369 U.S. 186, 211
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties.1
The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis.2 The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891.3 After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass.4
Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089.5 The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891.6 Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties.7
Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby.8 They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections.9 The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.10 It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws.11 The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional.12 It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute.13 Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment.14
A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint.15 The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.16 The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question.17 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.18 The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.19
Whether claims that a state legislative apportionment statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment present a justiciable controversy?20
The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.21 The claim that a state apportionment violates equal protection is justiciable because it does not involve a textually demonstrable commitment to another branch, lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, or other elements of the political question doctrine.22
Yes. The appellants, residents of urban counties, alleged that the 1901 statute debased their votes by failing to account for population shifts since 1900.23 The District Court dismissed the complaint as presenting a nonjusticiable political question.24 The Supreme Court held that the claim is justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the issue is the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution and judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar.25
The Court examined the contours of the political question doctrine and found none of the formulations present in this case.26 The question here is not decided by a political branch of government coequal with this Court, nor does it risk embarrassment of the government abroad.27
The claim presents a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision.28
Related opinions on this issue
While I join the opinion of the Court, a word of explanation is necessary.29 The question is the extent to which a State may weight one person's vote more heavily than it does another's.30 The traditional test under the Equal Protection Clause has been whether a State has made an invidious discrimination.31
Universal equality is not the test.32 There is room for weighting. As we stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., the prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.33
I agree with my Brother Clark that if the allegations in the complaint can be sustained a case for relief is established.34 We are told that a single vote in Moore County, Tennessee, is worth 19 votes in Hamilton County.35 The opportunity to prove that an invidious discrimination exists should therefore be given the appellants.36
The Court today decides three things and no more.37 The court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter.38 A justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief.39
The appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes.40 The complaint in this case asserts that Tennessee's system of apportionment is utterly arbitrary without any possible justification in rationality.41 The District Court did not reach the merits of that claim.42
This Court quite properly expresses no view on the subject.43 Contrary to the suggestion of my Brother Harlan, the Court does not say or imply that state legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality the voice of every voter.44 The Court does not say or imply that there is anything in the Federal Constitution to prevent a State, acting not irrationally, from choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of its people.45
Whether federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over suits challenging state legislative apportionment under the Equal Protection Clause?46
A federal constitutional claim arises under the Constitution within the meaning of Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 when the complaint alleges that a state statute effects an apportionment that deprives plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.47
Yes. The complaint alleges that the 1901 statute effects an apportionment that deprives the appellants of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 The District Court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter because the claim is not so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.49 Congress has exercised its power to assign such claims to the jurisdiction of the District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).50
An unbroken line of precedents sustains the federal courts' jurisdiction of the subject matter of federal constitutional claims of this nature.51
The District Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the federal constitutional claim asserted in the complaint.52
Related opinions on this issue
One emerging from the rash of opinions with their accompanying clashing of views may well find himself suffering a mental blindness.53 The Court holds that the appellants have alleged a cause of action.54 However, it refuses to award relief here although the facts are undisputed and fails to give the District Court any guidance whatever.
I believe it can be shown that this case is distinguishable from earlier cases dealing with the distribution of political power by a State.55 A patent violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution has been shown.56 An appropriate remedy may be formulated.57
The controlling facts cannot be disputed.58 It appears from the record that 37% of the voters of Tennessee elect 20 of the 33 Senators while 40% of the voters elect 63 of the 99 members of the House.59 The root of the trouble is not in Tennessee's Constitution.60
The discrimination lies in the action of Tennessee's Assembly in allocating legislative seats to counties or districts created by it.61 The frequency and magnitude of the inequalities in the present districting admit of no policy whatever.62
Whether qualified voters have standing to challenge a state apportionment statute that allegedly debases their votes?63
Voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue when they assert a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.64
Yes. The appellants are residents of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby Counties and are persons allegedly qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly representing their counties.65 They sued on their own behalf and on behalf of all qualified voters of their respective counties.66 Their constitutional claim is that the 1901 statute constitutes arbitrary and capricious state action offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment in its irrational disregard of the standard of apportionment.67
The injury they assert is that this classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside.68 A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution.69
The appellants have standing to maintain this suit.70
Whether a three-judge district court properly dismissed a complaint alleging that a state apportionment statute debases votes and denies equal protection?71
A complaint alleging denial of equal protection by a state apportionment statute states a justiciable cause of action upon which the plaintiffs are entitled to a trial and a decision.72
No. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it presented a nonjusticiable political question.73 The Supreme Court held that the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision.74 The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.75
The District Court erred in dismissing the complaint; the cause is remanded for further proceedings.76
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Harlan
The Court today reverses a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases over a period of more than fifty years.77 The Court has now entered the political thicket of legislative apportionment.78 This is a task for which the courts are ill-equipped.79
The Constitution confers upon the states the power to determine the composition of their legislatures.80 The question of how to apportion representation is a political question to be resolved by the political processes of each state.81 The Federal courts have no power to intervene in such matters.82
The complaint should be dismissed for want of equity.83 The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.84
I dissent. The claim that the Tennessee apportionment statute violates the Equal Protection Clause is not justiciable.85 The Constitution leaves the matter of legislative apportionment to the states.86
This Court has no power to revise state legislative apportionments.87 The decision today will have far-reaching consequences and will thrust the Federal judiciary into a domain that has traditionally been reserved to the states and to the political branches of government.88 I would affirm the judgment below.89