Concept
Enforce Versus Redefine
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power
Enforce Versus Redefine
City of Boerne v. Flores marks the point where the broad reading of Section 5 meets its limit, and the case began with a dispute over religion. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when no compelling governmental interest supports them.1 Congress answered with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which forbade government to substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even under a rule of general applicability, unless the burden furthered a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.2 RFRA, in short, sought to overrule Smith by statute.3
Different philosophies of the relation between church and state animated the founding generation and still animate individual Justices.4 Boerne did not settle that disagreement. It asked which institution may settle it for the states, and it held that RFRA, as applied to the states, was beyond Congress’s authority under Section 5.5 The statute’s application to the federal government survived.6
The rule that emerges is that Congress has power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees and no power to determine what constitutes a violation of them.7 The reason lies in the text. A power to enforce presupposes a guarantee that already has content, and a statute that rewrites the content no longer carries the guarantee into effect. The earlier sections showed how far the traditional reading of “appropriate legislation” extends, and Boerne marks where that breadth stops. The first subsection below states the holding precisely, the second gives the historical and structural reasons for reading Section 5 as remedial, and the third shows how that reading recasts Katzenbach v. Morgan.
The Boerne Rule
The limit starts with the verb. Section 5 gives Congress power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”8 The Court began from that text and did not dispute that free exercise falls within the provisions Congress may enforce. It agreed that Congress can enact Section 5 legislation enforcing the right to free exercise, because the “provisions of this article” include the Due Process Clause, and under Cantwell v. Connecticut the liberty that clause protects embraces the liberties the First Amendment guarantees.9
Boerne therefore did not hold that religious liberty lies beyond Section 5. A state law that burdens religious practice presents a Section 1 question, because free exercise binds the states through the Due Process Clause, and a federal statute that enforces the guarantee against that state rests on Section 5. RFRA failed because of the standard it imposed and not because of the subject it addressed.
What Section 5 permits is enforcement, and the Court called the power “remedial.”10 The design of the Amendment and the text of Section 5, it said, are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress may decree the substance of the Amendment’s restrictions on the States.11 The Court compressed the rule into one sentence: “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”12 The verb carries the logic. To enforce a standard is to put into effect something that exists apart from the enforcer, so if Congress could decide what a guarantee means, what it would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
The Court conceded that the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional action and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and it gave Congress wide latitude in deciding where the line lies.14 But the distinction exists and must be observed. The Court named the instrument for policing it, a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end, and it warned that legislation lacking such a connection may become substantive in operation and effect.15 Later sections develop that test.
Because the line is hard to see and the latitude wide, the remedial reading leaves real room for preventive legislation. Congress’s power to enforce reaches beyond statutes that merely parrot the Amendment’s wording. It includes authority to remedy and to deter violations by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including conduct the Amendment’s text does not itself forbid.16 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 illustrates the point. The Court judges the constitutional propriety of such legislation by the historical experience it reflects, and it upheld that Act’s suspension of literacy tests and new voting regulations in covered jurisdictions as remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination had been most flagrant, supported by record evidence of pervasive discriminatory use of literacy tests.17 Legislation of this kind may intrude on spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States, an expansion of Congress’s powers, with a corresponding diminution of state sovereignty, that the Court has described as a “carving out.”18 “Remedial” therefore does not mean weak.
RFRA shows what falls on the wrong side of the line. Smith had read the Free Exercise Clause to let government prohibit, without justification, conduct mandated by religious belief, so long as the prohibition is generally applicable.19 RFRA answered by demanding a compelling interest and the least restrictive means for every such law, an attempt to overrule Smith.20 Because Smith stated the courts’ definition of the right, a statute demanding more altered the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, and legislation that alters the meaning of the Clause cannot be said to enforce it.21
Compare a statute that creates a damages action against state officials who purposefully discriminate by race in public employment and requires each plaintiff to prove every element of an equal protection violation as the courts define it. Congress has added a remedy and left the right untouched, and a court is quite unlikely to second-guess that choice.22 Both statutes aim to protect individuals from state governments. They differ on the baseline: the damages action takes the courts’ definition as given, and RFRA set a stricter one and imposed it on the states.
Later opinions repeat the rule in nearly the same terms. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents called Section 5 an affirmative grant of power, with the conclusions of Congress, which decides in the first instance whether and what legislation is needed, entitled to much deference. It added that the same language that grants the power also limits it. Congress cannot decree the substance of the Amendment’s restrictions, because it has the power to enforce and not the power to determine what constitutes a violation, and the ultimate interpretation of the Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.23
Even a Justice who rejected the Court’s baseline accepted the structure. Justice O’Connor, dissenting in Boerne, argued that Smith misread the Free Exercise Clause, which in her view is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against laws singling out religious practice.24 Yet she wrote that Congress, no less than the Court, must consider the Constitution’s requirements, and that when it legislates in furtherance of its delegated powers it must make its judgments consistent with the Court’s exposition of the Constitution and with the limits the Fourteenth Amendment places on its authority.25 Her dispute was over the baseline, and not over who sets it.
