346 U.S. 249 (1953)
In Los Angeles, California, petitioners and respondent entered into a restrictive covenant as owners of residential real estate in the same neighborhood.1 The covenant stated that each signer promised that no part of the real property should ever be used or occupied by any person not wholly of the white or Caucasian race.2 Exceptions applied only for domestic servants actively employed on the premises.3 The restriction was to be incorporated in all transfers of the lots.4
Petitioners alleged that respondent breached the covenant by conveying her real estate without incorporating the restriction in the deed and by permitting non-Caucasians to move in and occupy the premises.5 Petitioners sued respondent at law for damages totaling $11,600 for the breach.6 Petitioner Pikaar was not a signer of the covenant but is successor in interest of a signer.7
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint.8 The District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P. 2d 99.9 The Supreme Court of California denied hearing.10
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the constitutional question involved.11 The Court also sought to consider the conflict which has arisen in the decisions of the state courts since its prior ruling on related covenants.12
Whether a racial restrictive covenant can be enforced at law by a suit for damages against a co-covenantor who allegedly broke the covenant?13
The action of a state court at law to sanction the validity of the restrictive covenant would constitute state action as surely as it was state action to enforce such covenants in equity.14 Denial of this right by state action deprives such non-Caucasians of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.15
No. Petitioners sued respondent at law for damages totaling $11,600 alleging breach by conveying property without the restriction and permitting non-Caucasians to occupy the premises.16 To compel respondent to respond in damages would punish her for failure to perform her covenant to continue discriminating against non-Caucasians.17 The result of that sanction by the State would encourage use of restrictive covenants so that it becomes the State's choice that she observe the covenant or suffer damages.18
A racial restrictive covenant cannot be enforced at law by a suit for damages against a co-covenantor.19
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Vinson dissented.20 He argued that these racial restrictive covenants are not legal nullities so far as any doctrine of federal law is concerned.21 Vinson stated that it is not unlawful to make them and not unlawful to enforce them unless the method contravenes the Federal Constitution.22
He noted that the plain fact that there is no identifiable non-Caucasian before this Court who will be denied any right is decisive.23 Vinson concluded that the covenant can be enforced between the parties without running afoul of any doctrine promulgated by this Court.24
Whether a defendant in an action for damages for breach of a racial restrictive covenant may rely on the constitutional rights of third parties not before the court?25
Yes. Respondent faces a direct pocketbook injury from a judgment for $11,600 and the persons whose rights are asserted are unidentified but identifiable prospective purchasers.28 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case the reasons for denying standing are outweighed by the need to protect fundamental rights that would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained.29 Respondent is the only effective adversary of the covenant in its last stand.30
The defendant may rely on the constitutional rights of third parties not before the court in this unique situation.31
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Vinson dissented arguing that respondent makes no showing that she herself is the victim of unconstitutional discrimination.32 He stated that respondent asks the Court to protect the rights of non-Caucasians who might at some point be prospective vendees of some other property encumbered by some other similar covenant.33 Vinson emphasized that the plain admitted fact that there is no identifiable non-Caucasian before the Court who will be denied any right is decisive to him.34
He concluded that such tenuous circumstances cannot spawn the broad constitutional limitation upon state courts which springs from the majority's decision.35 Vinson maintained that the Court has no power to deal with the constitutional issue which respondent seeks to inject as a defense to her breach of contract.36
Whether enforcement of a racial restrictive covenant through an award of damages impairs the obligation of contracts under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution?37
The provision of Article I Section 10 protecting the obligation of contracts against state action is directed only against impairment by legislation and not by judgments of courts.38
No. Petitioners contended that refusal to enforce the covenant impairs the obligation of their contracts.39 The short answer is that the contract clause as its terms indicate is directed against legislative action only.40 A long line of decisions establishes that the provision protects against impairment by legislation and not by judgments of courts.41
Enforcement of a racial restrictive covenant through an award of damages does not impair the obligation of contracts under Article I Section 10.42
Whether failure to enforce a racial restrictive covenant denies petitioners due process and equal protection of the laws?43
The Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand action by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals.44
Failure to enforce a racial restrictive covenant does not deny petitioners due process and equal protection of the laws.47