Concept
Limits on the Bar
Does state sovereign immunity bar the suit?
Limits on the Bar
The Eleventh Amendment withdraws the judicial power of the United States from “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”1 Read narrowly, the text closes two doors to federal court, the citizen-state and alien-state diversity doors, and arguably leaves the others open, including the federal-question door.2 The Court did not read it narrowly. In Hans v. Louisiana, a Louisiana resident sued Louisiana in federal court to recover on repudiated state bonds. He argued that the repudiation violated the Contracts Clause and that the Amendment could not touch him, since he was not one of the plaintiffs its text names.3 Because his claim arose under the Constitution, he had entered through the federal-question door rather than either closed one.4 The Court dismissed the action anyway.5
On the profound-shock thesis that Hans articulated, the framers recoiled from state suability and meant to curtail virtually all federal judicial power to hear suits against the States, even though the Amendment does not say so. The Court has made that thesis the law of the land, with some exceptions.6 The recognized exceptions cover suits brought by the United States, suits brought by another State, suits in which the Supreme Court reviews a state court’s decision, suits against state officials under the “stripping doctrine,” suits against a political subdivision, and suits as to which Congress has abrogated the immunity.7 Abrogation has its own section above. This unit takes up a State’s consent, which adds a further route around the bar, and then officer suits, suits by the United States and other States, and local governments.
Each limit follows from a fact the bar requires and the limit shows to be missing. The bar applies when a private plaintiff sues a State that has not agreed to answer. A State may agree to answer, and its consent defeats the immunity.8 A suit to stop an officer’s ongoing violation of federal law goes forward because the Constitution must remain the supreme law of the land.9 The States accepted the constitutional plan, and the consent inherent in it runs to the United States and to the other States, so neither meets the immunity as a plaintiff.10 A city or county is not the State, and the immunity does not extend to it.11
These limits are a second round of questions, asked after the forum analysis. A suit that seems to end in dismissal is not finished until it has passed through them. Consent comes first, because the immunity belongs to the State and the State may already have given it up.
Consent and Waiver
Sovereign immunity bars suits only when the State has not consented. Alden v. Maine listed that as the first limit built into the principle and observed that many States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits.12 The default comes from the founding period. “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent,” one early account states, and unless the plan of the convention surrendered that immunity, it remains with the States.13 Three questions organize the rest of this section: who may give consent, what the State may do with its consent once given, and how clearly the State must speak before a court treats the immunity as gone.
The State may give up the immunity because the immunity protects the State. That raises a puzzle, since the Amendment says the judicial power shall not extend to the suit: how can a State confer jurisdiction the Constitution withholds? The courts answer that the Amendment grants the State a personal immunity, founded on sovereign immunity, and a personal immunity can be waived.14 The answer persuades the courts more than it satisfies the logician, but it explains a contrast with Article III. Parties cannot waive the diversity requirement or confer jurisdiction on a federal court by agreeing to it, because the Article III limits protect the federal courts. The Eleventh Amendment protects the State, so the State may decline its protection.15
Once given, consent stays under the State’s control. Hans v. Louisiana confirms that a State may be sued by its own consent, as in Curran v. Arkansas, where the suit proceeded by virtue of a state law.16 The same passage draws from Beers v. Arkansas the terms on which consent operates. Because the permission is “altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty,” the State “may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted, and may withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that justice to the public requires it.”17 The earlier statute was not a contract. It was “an ordinary act of legislation, prescribing the conditions upon which the State consented to waive the privilege of sovereignty,” and it contained no stipulation against later modification. The Court would not ask whether the change fell harshly on parties whose suits were then pending; that was a question for the legislature.18
A State may also consent in part. In Alden, the employees argued that Maine discriminated against federal rights by asserting immunity from their FLSA suit. The Court found no evidence that Maine had manipulated its immunity “in a systematic fashion to discriminate against federal causes of action,” and held that a State consenting to certain classes of suits while maintaining immunity from others “has done no more than exercise a privilege of sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity from suit.”19 Consent to one class of suit extends no further than its terms.
Congress cannot find consent merely because a State joined a federal program. The Federal Government keeps, subject to constitutional limits, the authority to seek a State’s voluntary consent to private suits, and the spending power is one way it tries; cf. South Dakota v. Dole.20 If Congress attaches a waiver to federal funds, the State’s receipt of the funds waives immunity only if Congress clearly required the waiver and made clear that it was explicitly granting individuals a right of action in federal court.21 Neither a State’s participation in a federal program nor its agreement to obey federal law amounts to waiver.22 Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, so the State’s consent should be express.23 A State that takes a grant and promises to follow the program’s rules has made a promise about its conduct. It has not necessarily decided to let private plaintiffs sue it in federal court if it breaks that promise.
Consent in a State’s own courts does not carry into federal court. In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, a Utah statute undoubtedly provided for suit against Utah in its own courts, but it fell short of the required “clear declaration by a State of its consent to be sued in the federal courts.”24 A state constitutional provision allowing suit against the State “in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law” fared no better. The Court held that language too general to show consent to suit in federal court and refused relief.25 A State may open its own courts without choosing to answer in federal court, so a general permission does not settle the federal question. Alden drew the contrast from the other direction: a federal statute authorizing employee suits against States “in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction” removed the ambiguity identified in Kennecott Copper, because it answered whether suits may be maintained in federal court as well as state court.26 For consent language drawn from an interstate compact, see Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney.
