543 U.S. 125 (2004)
In 1994, Michigan amended its Constitution to provide that an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of the court and not as of right.1 Following this amendment, several Michigan state judges began to deny appointed appellate counsel to indigents who pleaded guilty, and the Michigan Legislature subsequently codified this practice in a statute scheduled to go into effect on April 1, 2000.2
A challenge to the Michigan practice was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.3 The named plaintiffs included the two attorney respondents and three indigents who were denied appellate counsel after pleading guilty.4 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they alleged that the Michigan practice and statute denied indigents their federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.5 They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the practice and the statute.6
A day before the statute was to take effect, the District Court issued an order holding the practice and statute unconstitutional.7 It ultimately issued an injunction that bound all Michigan state judges, requiring them not to deny appellate counsel to any indigent who pleaded guilty.8 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.9 The panel held that Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), abstention barred the suit by the indigents but that the attorneys had third-party standing to assert the rights of indigents.10 It then held that the statute was constitutional.11 The Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc and reversed.12 The en banc majority agreed with the panel on standing but found that the statute was unconstitutional.13 We granted certiorari. 540 U. S. 1148 (2004).14
The attorneys in this case invoke the attorney-client relationship to demonstrate the requisite closeness.15 Specifically, they rely on a future attorney-client relationship with as yet unascertained Michigan criminal defendants who will request, but be denied, the appointment of appellate counsel, based on the operation of the statute.16 The three indigent criminal defendants who were originally plaintiffs in this § 1983 action were appropriately dismissed under Younger.17
Whether two attorneys have third-party standing to challenge Michigan's procedure for appointing appellate counsel for indigent defendants who plead guilty by invoking the rights of hypothetical future clients?18
A party generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.19 We have limited the exception to this rule by requiring that a party seeking third-party standing make two additional showings.20 First, we have asked whether the party asserting the right has a close relationship with the person who possesses the right.21 Second, we have considered whether there is a hindrance to the possessor's ability to protect his own interests.22
No. The attorneys do not have third-party standing to assert the rights of Michigan indigent defendants denied appellate counsel.23
The attorneys rely on a future attorney-client relationship with as yet unascertained Michigan criminal defendants rather than any existing close relationship.24 The indigents have open avenues to argue that denial deprives them of their constitutional rights by seeking leave to challenge that denial in the Michigan Court of Appeals and, if denied, seek leave in the Michigan Supreme Court.25 They then may seek a writ of certiorari in this Court.26 Beyond that, there exists both state and federal collateral review.27 Pro se defendants have in fact pursued such claims in Michigan courts and this Court.28 The attorneys could have attended state court and assisted the indigents rather than pursuing federal litigation to short circuit the state process.29
In sum, we hold that the attorneys do not have third-party standing to assert the rights of Michigan indigent defendants denied appellate counsel.30
Related opinions on this issue
That this case is even remotely close demonstrates that our third-party standing cases have gone far astray.31 We have granted third-party standing in a number of cases to litigants whose relationships with the directly affected individuals were at best remote.32 The attorneys before us do not have a close relationship with their alleged clients.33
Indeed, they have no relationship at all.34 Because the Court's opinion is a reasonable application of our precedents, I join it in full.35
Ordinarily, one may not claim standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party.36 The close relation and hindrance criteria are prudential considerations.37 Attorneys Fitzgerald and Vogler have shown both injury in fact and the requisite close relation to indigent defendants.38
Those attorneys have demonstrated a formidable hindrance to the indigents ability to proceed without the aid of counsel.39 This case turns on the existence of an impediment to the indigent defendants effective assertion of their own rights.40 The challenged statute leaves indigent criminal defendants without the aid needed to gain access to the appellate forum.41
I would affirm the en banc Sixth Circuit decision that attorneys Fitzgerald and Vogler have standing to maintain the instant action.42