That gives every Section 5 problem the same first question. Fix the scope of the right being enforced as the courts have defined it, since whatever interpretation Congress adopts remains subject to judicial review.26 A remedy that encompasses every element of that right is parallel and receives rational-basis treatment. A remedy that does not require the plaintiff to establish a violation must be congruent and proportionate to the perceived violation, which the next section develops.27
The verb “enforce” also sets Section 5 apart from grants of a different kind. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court declined to apply congruence and proportionality review to a copyright statute, because the Copyright Clause, in contrast to Section 5, empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right, and judicial deference to that definition is a corollary of the grant of an Article I power.28 Section 5 gives Congress no such power over the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees, which is why their definition stays with the courts.
How far Boerne reaches is still debated. Did it simply repudiate an unusually flagrant attempt to overturn the substance of one of the Court’s decisions by statute and not by constitutional amendment? Was it more about the horizontal separation of powers than about federalism? Or did it announce a new, stricter standard of scrutiny for statutes claimed to enforce constitutional civil rights guarantees?29 The next section takes up the last possibility.
History and Structure
The Court rested the remedial reading on more than the verb. It also looked to how the Amendment was written, and the drafting record shows a broader proposal rejected and a narrower one adopted.31
An earlier version of the Amendment was defeated. The Court quoted a contemporary account that the measure failed “chiefly because many members of the legal profession s[aw] in [it] . . . a dangerous centralization of power.”32 Representative Garfield recalled that many leading Republicans of the House would not consent to so radical a change in the Constitution, and the Amendment in its early form was not considered again.33
The sponsors of the replacement draft described Congress’s role in terms of what a State had done. Representative Bingham said the draft would give Congress power to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of citizens whenever they were abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State. Representative Stevens described it as allowing Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States. Senator Howard said Section 5 would enable Congress, when the States enact laws in conflict with the Amendment’s principles, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment.34 Each description ties Congress’s role to the States’ own unconstitutional acts or conflicting laws, which fits a remedial reading.
The defeated proposal also raised a separation-of-powers concern. That aspect did not provoke the widespread resistance caused by the proposal’s threat to the federal balance, but it caught the attention of various Members.35 As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States that, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing, and the power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.36 Self-executing means that a court can apply Section 1 directly to a state law in a case, without waiting for a statute to give the guarantee content. A guarantee that already has an interpreter leaves Congress the work of making it effective, and Section 5 grants that authority.
The early cases point the same way. Boerne acknowledged that the specific holdings of those cases may have been superseded or modified by later decisions such as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and United States v. Guest. Even so, their treatment of the Section 5 power as “corrective or preventive, not definitional,” has not been questioned.37
The third reason ties the structural point to the amendment process. If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, the Constitution would no longer be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.” It would stand on a level with ordinary legislative acts and be alterable whenever the legislature pleased, as Marbury v. Madison put it.38 Article V lays down a difficult and detailed process for changing the Constitution, and a statute needs only an ordinary legislative majority. Shifting legislative majorities could therefore change the Constitution and effectively circumvent that process, and the Court found it difficult to conceive of any principle that would limit congressional power under such an approach.39
The same logic keeps a statute from displacing the Court’s own decisions. When the political branches act against the background of a judicial interpretation already issued, the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, but because its provisions were beyond congressional authority, the Court’s precedent and not RFRA controls.40
The remedial reading still leaves Congress an interpretive role. When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.41 It is for Congress in the first instance to determine whether and what legislation is needed to secure the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees, and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.42 What Congress lacks is the last word.
A competing view would give Congress more. Justice Black, dissenting in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, had no doubt that Congress may use Section 5 to abolish the poll tax if it believes the tax is being used as a device to deny voters equal protection of the laws.43 On that view Congress’s own belief about the need for legislation is enough. A dissent states no holding. Boerne controls, and it keeps the interpretation of Section 1 with the courts and confines Congress to enforcement.