Conduct can waive immunity when it chooses the federal forum. A State’s decision to remove a case, or to join other defendants in removing it, constitutes waiver.27 A State that simply appears in federal court waives nothing, and its failure to plead immunity at trial is no waiver either, because the Court allows the State to raise the Eleventh Amendment on appeal.28
Nor will a court imply waiver from a State’s participation in a regulated field. In Parden v. Terminal Railway, a State took over a railroad knowing that federal law already regulated railroad liability extensively, and the Court treated that decision as an implied waiver of immunity from employees’ suits.29 The Court has since abandoned the doctrine of implied waiver and explicitly overruled Parden in 1999.30 Even before that, it was reluctant to find implied waivers and never held that a State automatically waived immunity by operating a federally regulated enterprise. It also held that a State’s waiver should not be implied more readily than an individual’s waiver of personal constitutional rights.31 An answer that finds waiver because a State runs a regulated enterprise, accepts program funds, or opens its own courts therefore skips the step that matters: an express act by the State directed at the federal forum.
Suits Against State Officers
An immunity that covered everything done in a State’s name would leave no court able to stop a State from violating the Constitution. The Court avoided that result in Ex parte Young (1908), which permits suits against state officials to obtain prospective relief against violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 The premise is that sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, so certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must be permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land.35 Alden v. Maine counts the route among the limits on the immunity, observing that the rule “does not bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief.”36
Young arose from a challenge to a state rate statute that the plaintiff companies alleged to be unconstitutionally confiscatory. The lower court preliminarily enjoined Young, the state’s attorney general, from enforcing the statute. The next day Young began an enforcement action, and the federal court held him in contempt.37 The decision rests on a legal fiction: an officer cannot be given authority to violate federal law, so a suit to stop him is not a suit against the State itself.38 The fiction survives in one visible form. A state officer must be the named defendant.39
The fiction has a long ancestry. English courts did not wish to confront the King’s immunity directly, yet they found it intolerable that the sovereign’s abuses should go unremedied. Because the King could act only through officers, a rule permitting suits against those officers formally preserved the immunity while curbing the abuses.40 American decisions describe the officer cases the same way: the suits were held to be against individuals and not against the State, with the concession that a suit against the State itself could not be maintained.41
The name on the complaint does not decide the question. Osborn v. Bank of the United States once confined the Amendment to cases naming the State as a party of record. Later rulings modified that decision and held that the Amendment applies to any suit brought in the name of a state officer when “the State, though not named, is the real party against which the relief is asked, and the judgment will operate.”42 Louisiana v. Jumel, Hagood v. Southern, and In re Ayers illustrate the point. Those suits arose under the Constitution and sought relief against state officers who professed to act in obedience to state laws, and the Court held them virtually against the States themselves and barred.43
The Court accepts the fiction because the alternative is worse. Brown v. Board of Education, and the rest of the cases protecting individual liberty from state infringement, came to federal court under what one commentator calls “this important, if anomalous, legal fiction.”44
Two features fix how far the route reaches: the law the officer is accused of violating, and the relief the plaintiff seeks. The inquiry is straightforward. It asks whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief that can fairly be characterized as prospective.45 Federal courts may issue prospective relief against state officials to enforce federal law even if the relief requires the official to use state funds.46
The state treasury marks the boundary. Edelman v. Jordan held that the Eleventh Amendment forbids a federal court to order a state officer to pay welfare benefits out of the state treasury to remedy past violations of federal law. The Court acknowledged that Young authorized injunctions against future violations, but it invoked earlier decisions denying federal-court authority to order tax collectors to pay refunds with public money. It concluded that a suit “seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury” for past wrongs falls outside Young.47 In that setting the State is the real party against which relief is asked, whoever is named.48 Critics find little to recommend the distinction. An injunction that Young allows can have as great an impact on state policy as the order Edelman rejected, and Edelman itself affirmed an order requiring officials to comply in future cases with federal timing requirements for processing welfare applications, which undoubtedly cost the State more than three years of past violations.49 The Court treats the cost of compliance as an ordinary consequence of prospective relief; see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney and Milliken v. Bradley.
