Concept
Limits of the Doctrine
Political question doctrine
Limits of the Doctrine
Baker v. Carr’s considerations work as a screen, and the screen usually lets a case through. Their chief use is to test whether the text commits an issue to another branch. A lack of judicially discoverable standards, or a need for a nonjudicial policy determination, supports finding a textual commitment. Each factor can also stand alone as a reason to find a political question, and together the factors leave the Court some latitude to weigh prudential considerations.1 When none of the factors applies, the case is justiciable.2 The default is adjudication, and a party who wants dismissal must fit the dispute to at least one formulation.
The doctrine has rarely ended a case. Rucho v. Common Cause, which involved partisan gerrymandering (the use of redistricting to “load the dice” for the party that designs the map), is one of the Court’s few decisions to find a political question.3 The reluctance is older than Baker. Luther v. Borden refused to decide which of two competing bodies was Rhode Island’s legitimate government, rejecting the argument that the Guaranty Clause supplied a basis for adjudication.4 Pacific States Telephone Co. v. Oregon refused to decide whether a state may constitutionally adopt legislation by initiative or referendum.5
Even Rucho did not leave congressional elections without a constitutional home. The Elections Clause assigns state legislatures the power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of Congress,6 gives Congress the power to “make or alter” any such regulations,7 and Congress has regularly exercised that power, including to address partisan gerrymandering.8 A political question holding sends a question to another actor; it does not abolish the question.
Three limits mark where the doctrine stops. First, the courts, not the branch that claims the power, decide how far a textual commitment reaches. Second, a case does not become political because it touches foreign relations, since the court examines the question it is actually asked to decide. Third, a case that is political in the everyday sense, as the 2000 election litigation was, is not thereby political in the doctrinal sense.
Scope of the Commitment
Baker v. Carr lists a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch among the grounds for finding a political question, but the list does not say who decides whether a commitment exists. The courts do. Whether a formulation applies to commit an issue to Congress or the Executive, and how far the commitment reaches, are matters for judicial decision. That is why the Supreme Court remains the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and determines for itself what the Constitution commits exclusively to another branch.9 The rule matters because the alternative defeats review. If the branch claiming authority could define its extent, any branch could put a contested act beyond the courts by announcing that the Constitution had committed the act to it.
Powell v. McCormack shows the rule at work. The House excluded Powell from the 90th Congress, and he and the other petitioners sought a determination that the House lacked the power to do so.10 The House answered that Article I, Section 5 made it the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, a textual commitment of unreviewable authority.11 The case therefore turned on how much power Section 5 conferred.
The Court answered by reading the historical record. Beginning with the pre-Convention precedents, it concluded that the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution.12 Section 5 was therefore, at most, a textually demonstrable commitment to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution, and the textual-commitment formulation did not bar the suit.13
Narrowing the commitment disposed of the House’s remaining objections as well. The petitioners’ claim required an interpretation of the Constitution, for which there are judicially manageable standards. A judicial ruling would not produce “multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,” because the Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.14 Nor did the House need unreviewable power to protect itself. Congress has an interest in preserving its institutional integrity, but in most cases its power to punish members for disorderly behavior and, in extreme cases, to expel with the concurrence of two-thirds safeguards that interest sufficiently.15
The Court later explained Powell in terms that mark its limits. Powell rested on the fixed meaning of “qualifications” in Article I, Section 2, and the House’s claim of unreviewable authority failed because that separate provision specifies the only qualifications House membership may require. The decision whether a member satisfied the qualifications was placed with the House; the decision what the qualifications consist of was not.16 Powell itself reserved a related question: courts might still be barred by the doctrine from reviewing the House’s factual determination that a member did not meet one of the standing qualifications.17 Powell therefore decided how far the textual commitment extends. It did not hold that every House judgment about membership is reviewable.