Morgan After Boerne
Katzenbach v. Morgan left a worry that Boerne had to address. Its alternative rationale let Congress find that a literacy test the Court had earlier upheld in Lassiter denied equal protection, and read broadly, that rationale accords Congress the authority to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Boerne acknowledged language in Morgan that could be interpreted as recognizing a congressional power to enact legislation expanding the rights in Section 1. It then held that this reading is neither necessary nor even the best one.46
Boerne rebuilt each Morgan rationale as a remedy. Morgan upheld § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which barred denying the vote, because of inability to read or write English, to a person who had completed the sixth primary grade in a school in Puerto Rico where the language of instruction was other than English.47 Justice Brennan offered two supports. First, § 4(e) was rationally related to securing for Puerto Ricans in New York nondiscriminatory treatment in the provision and administration of governmental services. That discrimination was already clearly unconstitutional under the Court’s equal protection cases, so Congress could be viewed as implementing a judicially determined right.48 Second, Congress could reasonably have thought § 4(e) would eliminate an invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.49 Boerne’s summary is that both rationales rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New York and on Congress’s reasonable attempt to combat it.50
That summary changes what Congress is doing in the second rationale. On the remedial reading, Congress applies the courts’ definition of invidious discrimination to the facts it could reasonably find about one state’s requirement and imposes a remedy for the violation, so the definition of the right stays with the courts. Some strain remains, because the second rationale approved overriding a literacy test contrary to the Court’s earlier holding in Lassiter.51 How much preventive power Congress keeps under the remedial reading is the subject of the congruence and proportionality sections that follow.
Boerne supported its reading with Oregon v. Mitchell, where the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 lowered the minimum voting age to 18 in state and local elections. The Justices who concluded that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers on that point wrote separately. Four of the five said explicitly that Section 5 does not let Congress establish the meaning of constitutional provisions, and Justice Black’s rejection can be inferred from his disagreement with Congress’s reading of the Equal Protection Clause.52
The opinions explain why the age provision failed where § 4(e) survived. Justice Black found that Congress had invaded an area preserved to the States without a foundation for enforcing the Civil War Amendments’ ban on racial discrimination.53 Justice Harlan thought the suggestion that people between 18 and 21 face unconstitutional discrimination little short of fanciful, because Congress thought only that 18-year-olds were fairly entitled to the vote.54 Justice Stewart read Morgan as giving Section 5 “the furthest possible legitimate reach,” and he observed that, unlike the statute in Morgan, the age provision was valid only if Congress could determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law which situations fall within the Equal Protection Clause and what state interests are compelling.55
Black’s opinion shows why the literacy-test provision stands on different footing. The division of power between state and national governments, he wrote, was expressly qualified by the Civil War Amendments’ ban on racial discrimination, so that when Congress attempts to remedy such discrimination its authority is enhanced by the avowed intention of the framers.56 A tie to discrimination carried the literacy provision, and the absence of any tie sank the age provision. A statute resting on Congress’s own view of what fairness requires belongs with the age provision. A statute resting on findings of discrimination by state governments belongs on the Morgan side of the line, subject to the congruence and proportionality limits taught later.
The limits on the enforcement power can be organized in three parts. The power is broad but not unlimited:57
- Congress may not repeal other provisions of the Constitution by legislation.
- The power was not intended to strip the States of their power to govern themselves or to turn a national government of enumerated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority.
- Congress may only “enforce” the provisions of the amendments, and may do so only by “appropriate legislation.”
Each limit protects something different. The first protects the rest of the Constitution, since an enforcement power able to repeal other provisions would let Congress amend the document by statute. The second protects the federal structure. The third is the one Boerne builds on, because enforcing a provision presupposes a provision that already has content. The same passage adds that Congress has no power under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendments’ guarantees of personal equality and freedom from discrimination, a one-way limit that a later section develops.58
The decisions after Morgan divide over two views of Section 5. Under the narrow view, Congress may prevent or remedy violations of rights the Supreme Court has recognized but may not define the rights themselves. Under the broad view, Congress may also interpret the Amendment to expand the rights it protects. Morgan adopted the broad approach and accorded Congress expansive authority under Section 5, and City of Boerne and Shelby County v. Holder chose the narrow view and limited Congress’s power.59
The broad view in its most developed form is the ratchet theory, under which Congress may move the constitutional line only toward greater individual protection and never back toward less. The no-dilution half has a source in Morgan itself, which the Court has cited for the point that Congress has no power under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendments’ guarantees of personal equality and freedom from discrimination.60 The Court has not named and overruled the theory. But Boerne denies Congress the power to define constitutional rights substantively, so it is doubtful the theory retains any life.61 The reasoning is that if Congress could define its own power by interpreting the scope of Section 1 rights, the supremacy of the Constitution would be reduced to the level of ordinary legislation, because mere statutory law cannot alter the scope of constitutional liberty.62 A one-way direction does not repair that defect. A statute that enlarges a right against the states diminishes state authority, the concern behind the second limit, and it would still let a legislative majority rewrite what Section 1 means, which Boerne’s Article V reasoning forbids.63 After Boerne, a nonparallel statutory remedy is upheld only if it is congruent and proportionate to the perceived violation.64