218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021
Holt was indicted in the Circuit Court for murder alleged to have been committed within the Fort Worden Military Reservation, a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. There was a trial and a verdict of guilty, without capital punishment, as allowed by statute. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and thereupon brought this writ of error.1
The indictment alleged that Holt did with force and arms an assault make upon one Henry E. Johnson with a certain iron bar, and did then and there feloniously, wilfully, knowingly and with malice aforethought strike, beat, and mortally wound him, the said Henry E. Johnson, with said iron bar.2
The prisoner's counsel sought leave to withdraw the plea of Not Guilty and interpose a plea in abatement and motion to quash. The ground was an affidavit that Captain Newton of the Coast Artillery Corps had testified before the grand jury to admissions by the prisoner obtained under circumstances that made them incompetent. The affidavit added that aside from the above testimony there was very little evidence against the accused.3
A challenge for cause was made to a juryman who had taken the newspaper statements for facts but stated that he thought he could try the case solely upon the evidence fairly and impartially.4 The jurymen were allowed to separate during the trial, always being cautioned by the judge. After the verdict counsel filed an affidavit that members of the jury had read the Seattle daily papers with articles on the case while the trial was going on.56
A witness testified that they were within the inclosure of Fort Worden under military guard and control, from which all unauthorized persons are excluded, and that he knew that the fence was coincident with the boundaries shown on a map objected to but admitted.7 He identified the band barracks as described in the condemnation proceedings under which the United States claimed title.8 The deeds and condemnation proceedings under which the United States claimed title were introduced in evidence.9
The prisoner put on a blouse which fitted him.10 After the jury had been sent out they returned and asked the court what constituted a reasonable doubt, and the court gave instructions on that subject and on the presumption of innocence.11
Whether the indictment sufficiently alleged that the murder occurred within the Fort Worden Military Reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States?12
An indictment is sufficient when the words convey with clearness sufficient for justice that the place of the crime was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States at the time of the murder.13 Allegations that the assault was made feloniously and with malice aforethought adequately charge the elements without repetition in preliminary averments.14
Yes. The established facts show that Holt was indicted for murder alleged to have been committed within the Fort Worden Military Reservation, a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.15 The indictment further alleged that Holt did with force and arms an assault make upon one Henry E. Johnson with a certain iron bar, and did then and there feloniously, wilfully, knowingly and with malice aforethought strike, beat, and mortally wound him.16
These averments satisfy the rule because they state the jurisdictional fact plainly and charge the mental state in the description of the acts themselves.17
The indictment sufficiently alleged the location and elements of the offense.18
Whether the trial court erred in denying leave to withdraw the plea of not guilty to interpose a plea in abatement and motion to quash based on an affidavit concerning grand jury testimony?19
A trial court need not permit withdrawal of a not guilty plea to challenge an indictment on the ground that incompetent evidence was presented to the grand jury.20 The affidavit must show only that evidence competent in nature but rendered incompetent by circumstances was considered along with other evidence, as such a ground does not warrant upsetting the indictment.21
No. The established facts establish that the prisoner's counsel sought leave based on an affidavit that Captain Newton had testified before the grand jury to admissions obtained under circumstances making them incompetent.22 The affidavit added that aside from that testimony there was very little evidence against the accused.23 This showing falls squarely within the rule because it reveals only the consideration of evidence that was competent in character though inadmissible due to surrounding circumstances, which provides no basis for reviewing the trial court's denial.24
The trial court did not err in denying leave to withdraw the plea.25
Whether the trial court erred in overruling a challenge for cause to a juror who had formed an opinion from newspaper statements?26
A trial court's finding on the strength of a juror's opinions and impartiality should not be set aside unless the error is manifest.27 A juror who has taken newspaper statements for facts but states that evidence would change the opinion easily and that he could try the case solely upon the evidence fairly and impartially may properly be seated.28
No. The established facts show that a challenge for cause was made to a juryman who had taken the newspaper statements for facts but stated that he thought he could try the case solely upon the evidence fairly and impartially.29 The trial court's overruling of the challenge was proper under the rule because the juror's responses demonstrated that any opinion was not fixed and that he could decide the case on the evidence alone.3031 No manifest error appears.