The corollary also works in the other direction, because courts conclude that a commitment exists when the text and the nature of the question warrant it. In Coleman v. Miller, the Court held that how long a proposed constitutional amendment remains open to ratification, and what effect a prior rejection has on a later ratification, were committed to congressional resolution and involved criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.18 The same considerations carry over to the enacting process. The respect due to coequal and independent departments, and the need for finality and certainty about a statute’s status, make courts reluctant to ask whether a statute, as passed, complied with all requisite formalities.19
The corollary also answers a different overreach: the argument that a challenge to a statute is political because the statute is Congress’s work. In Chadha, the noncitizen argued that one House of Congress could not constitutionally veto the Attorney General’s decision to let him remain in the country, and Congress urged that the controversy was political. The Court saw where that logic led: virtually every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a political question.20 No policy underlying the doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert and in compliance with Article I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts. A controversy may be “political” in a loose sense, but constitutional issues with significant political overtones do not automatically invoke the doctrine. Courts cannot evade a challenge to the constitutional authority of one of the three branches because the issues have political implications.21
United States v. Munoz-Flores applied the same reasoning to the Origination Clause. The defendants claimed that a federal statute requiring courts to impose a monetary “special assessment” on persons convicted of a federal misdemeanor was unconstitutional because it raised revenue without originating in the House. The Court held the case justiciable because none of Baker’s characteristics applied. The clause is not a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to Congress, and invalidating the statute would show no more disrespect for Congress than invalidating any other law. Courts can also create judicially manageable standards to decide where a bill “originates” or whether it is for “raising revenue.” On the merits, the Court ruled against the defendants.22 Justiciability gives a challenger a hearing, and it does not promise a win.
Clearing the political question hurdle also does not guarantee a hearing, because standing screens plaintiffs separately. Members of Congress who sued to challenge a statute after losing the vote on it were dismissed for lack of standing in Raines v. Byrd. Being on the losing end of a congressional vote was not a case or controversy, and only someone who had suffered an injury-in-fact from a presidential cancellation of legislation could bring the suit.23 How strictly the Court applies that gate is itself contested. In a global-emissions case, a critic of the Court’s standing analysis objected that, on the majority’s reasoning, any decrease in domestic emissions will “slow the pace of global emissions increases,” so a state may sue over any little bit, a decision that recalled the previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements in SCRAP.24
Powell and Chadha reach reviewability by different routes. In Powell the clause assigned the House a decision, so the work was to measure that assignment against the rest of the text. In Chadha the argument that the statute was Congress’s own work identified no assignment of the constitutional question at all, because the constitutionality of a statute is for the courts. Nixon v. United States, discussed earlier, ran the same inquiry and found the commitment to the Senate controlling. A clause that names a chamber’s authority opens the commitment inquiry. A second provision that measures that authority, as Article I, Section 2 did in Powell, is what lets a court find the commitment narrow.25
On an exam, meet a branch’s claim of commitment with two questions in order. First, what does the clause actually assign, read through its text, history, and structure? Second, does the challenged act fall inside that assignment? An exclusion on grounds beyond the listed qualifications falls outside and is reviewed. When the attack is on a statute’s validity and the branch points only to its authorship, the commitment question has nothing to hold, and the court turns to the merits.
Foreign Affairs Cases
Foreign affairs is not a category of political questions. Baker v. Carr called it error to suppose that every case or controversy touching foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. It prescribed instead a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed: the history of its management by the political branches, its susceptibility to judicial handling in light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and the possible consequences of judicial action.28
Baker’s own examples show how fine the inquiry runs. A court will not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty has been terminated, because on that question governmental action is of controlling importance. If there has been no conclusive governmental action, however, a court can construe the treaty and may find that it supplies the answer.29 Recognition of foreign governments so strongly defies judicial treatment that the judiciary ordinarily follows the executive on which nation has sovereignty over disputed territory. Once sovereignty over an area is politically determined and declared, though, courts may examine the resulting status and decide independently whether a statute applies to that area.30 Recognition of belligerency abroad is likewise an executive responsibility, but if executive proclamations fall short of an explicit answer, a court may construe them to decide, for example, whether the situation is such that statutes designed to assure American neutrality have become operative.31 In each example the subject is foreign affairs, and the result depends on whether the court is asked to make the foreign-policy determination itself or to construe a statute, treaty, or proclamation that already speaks to the issue.
