Concept
Asserting Others' Rights
Standing
Asserting Others' Rights
A plaintiff who proves injury in fact, causation, and redressability has shown a personal stake in the dispute. One question remains: whose legal rights is the plaintiff asking the court to vindicate? Ordinarily the answer must be the plaintiff's own. The Court calls it a “fundamental restriction on our authority” that a litigant “must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties,” although it recognizes “certain, limited exceptions.”1 The restriction reaches plaintiffs whose injury is real but whose legal theory belongs to someone else. This section states the rule, builds the principal exception around Craig v. Boren, and identifies the facts that defeat the exception.
The Own-Rights Rule
Even a plaintiff who clears the Article III minimum on his own claims may be barred from raising the rights of others.2 Older opinions call the idea jus tertii, the right of a third party.3 The bar poses a second standing question that runs beside the constitutional elements. In Singleton v. Wulff, physicians who performed abortions challenged a Medicaid funding exclusion, and the Court separated two questions: whether the physicians alleged an injury in fact sufficient to make the suit a case or controversy, and whether, as a prudential matter, they were “proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suit.”4 A plaintiff can pass the first question and fail the second, so the own-rights rule is a separate checkpoint in any standing analysis.
Two independent reasons support the rule. The first concerns who will litigate well. The holder of a right ordinarily makes the best plaintiff, because the holder has the strongest incentive to develop the facts and press the argument, and courts presume that an absent holder can protect his or her own interests if so inclined. If the holder prefers not to sue, a stranger's suit may settle a dispute that its real participants never wanted settled, and the question is better left to other governmental institutions.5 The second reason concerns the quality of the constitutional ruling. The Court describes the limit as a “rule of self-restraint” that minimizes unwarranted intervention in controversies where the constitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative.6 A stranger's claim arrives with the stranger's facts and not the right-holder's, and those facts may decide whether the right was violated at all. The reasons double as tests for the exception below: the first asks whether the holder can sue, and the second asks whether the plaintiff stands close enough to the holder's situation to present it accurately.
The Court treats the restriction as prudential, a judge-made overlay on the constitutional minimum and not part of it.7 Craig v. Boren shows why the label matters. The State had never objected below to the vendor's reliance on the rights of young men, the lower court had already entertained the constitutional challenge, and the parties sought, or at least never resisted, a ruling. Declining to decide so that injured third parties could sue anew would have fostered “repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence.”8
The characterization has a dissenting critic. Justice Thomas, dissenting in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, argued that under a proper understanding of Article III the plaintiffs there lacked standing: the owners of private rights can show injury simply by asserting that their rights were violated, and the right to abortion is an individual right that is inherently personal.9 An exam answer should present the prudential characterization as the Court's working rule and mention the dissent only when the problem turns on whether the bar is constitutional or prudential.
Bob's complaint shows the rule operating on a single set of facts. The due process claim rests on his own rejection, so he may press it. The equal protection claim of the excluded women is better left to a case in which a female applicant challenges the policy.10 Standing must be established separately for each claim, which is why Bob can proceed on one claim and still be barred from the other.11
The first step in applying the rule is to ask whose right the plaintiff actually invokes, because a right that looks like someone else's may belong to the plaintiff. In Bond v. United States, the Court endorsed the view that an individual who challenges a federal law on Tenth Amendment grounds asserts her own constitutional rights, so no third-party problem arises.12
The Third-Party Exception
The principal exception has three components. The plaintiff must have an Article III injury of his or her own. The third party must face some practical hindrance to protecting his or her own interests. And the plaintiff must have a close relationship with the third party that will make the plaintiff an effective advocate of the right.14 The first component is a precondition for every exception: even when litigants may assert the interests of others, they must have suffered an injury in fact that gives them a concrete interest in the outcome.15 Each component answers one of the reasons for the rule. The plaintiff's own injury supplies the personal stake Article III requires. The hindrance requirement removes the premise that the holder can sue for himself or herself, so refusing the claim would leave the right without a practical champion. The close relationship answers the worry about a stranger's poorly informed advocacy.
