446 U.S. 55 (1980)
The city of Mobile was incorporated in 1814.1 In 1866 its charter was superseded by a new one that established a three-member Board of Commissioners elected at large.2 One commissioner was elected to an executive position, and the other two were elected to positions with legislative and quasi-judicial responsibilities.3
In 1911 the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to adopt a commission form of government.4 Mobile established its City Commission in the same year and has maintained that basic system ever since.5 The three commissioners jointly exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power.6
In 1931 the Alabama Legislature enacted a statute authorizing voters to adopt a three-member commission form with all members elected at large for concurrent four-year terms in a single election where the top three vote-getters win.7 Mobile voters approved this system, which has remained in place since.8 Candidates run citywide for numbered posts and must win by majority vote.9 After election the commissioners designate one as mayor for a largely ceremonial role.10
Mobile's population is approximately 190,000, of whom approximately 35% are Negro.11 No Negro has ever been elected to the City Commission.12 Negro citizens of Mobile brought a class action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Alabama against the city and its three incumbent commissioners.13 The complaint alleged that the at-large system unfairly diluted Negro voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment.14
Following a bench trial the District Court found that the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs had been violated.15 It entered judgment for them and ordered that the commission be replaced by a mayor-council government with members elected from single-member districts.16 The District Court found that Mobile has a long history of public and private discrimination against Negroes, that Negroes register and vote in lower numbers than whites, and that Negroes and whites tend to vote as blocs.17 It also found that the at-large system has the effect of diluting Negro voting strength, yet found that the commission has been responsive to the needs of the Negro community and that there are no official obstacles preventing Negroes from registering, voting, or becoming candidates.18
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the at-large elections violated the Fourteenth Amendment.19 It did not reach the Fifteenth Amendment issue.20 An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.21 The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term and reargued in the present Term.22
Whether the at-large system of electing city commissioners in Mobile, Alabama, violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because it has the effect of diluting the voting strength of Negroes?23
The Fifteenth Amendment forbids only purposeful racial discrimination in voting.24 It does not prohibit electoral systems that merely have a dilutive effect absent such purpose.25 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise requires proof of invidious discriminatory purpose rather than disproportionate impact alone.26
No. The District Court found that Negroes register and vote without hindrance and that the commission has been responsive to Negro needs.27 Yet no Negro has ever been elected because of bloc voting patterns that arise from socioeconomic factors and history rather than from the at-large mechanism itself.28 The 1931 statute establishing the system was not enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose.29 The mechanics of at-large elections with numbered posts and majority-vote requirements disadvantage any minority without regard to race.30
The evidence fell far short of showing that the system was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination.31
The at-large system does not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment of reversal.33 He agreed that proof of intent is a prerequisite to prevailing on the constitutional claim of vote dilution and believed the findings of the District Court amply support an inference of purposeful discrimination.34 He concurred in reversal nonetheless because the relief afforded by the District Court was not commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial discretion.35
The District Court ordered replacement of the commission with a mayor-council system.36 Blackmun would have required the lower courts to consider less drastic alternatives that preserved at-large elements while adding residency requirements or plurality voting to provide black voters an opportunity to participate on an equal footing.37
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that the commission form is a traditional and commonly used structure followed by thousands of municipalities nationwide.38 Its retention, even if influenced by some racial considerations, is supported by neutral justifications and does not involve the uncouth gerrymander or total exclusion present in Gomillion.39 Stevens would judge such structural choices by an objective-effects standard rather than subjective intent.40
He distinguished between practices that deny individuals access to the ballot and those that affect the political strength of groups.41 He concluded that the Fifteenth Amendment applies but must be judged by a standard that allows the political process to function effectively without spawning endless litigation.42
Justice White dissented because the District Court's meticulous findings supported an inference of purposeful discrimination.45 The findings included racial polarization in every commission race, unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority needs, a history of official discrimination whose effects persist, and the maintenance of the at-large system despite foreseeable discriminatory consequences.46 These findings supported an inference of purposeful discrimination under White v. Regester and Washington v. Davis.47
White concluded that the at-large system has been maintained with the purpose of diluting the black vote, violating both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.48
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the fundamental right to an equally effective vote is infringed by any districting scheme that, when combined with historical and social factors, submerges a discrete minority's influence.49 The Fifteenth Amendment reaches dilutive effects as well as outright denials.50 Marshall would have applied a discriminatory-impact test without requiring proof of purpose because the vote-dilution doctrine protects the fundamental interest in voting.51
He argued that the Equal Protection Clause protects the right to participate on an equal basis in the electoral process and that this right cannot be denied for any reason lacking substantial justification.52
Whether the Constitution requires that Negroes have a right to elect commissioners proportional to their share of the population?53
No. The assumption that the Constitution mandates proportional representation is incorrect.56 The at-large system gives each voter the same mathematical weight because the city is a unitary electoral district and all elections are conducted at large.57 The absence of Negro commissioners results from bloc voting and socioeconomic factors rather than any structural denial of equal participation.58 The Constitution does not require that a particular group be represented in proportion to its numbers or that the electoral system be structured to maximize the political power of any group.59
The Constitution does not require proportional representation.60
Whether the system of at-large elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment because it was adopted or maintained for a racially discriminatory purpose?61
No. The District Court made no finding that the 1931 statute was adopted for a discriminatory purpose.64 It found only that the system has the effect of diluting the voting strength of Negroes.65 The Court of Appeals did not reach the Fifteenth Amendment claim.66 The evidence showed only effects arising from polarized voting and historical discrimination, not purposeful state action to abridge Negro votes on account of race.67
The at-large system does not violate the Fifteenth Amendment.68
Whether proof of discriminatory purpose is required to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a challenge to an at-large electoral system?69
Yes. The District Court and Court of Appeals relied on the Zimmer factors that pre-dated Washington v. Davis and treated effect as sufficient.72 Those factors, standing alone, do not prove that the at-large system was conceived or maintained as a purposeful device to discriminate against Negroes.73 Although the presence of the indicia may afford some evidence of discriminatory purpose, satisfaction of the Zimmer criteria is not of itself sufficient proof of such a purpose under the Equal Protection Clause.74
Proof of discriminatory purpose is required.75
Whether the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits electoral systems that have the effect of diluting the voting strength of a racial group in the absence of purposeful discrimination?76
No. The Amendment's command is wholly negative and forbids only intentional racial discrimination.79 The District Court's finding that Negroes register and vote without hindrance precludes any Fifteenth Amendment claim based on mere dilution.80 The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected and prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote on account of race.81
The Fifteenth Amendment does not prohibit effect-only dilution.82