395 U.S. 486 (1969)
In November 1966 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected from New York's Eighteenth Congressional District to serve in the 90th Congress.1
During the preceding Congress a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration investigated expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor.2 The subcommittee issued a report concluding that Powell had deceived House authorities about travel expenses and that illegal salary payments had been made to his wife at his direction.3 The report also found that Powell met the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence.4
When the 90th Congress organized in January 1967 the House adopted House Resolution No. 1 by a vote of 363 to 65.5 The resolution appointed a nine-member Select Committee to inquire into Powell's qualifications and alleged misconduct.6 Powell appeared before the committee but, on advice of counsel, limited his testimony to the three standing qualifications and refused to answer questions about other matters.7
The Select Committee issued a report finding that Powell met the standing qualifications yet recommending that he be seated, censured, fined $40,000, and deprived of seniority.8 On March 1, 1967, the House rejected a motion to vote on that recommendation.9 The House then adopted an amendment calling for exclusion by a vote of 248 to 176 and passed House Resolution No. 278 by a vote of 307 to 116, thereby excluding Powell and declaring the seat vacant.10
Powell and thirteen voters from his district filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Speaker John W. McCormack, four other House members, and the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Doorkeeper.11 The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the Constitution because Powell satisfied the standing qualifications and requested declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus to compel seating and payment of salary.12 The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.13 The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
While the case was pending the 90th Congress ended.15 Powell was reelected in November 1968 and seated in the 91st Congress under a resolution that imposed a $25,000 fine.16 Respondents filed a suggestion of mootness, but Powell's claim for back salary from the period of exclusion remained unresolved.17
Whether events after the grant of certiorari rendered the case moot?18
No. Although the 90th Congress terminated and Powell was seated in the 91st Congress, his claim for back salary withheld during the period of exclusion from the 90th Congress remained unresolved and hotly contested by adverse parties.21 That claim supplied the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy under Article III.22 The salary issue was not a mere incident to the seating claim but a live dispute that kept the entire action alive.23
The case is not moot because Powell's back salary claim keeps the controversy alive.24
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Joined by Justice White
Justice Stewart dissented on mootness grounds.25 He argued that the essential purpose of the lawsuit was to regain the seat from the 90th Congress.26 That purpose became impossible of attainment when the 90th Congress ended and Powell was seated in the 91st Congress.27
The principal relief sought was therefore moot.28 Stewart viewed the salary claim as too incidental and subordinate to preserve a live controversy between the parties.29 He would have dismissed the entire action as moot without reaching the novel constitutional questions.30
Stewart emphasized that the termination of the 90th Congress was an event beyond the respondents' control and that Powell possessed an adequate alternative remedy in the Court of Claims for any back-pay claim.31
Whether the Speech or Debate Clause barred judicial review of the House's action?32
No. The clause requires dismissal of the action against the Congressmen themselves.35 Yet the clause permits the suit to proceed against House employees such as the Sergeant at Arms, Clerk, and Doorkeeper.36 Judicial review of the constitutionality of the underlying exclusion decision therefore remains available through the claims against those employees.37
The Speech or Debate Clause does not bar the suit against the employees.38
Whether the House resolution excluding Powell should be treated as an expulsion rather than an exclusion?39
No. The House adopted House Resolution No. 278 by a 307-to-116 vote after the Speaker ruled that a majority vote sufficed for exclusion.43 Powell had not yet been seated when the resolution passed.44 The proceedings show that the House intended exclusion rather than expulsion.45 The Speaker explicitly ruled that the vote concerned exclusion, and the House never treated the matter as an expulsion proceeding.46
The resolution cannot be treated as an expulsion.47
Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the constitutional claims?48
Yes. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated Article I, Section 2 because Powell satisfied the standing qualifications.51 The claim presented a substantial federal question.52 The district court therefore possessed jurisdiction to entertain the action even though the merits ultimately turned on separation-of-powers considerations.53
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction.54
Whether the case presented a nonjusticiable political question because of a textually demonstrable commitment to the House or other Baker v. Carr factors?55
A case presents a nonjusticiable political question if there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch.56 A case also presents a political question if there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards or any of the other formulations identified in Baker v. Carr.57
No. Article I, Section 5 commits to the House only the power to judge the standing qualifications expressly set forth in Article I, Section 2.58 Judicially manageable standards exist in the precise text of those qualifications.59 None of the Baker v. Carr factors are satisfied here because the Court is merely interpreting the Constitution rather than intruding on a coordinate branch.60
The case is justiciable.61
Whether the House possessed constitutional authority to exclude a duly elected member who satisfied the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence set forth in Article I, Section 2?62
The House's power under Article I, Section 5 to judge the qualifications of its members is limited to the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence expressly prescribed in Article I, Section 2.63 The House may not add qualifications or exclude for misconduct except by expulsion with a two-thirds vote.64
No. The Select Committee found that Powell met the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence.65 Yet the House excluded him by majority vote for other reasons.66 That action exceeded the authority granted by the Constitution.67 The Framers intended the standing qualifications to be exclusive, and the two-thirds expulsion requirement cannot be circumvented by labeling the proceeding an exclusion.68
The House did not possess constitutional authority to exclude Powell.69
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Justice Douglas concurred to emphasize that the decision does not affect the House's power to expel a member for misconduct by a two-thirds vote under Article I, Section 5.70 He stressed that the House attempted to accomplish by exclusion what it could not do by expulsion.71 Douglas noted that the Constitution expressly provides for expulsion by a two-thirds vote and that the House had not exercised that power here.72
He warned that allowing exclusion for misconduct would permit the House to add qualifications not found in the Constitution.73 Douglas also highlighted the importance of protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the right of constituents to be represented by the person they choose.74