542 U.S. 1 (2004)
In 1892 a national magazine proposed that schoolchildren recite a pledge of allegiance to the flag.1
Congress first codified rules for the Pledge in a 1942 joint resolution and amended the text twelve years later to add the words "under God."2
California law requires every public elementary school to begin each day with appropriate patriotic exercises.3 The Elk Grove Unified School District satisfies the requirement by directing that each elementary class recite the Pledge once daily, while permitting students who object on religious grounds to abstain.4
Michael A. Newdow, an atheist whose daughter was then enrolled in kindergarten in the district, filed suit in March 2000 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against Congress, the President, the State of California, the School District, and its superintendent.5 The complaint sought a declaration that the 1954 amendment adding "under God" violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and an injunction against the district's daily recitation policy.6 The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed the complaint on July 21, 2000.7
A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that Newdow had standing as a parent and that both the 1954 Act and the district policy violated the Establishment Clause.8 After that decision, Sandra Banning, the mother of Newdow's daughter, moved to intervene or dismiss, stating that she held sole legal custody and that the child was a Christian who had no objection to reciting or hearing the Pledge. On September 25, 2002, a California Superior Court enjoined Newdow from including his daughter as a party or suing as her next friend.9
The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that Newdow retained Article III standing as a noncustodial parent under California law.10 In February 2003 the court amended its opinion to omit any determination of standing to challenge the 1954 Act itself.11 At a September 2003 hearing the Superior Court announced that the parents now share joint legal custody but that Banning makes the final decisions if they disagree.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider both Newdow's standing and the First Amendment question.13
Whether Newdow has standing as a noncustodial parent to challenge the School District's policy requiring daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance?14
Prudential standing embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.15 These limits include the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights.16 They also include the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.17 Federal courts have customarily declined to intervene in the realm of domestic relations.18 They recognize a domestic relations exception that divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.19
No. Newdow's standing derives entirely from his relationship with his daughter.20 He lacks the right to litigate as her next friend because Banning holds sole legal custody or the tie-breaking authority on education and welfare decisions under the California Superior Court orders.21 The interests of the parent and child are not parallel and are potentially in conflict.22 The child is a Christian who believes in God and has no objection to reciting the Pledge.23
Although the Court of Appeals concluded that California law vests in Newdow a cognizable right to influence his daughter's religious upbringing, the relief Newdow seeks goes beyond protecting the parent-child sphere to restraining the acts of a third party, the School District. When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.24
Newdow lacks prudential standing to bring this suit in federal court.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor And Justice Thomas (as To Part I)
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents from the majority's novel prudential standing principle that bars adjudication when family law rights are in dispute and prosecution may adversely affect the source of the plaintiff's standing.26 He would defer to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of California law under the Murga and Mentry decisions.27 Those decisions recognize a noncustodial parent's right to expose a child to religious views even when they conflict with those of the custodial parent.28
Rehnquist concludes that Newdow retains a cognizable interest under state law to challenge the Pledge policy as an infringement on his own parental right to direct his daughter's religious upbringing without the state's endorsement of religion.29 Therefore Newdow has standing to bring the suit in federal court.30
Justice O'Connor joins the Chief Justice's opinion in full.31 She agrees that Newdow has standing under the Court of Appeals' reading of California law because the policy of deferring to regional courts of appeals on state-law questions supports that conclusion.32 She would reach the merits and hold that the policy does not offend the Establishment Clause under the endorsement test.33
She applies that test by examining the history and ubiquity of the Pledge, the absence of worship or prayer, the absence of reference to a particular religion, and the minimal religious content of the phrase "under God."34
Justice Thomas joins the Chief Justice as to Part I and agrees that Newdow has standing. He separately argues that the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments of religion and therefore resists incorporation against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.35 He concludes that the Pledge policy does not implicate any incorporated religious liberty right because it creates no coercive state establishment of religion.36
The policy involves no legal compulsion by force of law and threat of penalty that would characterize a traditional establishment.37 The voluntary Pledge recitation does not create or maintain any such coercive establishment.38 No free-exercise rights are infringed by the policy.39
Whether the School District's policy offends the First Amendment?40
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community by conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.41 References to God in patriotic contexts may qualify as ceremonial deism that does not constitute an establishment of religion.42
No. The Court does not reach the question whether the School District's policy offends the First Amendment because Newdow lacks prudential standing.43 The majority therefore reverses the Ninth Circuit without addressing whether the policy of daily recitation of the Pledge containing the words "under God" violates the Establishment Clause.
The Court does not reach the question whether the School District's policy offends the First Amendment.44
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor And Justice Thomas (as To Part I)
Chief Justice Rehnquist would hold that the policy does not violate the Establishment Clause.45 The phrase "under God" is a patriotic acknowledgment of the Nation's religious history rather than a prayer or endorsement of religion.46 Reciting the Pledge is a patriotic exercise focused on the flag and the Republic.47
The voluntary recitation by willing students does not coerce participation in any religious exercise.48 Extending the Establishment Clause to prohibit this practice would give objectors an unwarranted heckler's veto over a commendable patriotic observance.49
Justice O'Connor would hold that the Pledge recitation is an instance of ceremonial deism that does not offend the Establishment Clause.50 She applies the endorsement test and evaluates the history and ubiquity of the practice, the absence of worship or prayer, the absence of reference to a particular religion, and the minimal religious content of the phrase "under God."51 A reasonable observer fully aware of the Pledge's origins and context would not perceive the recitation as a government endorsement of religion.52
Justice Thomas would hold that the Pledge policy is constitutional because the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision that resists incorporation against the states.53 Even if incorporated, it would prohibit only coercive state establishments of religion involving legal compulsion by force of law and threat of penalty.54 The voluntary Pledge recitation does not create or maintain any such coercive establishment.
No free-exercise rights are infringed by the policy. He notes that adherence to Lee v. Weisman would require striking down the policy but concludes that Lee was wrongly decided and that peer pressure does not constitute the legal coercion required for an establishment violation.