A passport case shows the inquiry at work. Zivotofsky v. Clinton began when officials declined a request about the birthplace listed on a young citizen’s passport, citing a longstanding State Department policy of listing the birthplace simply as “Jerusalem.” Zivotofsky’s parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf. The district court found a nonjusticiable political question, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Constitution gives the Executive the exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns and that the courts cannot review its exercise.32
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded by a vote of 8 to 1. It held that the courts “are fully capable of determining whether this statute may be given effect, or instead must be struck down in light of authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution.” Because the Court saw the issue as the constitutionality of § 214(d), it found no textually demonstrable commitment of the issue exclusively to the Executive and no lack of judicially administrable standards.33
The characterization of the claim decided the case. If a court were asked to decide whether Jerusalem falls within the sovereignty of Israel or of Jordan, the dispute would likely present a political question, because it involves the recognition of foreign governments, an area of foreign affairs that the Constitution textually assigns to the President.34 Zivotofsky asked a different question. Federal courts pass on the constitutionality of statutes every day, so there was no textually demonstrable commitment. The judiciary may lack standards for assessing the status of Jerusalem, but it has ample tools for constitutional questions, including arguments from text, history, structure, and practice. The Court accordingly remanded with directions that the lower courts address the merits.35 The two factors are linked, since a lack of judicially discoverable standards supports a finding of textual commitment, and where standards exist the commitment argument weakens.36
The decision may portend two changes in the doctrine. First, disputes over the constitutionality of a statute will rarely qualify, if at all, as political questions. Second, the Court may be uncomfortable with prudential factors, consistent with its turn away from doctrines that let federal courts refrain from hearing matters on the basis of prudential calculations.37
The decision settled justiciability only. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry the Court later held that the Constitution gives the recognition power to the President and that the power is exclusive, because “[r]ecognition is a topic on which the Nation must ‘speak . . . with one voice.’”38 That holding answered the question the first decision had left open, whether the statute must yield to authority the Constitution confers on the Executive, and it did so on separation-of-powers grounds, not under the political question doctrine.39 The concern for a single national voice thus did its work on the merits, helping decide which political branch controls, and it did not close the courthouse. A political-question dismissal leaves the political branch’s act unreviewed and says nothing about its constitutionality, while a merits ruling for the Executive tests the statute against the Constitution. An answer that describes the Kerry result as a political question holding therefore misstates it.
Bush v. Gore
The 2000 presidential election litigation shows the limit from the other side: a dispute can be political in every everyday sense and still be decided on the merits. In Bush v. Gore, the federal issue was whether the recount procedures ordered by the Florida high court, which allowed the state’s counties to use different procedures, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court resolved that constitutional issue. By a 5–4 vote it held that allowing such variations would be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, because “[w]hen a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.”43
Timing sharpened the dispute. The Court first agreed to hear the case on December 9 and stayed the Florida decision, which temporarily halted the recount. Three days later it ruled that Florida could conduct no further recounts because the “safe harbor” period would lapse that day. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer strenuously dissented, noting that even without a safe harbor Florida was entitled to proceed with a recount as long as it was completed in time for Congress to consider the results.44
A dissent made the political question argument. The Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count electoral votes. The Electoral Count Act, enacted after the close 1876 Hayes-Tilden election, specifies that once the States have tried to resolve disputes through judicial or other means, Congress is the body primarily authorized to resolve the remaining disputes.45 The dissent conceded that the selection of a President is of fundamental national importance, but it insisted that the importance is “political, not legal,” and it urged the Court to resist the temptation unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes where doing so threatens to determine the outcome of the election.46
That argument has the shape of Baker’s first formulation, and its force is structural. If the Constitution and the statute make Congress the final decider of contested electoral votes, a judicial ruling would displace the branch the law chose. The argument is contestable, however, for two reasons. First, whether the Twelfth Amendment and the Electoral Count Act commit the dispute to Congress is itself a question about the scope of a commitment, and under the judicial corollary the courts decide it.47 Second, the claim before the Court was an equal protection claim of a familiar kind. In Baker v. Carr the Court held that a vote dilution challenge to legislative reapportionment does not present a political question,48 and the Court has since developed a “one-person, one-vote” standard that can be applied without a nonjudicial policy determination. In other words, equality is judicially measurable.49
A prudential question remained. Baker’s factors give the Court a latitude of discretion within which to apply prudential considerations in deciding whether a particular matter ought to be resolved by the judicial branch.50 The dissent’s closing appeal, that the Court should not resolve legal questions that threaten to determine an election whose importance is political, reads as a prudential appeal of that kind. Four Justices found it persuasive, and the majority decided the constitutional question anyway.
The case therefore teaches how the doctrine works in practice. Baker’s list does not produce its own answer. Whether a dispute belongs in court depends on how far a claimed commitment reaches, on whether judicial standards exist, and on how much weight the Court gives prudence, and reasonable Justices can divide on each. On an exam, attribute the commitment argument to the dissent, report that the majority decided the equal protection issue, and do not describe Bush v. Gore as a political question holding.