The trial court did not err in overruling the challenge for cause.32
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to exclude the jury during preliminary hearings on the admissibility of the defendant's statements?33
It is within the discretion of the trial judge to allow the jury to remain during preliminary hearings on the admissibility of statements.34 The evidence heard must be simply evidence of facts showing the statements were not freely made.35 The jury must be instructed that it must decide the case only on admitted testimony, and no confession is ultimately admitted.36
No. The established facts establish that the judge refused to exclude the twelve jurors during hearings on the circumstances of the prisoner's statements.37 The statements were ultimately excluded.38 The judge instructed the jury that it must decide the case on the testimony from the witnesses and that the preliminary evidence had no bearing on its decision.39 This course was within discretion under the rule because the jury heard only foundational facts and received clear limiting instructions that prevented prejudice.40
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to exclude the jury.41
Whether the district attorney's references to statements as confessions constituted misconduct warranting reversal?42
No. The established facts show that in his opening the district attorney stated that the prisoner admitted a coat with soot marks upon it and a gunner's badge were his and was going on to recite further statements when they were objected to.47 He answered that these were voluntary confessions but desisted.48 The judge replied he did not hear any statement that the prisoner made any confession while later instructing the jury to regard only admitted evidence.49 These facts demonstrate no misconduct under the rule because the reference was curtailed and the jury was properly cautioned.50
The district attorney's references did not constitute misconduct warranting reversal.51
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to separate during trial and in denying a new trial after jurors read newspaper articles about the case?52
A trial court does not err in allowing the jury to separate when jurors are cautioned to avoid outside impressions.53 Denial of a new trial after an affidavit that jurors read newspaper articles is proper when the court assumes the reading occurred yet finds no conclusive ground that the trial was unfair.54 The mere opportunity for prejudice does not raise a presumption that it existed.55
No. The established facts establish that the jurymen were allowed to separate during the trial always being cautioned by the judge.56 After the verdict counsel filed an affidavit that members of the jury had read the Seattle daily papers with articles on the case while the trial was going on. The court denied the motion on the assumption that the reading occurred.57 The denial was correct under the rule because the cautionary instructions were given and the opportunity for prejudice alone does not compel a new trial.58
The trial court did not err in allowing separation or in denying a new trial.59
Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the band barracks where the crime occurred were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States?60
Evidence is sufficient to establish exclusive jurisdiction when a witness testifies that the location is within the inclosure under military guard and control from which unauthorized persons are excluded.61 The witness identifies the site from condemnation proceedings.62 The deeds and condemnation proceedings are introduced, even if the witness relies in part on official maps and title books compiled under governmental authority.63
Yes. The established facts show that a witness testified that they were within the inclosure of Fort Worden under military guard and control from which all unauthorized persons are excluded, and that he knew that the fence was coincident with the boundaries shown on a map objected to but admitted. He identified the band barracks as described in the condemnation proceedings under which the United States claimed title. The deeds and condemnation proceedings under which the United States claimed title were introduced in evidence.
This body of proof satisfies the rule because it demonstrates both de facto exercise of jurisdiction and documentary title.64
The evidence was sufficient to establish exclusive jurisdiction.65
Whether requiring the defendant to try on a blouse to determine if it fit him violated the Fifth Amendment?66
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself forbids only the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him.67 It does not exclude his body as evidence when it may be material.68 Requiring a defendant to try on a blouse that fits him produces competent evidence even if done under some duress.69
No. The established facts establish that the prisoner put on a blouse which fitted him and that this was done to determine ownership.70 The act did not violate the Fifth Amendment under the rule because it involved only the exhibition of the defendant's body for physical comparison and produced material evidence rather than any compelled communication.71
Requiring the defendant to try on the blouse did not violate the Fifth Amendment.72
Whether the trial court's instructions on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence were adequate?73
Instructions on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence are adequate when the court states that the law presumes innocence.74 The evidence must overcome that presumption by being clear and convincing and sufficiently strong to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.75 The court further defines reasonable doubt as an actual doubt arising after consideration of all testimony such that a reasonable person would hesitate to act.76
Yes. The established facts show that after the jury returned and asked what constituted a reasonable doubt the court replied that a reasonable doubt is an actual doubt that you are conscious of after going over in your minds the entire case, giving consideration to all the testimony.7778 If you then feel uncertain and believe a reasonable man would hesitate to act because of such a doubt the defendant is entitled to the benefit.79 The court had earlier instructed that the law presumes innocence and that the evidence must overcome the legal presumption by being clear and convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.80
These instructions fully satisfy the rule.81
The trial court's instructions on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence were adequate.82