405 U.S. 438 (1972)
On April 6, 1967, William R. Baird delivered a lecture on birth control at Boston University.1 As part of the presentation, he showed a film, displayed contraceptive devices in their original packages, and at the conclusion invited members of the audience to take contraceptive articles from the stage.2 A young woman requested and received a package of Emko vaginal foam from Baird, after which he was arrested and charged with exhibiting and giving away a contraceptive device in violation of Massachusetts General Laws, c. 272, § 21.3
Baird was convicted following a bench trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court.4 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts set aside the conviction for exhibiting the contraceptives on First Amendment grounds but upheld the conviction for giving away the foam by a four-to-three vote.5 Baird then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the petition.6
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded with directions to grant the writ discharging Baird.7 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the appeal brought by the Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts.8
The Massachusetts statute, as interpreted by the state courts, makes it a felony for anyone other than a registered physician or pharmacist to dispense contraceptives intended for the prevention of pregnancy, with distribution authorized only to married persons upon prescription.9
Whether appellee Baird has standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives under the Massachusetts statute?10
A party has standing to assert third-party rights when the litigant has a sufficient personal stake.11 The relationship with the third parties must be close enough that the litigant's advocacy protects their interests.12 The third parties must face barriers to asserting their own rights, particularly where enforcement of the statute would impair access to protected conduct.13
Yes. Baird delivered a lecture at Boston University and gave Emko vaginal foam to a young woman in the audience, leading to his conviction under the statute that bars distribution to unmarried persons.14 The relationship between Baird as an advocate challenging access restrictions and the unmarried persons denied contraceptives satisfies the alignment requirement.15 Unmarried persons face material impairment because the statute prohibits distribution to them while they are not themselves subject to prosecution, leaving them without a ready forum to assert their rights.16
Baird has standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons.17
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Justice Douglas concurs in the result but would affirm on narrower First Amendment grounds rather than reaching equal protection.18 He views Baird's lecture on birth control and the distribution of the sample as protected speech and a legitimate teaching technique.19 The First Amendment protects the opportunity to persuade to action and the use of visual aids in educational lectures.20
Handing out one article is merely a projection of the visual aid and should be a permissible adjunct of free speech.21 This approach avoids reaching standing or equal protection issues by resolving the case solely on First Amendment principles applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Whether the Massachusetts statute's distinction between married and unmarried persons in the distribution of contraceptives for the prevention of pregnancy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?23
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.24 All persons similarly circumstanced must be treated alike.25 Dissimilar treatment of similarly situated married and unmarried persons is invalid when the distinction lacks a rational basis.26
Yes. The statute permits physicians and pharmacists to distribute contraceptives to married persons on prescription but forbids any distribution to unmarried persons for pregnancy prevention.27 No ground of difference rationally explains the distinction because the statute is riddled with exceptions that undermine any claimed purpose and treats identically situated individuals differently based solely on marital status.28
The statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
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Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice White concurs in the result on the ground that the statute is overbroad and reaches constitutionally protected conduct of married persons.30 The record contains no evidence of the recipient's marital status.31 The conviction rested on Baird's unlicensed status alone.32
The conviction cannot stand under Griswold without proof that vaginal foam poses health hazards requiring medical supervision.33 A state's interest in health empowers restriction to medical channels only when evidence supports the classification for the particular product.34
Whether the statute can be sustained as a rational means of deterring fornication?35
A statute that distinguishes between classes must bear a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose.36 Where the classification is so riddled with exceptions that it has at best a marginal relation to the proffered objective, the purpose cannot reasonably be regarded as the aim of the legislation.37
No. The statute imposes felony penalties for distribution while fornication itself is only a misdemeanor.38 The law exempts distribution for disease prevention and allows married persons unrestricted access regardless of intended use.39 These exceptions demonstrate that deterrence of premarital sex cannot reasonably be viewed as the statute's purpose.40
The statute cannot be sustained as a rational means of deterring fornication.41
Whether the statute can be sustained as a health measure regulating the distribution of potentially harmful articles?42
A health regulation must be rationally related to protecting public health.43 When the statute discriminates between married and unmarried persons without evidence that the need for medical supervision varies by marital status and when other laws already regulate harmful drugs, the classification lacks a rational health basis.44
No. The statute permits distribution to married persons on prescription but bars it entirely for unmarried persons.45 The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the need for physician oversight is the same for both groups and that not all contraceptives pose health risks.46 Existing federal and state drug laws already address dangerous substances, rendering the marital distinction irrational as a health measure.47
The statute cannot be sustained as a health measure.48
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Chief Justice Burger dissents, maintaining that the statute is a valid exercise of the police power to regulate distribution of medicinal substances through licensed channels.49 He would uphold the restriction on distributors as rationally related to health protection.50 The highest state court found a legitimate interest in protecting health by requiring medical supervision.51
He would not extend Griswold to invalidate the licensing requirement for distribution.52 The majority's rejection of the health purpose invades state prerogatives under the police power.53