7 How. 1 (1849)
This is an action of trespass brought by Martin Luther against Luther M. Borden and others for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house on June 29, 1842.1 The defendants justified under pleas asserting that an armed insurrection existed in Rhode Island, that the State had declared martial law to defend itself, that the plaintiff aided that insurrection, and that the defendants, as militia, acted under orders to arrest him and, if necessary, to break and enter his dwelling in the performance of that duty.2
The record shows that Rhode Island had continued, since colonial times, to operate under the charter of 1663 with no express method for amendment.3 A group of citizens in 1841 called voluntary mass meetings, elected delegates, and by those delegates adopted a new constitution that extended the suffrage.4 Those proclaiming the new constitution proclaimed it adopted and organized officers under it in May 1842.5 The charter government did not recognize these acts and, after disturbances and armed assemblies, declared martial law and called out militia to suppress what it treated as an insurrection.6
The defendants offered evidence that they were militia ordered to arrest Luther, and to break and enter his house if necessary.7 The plaintiff offered evidence to show that the new constitution had in fact been adopted by a majority of those entitled to vote and thus that the charter government had been displaced.8 The plaintiff offered original minutes, ballots, and registers, and proposed to prove by the moderators and clerks and other witnesses that a majority of those qualified had in fact adopted the new constitution.9
The Circuit Court excluded the plaintiff's proffered proof of adoption and instructed the jury that the charter government was the lawful government and that the defendants were justified.10 The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.11 The case came before the Supreme Court from the Circuit Court upon a certificate of division, though the whole case had been transferred to the Supreme Court.12
Whether a federal court in a private trespass action may determine whether a new state constitution adopted through popular vote had lawfully displaced the existing charter government of Rhode Island?13
Questions concerning whether a new state constitution and government have lawfully displaced an existing state government are political questions committed to the political branches of the federal government under Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution and implementing statutes, rather than matters for judicial resolution in ordinary civil suits between private parties.14
No. The established facts demonstrate that the plaintiff offered voluminous proof including original minutes, ballots, and registers together with testimony from moderators and clerks to show that a majority of qualified voters had adopted the new constitution and thereby displaced the charter government, yet the Circuit Court excluded this evidence and instructed the jury that the charter government remained the lawful authority.15 The Supreme Court reasoned that federal courts cannot adjudicate such displacement claims in private trespass actions because the inquiry would produce inconsistent jury findings.16 The Constitution assigns primary responsibility for recognizing state governments and suppressing domestic violence to Congress and the President acting under the statute of February 28, 1795.17
A federal court may not determine in a private trespass action that a new state constitution adopted through popular vote had lawfully displaced the existing charter government.18
Whether federal courts must follow decisions of state tribunals treating the charter government as the established authority rather than independently weighing evidence of popular adoption of a new constitution?19
Federal courts must follow the decisions of state tribunals on questions concerning the constitution and laws of a state, including determinations of which government is the established authority within that state.20
Yes. Rhode Island state tribunals had refused to recognize the people's constitution and had treated participants in the Dorr movement as insurgents subject to criminal prosecution.21 The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court could not properly disregard those State decisions and independently award, on parol evidence, that a new government had been lawfully established.22 The Supreme Court held that federal courts adopt and follow such state rulings rather than independently weighing parol evidence of constitutional adoption in a civil trial.23
Federal courts must follow decisions of state tribunals treating the charter government as the established authority rather than independently weighing evidence of popular adoption of a new constitution.24
Whether a state legislature's declaration of martial law during an insurrection can justify militia members breaking and entering a private dwelling to arrest a person suspected of aiding the insurrection?25
A state may lawfully employ its military power to suppress an armed insurrection too strong for civil authorities to control.26 This permits militia officers to arrest persons reasonably believed to be engaged in the insurrection and to enter dwellings to search for such persons when necessary.27 Only the force required to accomplish the lawful objective may be used.28
Yes. The record establishes that an armed insurrection existed in Rhode Island, that the state declared martial law on June 25, 1842, and that the defendants were enrolled in the local militia and ordered to arrest the plaintiff and to break and enter his house if necessary.29 The Supreme Court concluded that these facts justified the defendants' conduct in breaking and entering the plaintiff's dwelling to arrest a person reasonably believed to be engaged in the insurrection. The Court cautioned, however, that only so much force as is necessary may be used and that persons who exceed that limit remain liable.30
A state legislature's declaration of martial law during an insurrection can justify militia members breaking and entering a private dwelling to arrest a person suspected of aiding the insurrection.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Woodbury accepted that the overarching question whether the people's constitution had displaced the charter government was primarily political and not for judicial determination, and agreed that State and federal political organs have principal responsibility.32 He focused instead on the separate question of the Rhode Island martial law declaration, concluding that the legislature's act of June 24-25, 1842, proclaiming martial law over the entire state was unconstitutional because the charter of 1663 authorized such measures only against a public enemy in narrow circumstances and because the federal Constitution vests the power to suppress insurrection in Congress and the President under the act of February 28, 1795.33 Woodbury reasoned that even in extreme cases the proper remedy is civil process supported by militia acting in subordination to civil authority, not a general substitution of military law for ordinary protections such as warrants and jury trials, and he would have reversed to allow the defendants to replead on other possible justifications.34
Whether the certificate of division from the circuit court presented proper questions of law for Supreme Court review?35
A certificate of division from a circuit court must present proper questions of law within the meaning of the act of Congress; otherwise the Supreme Court will dismiss the case and remand to the circuit court.36
No. The established facts show that the case arrived before the Supreme Court from the Circuit Court upon a certificate of division, though the whole case had been transferred.37 The Court determined that the certificate was merely formal with many points already decided in the companion Luther case and that no proper question of law had been certified.38 The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the case and remanded it to the Circuit Court.39
The certificate of division from the circuit court did not present proper questions of law for Supreme Court review.40