515 U.S. 900 (1995)
After the 1990 census showed that Georgia's population entitled it to an eleventh congressional seat, the General Assembly adopted redistricting guidelines requiring equal population, contiguity, nondilution of minority voting strength, and compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act before considering other factors such as preserving political subdivisions.1
The legislature submitted an initial plan creating two majority-minority districts and one additional district with a 35 percent black voting-age population, but the Department of Justice refused preclearance on January 21, 1992, stating that the plan failed to recognize certain minority populations.2
The General Assembly enacted a second plan that increased black populations in three districts, yet the Department of Justice again refused preclearance, pointing to alternative plans that created three majority-minority districts through a Macon/Savannah trade.3 Using the ACLU's max-black plan as a benchmark, the legislature then passed a final plan that created the Eleventh District by transferring black populations from Macon to the Second District and extending the Eleventh to include Savannah, resulting in a district that split twenty-six counties.4
On January 13, 1994, five white voters registered in the Eleventh District filed suit against state officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging that the district was a racial gerrymander.5 A three-judge panel received evidence including the Justice Department's objection letters, testimony from the operator of Georgia's reapportionment computer, the State's admissions that portions of Effingham and Chatham Counties were added solely to increase the black population, and expert reports showing fractured political and economic interests within the district.6
The District Court found that race was the overriding and predominant factor explaining the Eleventh District's irregular boundaries and invalidated the plan.7 Appellants appealed, the Supreme Court granted a stay, and later noted probable jurisdiction over the direct appeal.8
Whether the appellees have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Georgia's congressional redistricting plan?9
A voter has standing to challenge a redistricting plan if he or she is registered to vote in a district that is the subject of the litigation, as established in United States v. Hays.10
Yes. The established facts show that five white voters registered in the Eleventh District filed the suit on January 13, 1994, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.11 One appellee provided an affidavit confirming United States citizenship, residence in the Eleventh District, and registration as a voter there.12 This direct connection to the challenged district satisfies the standing requirement under Hays without impairment from the appellees' opposition to the district's creation during the legislative process.13
The appellees possess standing to bring the equal protection challenge.14
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Joined by Ginsburg, J., And Breyer, J.
Justice Stevens contended that the appellees alleged no legally cognizable injury because their claim rested on the premise that voters of a particular race think alike and will prefer the same candidates, an assumption the Court itself deemed offensive.15 He argued that without a showing of vote dilution or exclusion from representation, white voters in the Eleventh District suffered no harm from the inclusion of additional black voters, distinguishing the case from traditional desegregation precedents where groups were barred from facilities.16 Stevens further maintained that the Shaw cause of action improperly equates inclusion of minority voters with the exclusionary harms redressed in earlier equal protection cases.17
Whether race was the predominant, overriding factor motivating the Georgia General Assembly's decision to draw the boundaries of the Eleventh Congressional District?18
A plaintiff states a valid equal protection claim by showing that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place voters within or without a district, subordinating traditional race-neutral principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions to racial considerations; proof may come from direct evidence of legislative purpose or circumstantial evidence including district shape and demographics.19
Yes. The District Court found race the overriding and predominant force after reviewing the Justice Department's repeated objection letters demanding three majority-minority districts.20 The State's use of the ACLU max-black plan as benchmark supplied further proof.21 Explicit admissions showed that portions of Effingham and Chatham Counties were added solely to increase black population to offset losses from the Macon shift.22
The resulting Eleventh District linked Atlanta, Augusta, and Savannah through sparsely populated rural areas.23 Expert reports confirmed fractured political and economic interests.24 Testimony from the reapportionment computer operator and the State's concessions demonstrated that compactness, contiguity, and communities of interest were subordinated to the goal of maximizing black voting strength for preclearance.25
Race was the predominant factor in drawing the Eleventh District.26
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Justice O'Connor joined the majority's adoption of the predominant-factor standard as a demanding threshold that requires plaintiffs to show substantial disregard of traditional districting practices. She emphasized that the standard applies equally to all racial groups and serves Shaw's objective of subjecting extreme gerrymanders to meaningful review while leaving the vast majority of districts unaffected, provided they respect customary principles even when race receives some consideration. O'Connor noted that the threshold remains high enough to protect ordinary districting choices from routine constitutional attack.27
Whether Georgia's congressional redistricting plan can be upheld as narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest?28
Race-based districting is subject to strict scrutiny and cannot be upheld unless narrowly tailored to a compelling interest; compliance with the Voting Rights Act does not supply such an interest where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary under a correct constitutional reading of the statute, and there must be a strong basis in evidence of past discrimination or a statutory violation.29
No. The established facts reveal no finding of a constitutional or statutory violation that would justify the Eleventh District as a remedy for past discrimination.30 Georgia's first two plans were ameliorative, increasing majority-black districts from one to two, and thus could not violate section 5's nonretrogression principle under Beer.31 The Justice Department's maximization demands exceeded the Act's requirements, as the District Court determined it was not reasonably necessary to create a third majority-black district to avoid section 2 violations.32 The record shows the State acquiesced to obtain preclearance rather than because traditional principles or the Act compelled the bizarre configuration, rendering the plan not narrowly tailored.33
The redistricting plan cannot survive strict scrutiny and is unconstitutional.34
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Joined by Stevens, J., And Breyer, J.
Justice Ginsburg dissented on the ground that the Eleventh District reflected genuine consideration of traditional districting factors alongside race and did not abandon compactness or political-subdivision respect to the degree seen in Shaw.35 She stressed that the Voting Rights Act requires race-conscious districting in covered jurisdictions to prevent retrogression and that the majority's predominant-factor test would invite excessive litigation, undermining legislative flexibility to accommodate minority voting strength while respecting federalism and the political process.36 Ginsburg warned that the new standard would chill legitimate efforts to comply with statutory mandates without advancing equal protection values.37