recognized that the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the franchise.143 A count that applies one yardstick in one room and another in the next room debases ballots the way malapportioned districts did. Two voters who marked their ballots identically end up with different influence, and the difference follows where the ballots happened to be counted rather than anything the voters did.
The dispute arose from Florida's presidential count in 2000, where the margin was so thin that a manual recount of punch-card ballots carried the stakes of the election.144 The Florida Supreme Court ordered a hand recount of undervotes, meaning ballots on which the machines had recorded no presidential choice, and the Court held that the recount order failed to protect the fundamental right of each voter.145 The controversy centered on cards meant to be perforated with a stylus. Where the perforation was incomplete, a chad might hang by two corners or be only indented, so a machine could not register the vote and a human counter had to judge what the mark meant.146
Florida's basic command for counting legally cast votes was to consider the “intent of the voter,” and the Court accepted that command as unobjectionable in the abstract and as a sound starting principle.147 The defect lay in the absence of specific standards to ensure that the command would be applied equally, and the Court concluded that uniform rules for these recurring ballot conditions were both practicable and necessary.148 The reasoning rests on a contrast with a familiar task. Courts search for intent all the time, and when the question is whether to believe a witness, the judgment depends on demeanor and cannot be refined much further. Here the factfinder confronts a thing and must interpret marks, holes, or scratches on a piece of cardboard, so the search for intent can be confined by specific rules written in advance.149 A rule is practicable for ballots because the evidence is the mark itself, which looks the same to whoever picks the card up. A rule is necessary because, without one, each counter's private threshold for what a dimple means becomes the working standard, and two counters can disagree about the same dimple.
The record showed that disagreement in operation. A monitor in Miami-Dade County testified that three members of the county canvassing board applied different standards in defining a legal vote. Palm Beach County began with a 1990 guideline that excluded completely attached chads, moved to a rule counting a ballot if any light showed through a chad, returned to the 1990 rule, and then dropped any per se rule until a court ordered that dimpled chads be treated as legal.150 Between counties, Broward applied a more forgiving standard than Palm Beach and uncovered almost three times as many new votes, a result markedly disproportionate to the difference in population between the two.151 A dimpled chad counted in one room and rejected in another is the injury the Court had in view, since the ballots were identical and the outcome turned on who held them. The Court treated this as a recurrence of the arbitrary and disparate treatment of voters in different counties condemned in Gray v. Sanders, and it drew on Moore v. Ogilvie, which invalidated a county-based procedure that diluted the influence of citizens in larger counties.152
The Court did not rest on the missing standard alone. Three further features of the recount order show how widely it looked for unequal treatment, and each concerns a different stage of the process:
- In three counties the hand recount reached every ballot instead of only undervotes, and a hand count surfaces overvotes (ballots with more than one mark) that a machine would never count, so a voter whose ballot the machine could not read might have it counted by hand while a voter who marked two candidates in a way the machine could discern had no similar chance, with as many as 110,000 overvotes estimated statewide.153
- The certified total included a partial count from Miami-Dade County, which gave no assurance that recounts folded into a final certification would be complete, and the Court answered the time pressure behind that result by saying that a desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees.154
- The order did not say who would do the recounting, so county boards assembled ad hoc teams of judges with no training in handling and interpreting ballots, and observers could watch the process but could not object.155
The features share one structure: in each, the fate of a ballot depends on the people who happen to handle it and on rules that no one fixed beforehand. That structure also explains why the missing standard mattered to the Justices who disagreed about the result. Justice Breyer observed that differing standards could favor one candidate or the other, and that time was too short for ordinary judicial review to iron out the differences.156 A standard fixed before the counting begins cannot be shaped to the ballots in front of the counters, and a standard improvised during the count can be.
Does the decision mean that counties in one state may not use different voting equipment? An exam fact pattern is likely to press that question, and the opinions answer it in layers. The per curiam said the question before it was whether a state court with power to assure uniformity could order a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards, and it framed the issue as something other than whether local entities may develop different systems for implementing elections.157 Justice Souter, who found the equal protection claim meritorious, explained that the Clause does not forbid a variety of voting mechanisms within a jurisdiction, because local variety can be justified by cost and the potential value of innovation. The record here, he said, showed a different order of disparity: differing rules for reading intent applied to identical ballots on identical machines with identical physical features such as dimpled chads.158 He could conceive of no legitimate state interest served by those differing treatments, and he called the differences “wholly arbitrary.”159 Justice Stevens, who would have found no violation, worried that the majority's logic, taken seriously, might call into question Florida's decision to let each county choose its own balloting system despite large differences in accuracy.160 Justice Breyer's dissent put numbers on that variety, reporting that optical-scan counties registered no presidential vote on about 0.3 percent of ballots against 1.53 percent in punch-card counties.161
The hypothetical marks the edge of what the decision settled. Justice Breyer, who agreed that a uniform standard was needed, expressly declined to decide how far the Constitution limits the content of such a standard.162
The separate opinions show how narrow the disagreement was. Justice Souter treated the equal protection issue as the one on which a meritorious argument for relief existed.163 Justice Breyer agreed that, in the very special circumstances of the case, basic principles of fairness should have counseled adoption of a uniform standard.164 The Justices parted over the cure. The majority concluded that adopting adequate statewide standards, practicable procedures to apply them, and orderly judicial review could not be completed by the December 12 deadline, so it reversed the order requiring the recount to proceed.165 Justice Souter would instead have remanded with instructions to establish uniform standards, to be applied within and among counties in any further recount.166 Justice Stevens denied the violation altogether, reasoning that the intent-of-the-voter standard was no less sufficient than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that juries apply daily, and that a single impartial magistrate who would adjudicate all objections alleviated the concern about differing substandards.167
The Court never named a level of scrutiny. It cited Harper, which struck down the poll tax, and three one-person, one-vote cases, which may suggest heightened scrutiny, while its repeated reference to “arbitrary and disparate” treatment may suggest rational basis review.168 It also confined itself in its own words: “Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”169 Readings of the holding diverge. Some confine it to the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer, others read it to prohibit disparities in how votes are treated across jurisdictions, and still others read it to condemn excessive discretion in local officials.170 The Supreme Court has not relied on it since, although a federal district court invoked its admonition about arbitrary and disparate treatment in 2012 to enjoin conflicting early-voting deadlines in Ohio in Obama for America v. Husted.171 An exam answer should apply the uniform-standards rule where the facts show a state-ordered count with no specific rules, and should say that the Court named no tier of review.
Step three does most of the work, because the Court's objection was to different treatment of the same marks, and variety in machinery that has its own explanation never reaches it.