Craig v. Boren is the model. Whitener, a beer vendor, challenged an Oklahoma statute that restricted sales of 3.2% beer on the basis of sex, arguing that it violated equal protection.16 Her own injury was plain, because the statute's duties ran to vendors: she could obey the gender line and lose sales in a narrowed market, or disobey and risk sanctions and loss of her license.17 That injury satisfied Article III. The Court then held that she could assert the rights of third parties that would be “diluted or adversely affected” if her challenge failed, because a statute that works by commanding vendors impairs the buyers' rights indirectly when it is enforced against the vendor.18 The law regulated the sale of the beer and not its use, which left the vendor as the obvious claimant, just as the law in Eisenstadt v. Baird prohibited distribution and not use, which made a distributor the least awkward challenger.19 Bob is differently placed, because the military school's policy bars women directly and imposes no duty on him.
Hindrance carries more weight in Barrows v. Jackson. A white property owner who was sued for damages for breaching a racially restrictive covenant by selling to nonwhite buyers raised the equal protection rights of those buyers.20 The Court observed that it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights were asserted to present their grievance before any court.21 The close relationship was also present, because the owner's defense turned on the very question of the covenant's validity that mattered to the excluded buyers.22 The same structure appears in Campbell v. Louisiana, where a white criminal defendant was allowed to assert the equal protection rights of Black citizens systematically excluded from grand jury service. The excluded group had an economic disincentive to sue, and the defendant had a vital interest in the claim, since his conviction might be overturned.23 In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, a son born abroad was allowed to assert his deceased father's equal protection rights in a challenge to the citizenship rules. The father's silence came from disability and not from disinterest, which made the son the best available proponent.24 That distinction explains the hindrance requirement: a rights-holder who is free to sue and chooses not to has indicated that the claim may not need a champion.25
When the Exception Fails
The exception has no force for a plaintiff who lacks an injury of his own. The proponents in Hollingsworth v. Perry could not borrow California's interest in defending Proposition 8, because they had suffered no injury in fact of their own, and Diamond v. Charles had refused for the same reason to let a private litigant maintain litigation the State had abandoned.27 Congress cannot cure the gap. Injury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.28 A plaintiff with a real injury can still fail on the other two components, and the cases show each one failing in a different way.
In Kowalski v. Tesmer, two attorneys who represent indigent criminal defendants challenged a state law that restricted appointed counsel for defendants who plead guilty and then seek to appeal, and the Court denied them standing.29 Their own economic injury, the loss of appointments, was not the problem. Both added components were missing. The attorneys had no current clients among the defendants whose rights they invoked, so no close relationship existed. The defendants remained free to appeal on their own and to ask a state appellate court to review the denial of counsel, so no real hindrance existed.30 The contrast with Craig lies in how each law operates: the Kowalski statute imposed no duty on the lawyers and reached the defendants directly, while Oklahoma's statute reached the buyers through the vendor.
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow shows the rule gaining weight in a particular setting. A noncustodial father challenged a school district's Pledge of Allegiance policy on his daughter's behalf, even though a California court had ordered him not to represent her or to sue as her “next friend.”31 The Ninth Circuit held that even a noncustodial parent had Article III standing to object to government action affecting his child, but the Supreme Court denied him standing and kept a family-law dispute out of federal court. It is generally appropriate for federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic relations to the state courts, even when the case would otherwise fall within federal jurisdiction, so a parent's relationship to a child does not automatically supply the close relationship the exception requires.32
A plaintiff may speak for others by other routes as well. Overbreadth challenges relax the familiar standing requirements to allow a determination that a law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand, a departure the Court views with caution because such challenges invite judgments on fact-poor records.33 Organizations may raise their members' rights under a separate test, taken up in the next section. States suing as parens patriae occupy a related position: the Court gave special solicitude to the injury asserted by Massachusetts because it sued as a sovereign, which raises the question whether states should have greater latitude than individuals to drive the national regulatory agenda.34
Steps one and four do most of the sorting. A plaintiff who invokes a sympathetic right has not passed step one without a personal injury, and a plaintiff whose third parties remain free to sue has not passed step four however closely the two are connected.