How the plaintiff sues the officer fixes what the plaintiff can recover. An official-capacity suit is, in general, another way of pleading an action against the State and so falls within the Eleventh Amendment.50 The exception is the Young action: the Amendment does not prevent prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacity.51 A personal-capacity suit seeks to impose individual liability on an officer for acts taken under color of state law, and the Amendment does not bar it.52 Even a suit for money damages may proceed against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought from the officer personally and not from the state treasury.53 In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit against named state officials over the deaths of students at Kent State University.54 Clearing the immunity bar does not decide the merits. Doctrines such as the Parratt line of due process cases, which Zinermon v. Burch (1990) narrowed, still govern what the plaintiff can win.55
The state-law claim fails because the stripping rationale rests on the supremacy of federal law. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, held that the Eleventh Amendment bars even prospective relief against a state official if the legal basis for the relief is state law, whether the official failed to implement state law or acted contrary to it. The narrow majority read Young to allow stripping only to enforce supremacy, a consideration absent when state law furnishes the right.56 The result sits awkwardly with the stripping idea, since the State has no more authorized a violation of its own law than of federal law. The Court found that the official retained immunity against the state-law claim although he had lost it for the federal claim.57
A prospective claim for a continuing federal violation can still fail when Congress has built its own enforcement machinery. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the tribe alleged a continuing violation of federal law in the Governor’s failure to bring the State into compliance with § 2710(d)(3). But the duty to negotiate that the provision imposed on the State did not stand alone, because Congress passed it together with the carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme of § 2710(d)(7).58 The Court held that where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for enforcing a statutory right against a State, a court “should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young.” Congress chose to impose on the State a liability significantly more limited than the liability an officer would face under Young, which strongly indicates that it did not mean to create the heavier one. Courts are not free to rewrite the scheme to approximate what Congress might have wanted had it known part of it was beyond its power.59 The Court has refused officer suits in other settings too, as in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, and it has since described the governing inquiry in plain terms in Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland: whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks prospective relief.60
These rules explain how federal law keeps its force against a State whose immunity survives. The age discrimination statute is an example. Congress’s power to enact it arose under the commerce clause and not the Fourteenth Amendment, so the Eleventh Amendment restricts private monetary actions against the State unless the State waives immunity or consents. The Amendment does not prevent prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacity, damages recovery by the federal government, or private monetary recovery against entities that are not an arm of the State.61 The Alden majority took comfort in the same routes. Individual victims could still seek injunctions against state officials under Young, the United States could still sue unconsenting States, and Fitzpatrick permitted Congress to authorize some suits against States under the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. The majority also pointed to the “good faith of the States” as an important assurance, and the dissenters were unimpressed.62 As a matter of current law, abrogation by way of the Fourteenth Amendment remains the primary means at Congress’s disposal to overcome the immunity.63
The usual error is to treat the label on the complaint as decisive in either direction. A complaint that names only an officer does not escape the bar if the judgment would be paid from the treasury for past violations. A complaint that seeks only an injunction does not escape the Seminole Tribe limit when Congress prescribed a detailed scheme against the State. In each case the question is whom the relief really runs against, what it commands, and who pays.
Suits by the United States or States
The Eleventh Amendment names two kinds of plaintiffs who may not invoke the federal judicial power against a State, citizens of another State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. Neither the United States nor a sister State appears on that list.66 The sections above carried the bar far past that list, to a State’s own citizens and to every private plaintiff. A student can fairly ask whether any plaintiff may still sue a State that has not agreed to answer. Two can. Alden v. Maine states the limit in one sentence: in ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal Government.67 The immunity protects a State against private claimants, so the identity of the plaintiff decides whether the bar applies.
The consent is part of the constitutional plan, and each half of it has its own reason. Principality of Monaco explained that the waiver inherent in a State’s acceptance of the plan runs to the other States, who accepted the same plan, and to the United States, the sovereign the Constitution creates.68 For suits between States, Article III supplied a neutral federal forum in which the States agreed to be amenable to one another’s suits.69 The Constitution contemplates such suits among the members of the federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures.70 For suits by the United States, the Court has refused to assume that the framers meant to exempt a State altogether from suit by the General Government. Controversies capable of judicial solution would arise between them, and the permanence of the Union might be endangered if no tribunal could decide them.71 See also Minnesota v. Hitchcock.
The consent has a forum as well as a plaintiff. The Court has observed that, because all jurisdiction implies superiority of power, the only forums in which the States have consented to suits by one another and by the Federal Government are Article III courts.72 Congress has given the district courts jurisdiction over civil actions commenced by the United States or by an agency or officer expressly authorized to sue, and the courts read that grant to reach the full scope of constitutional authority.73 Suits between States belong in the Supreme Court alone. Jurisdiction over them is original and exclusive under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), so if California sues Arizona, the only forum is the Supreme Court. The Court usually appoints a special master to hold hearings and report findings and conclusions, and then reviews the report much as it would review an appeal.74
The same State and the same statute can produce opposite results depending on who sues. In Alden, Maine was shielded from a private suit to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, yet the Court observed that the United States could have enforced the Act against Maine in a suit of its own.75 The difference lies in who controls the suit. A suit commenced in the name of the United States by officers entrusted with the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed differs in kind from a private suit. The fear of private suits against nonconsenting States was the central reason the Founders preserved state immunity, and a federal suit requires the exercise of political responsibility for each case prosecuted, a control absent from a broad delegation to private persons.76 The United States had specific statutory authority to sue Maine and apparently did not send even one attorney. The Court treated the difference between the two kinds of suit as one the plan of the Convention had already settled: the States consented to the first and not to the second.77 A federal suit may also serve individuals. The Secretary of Labor may sue a State to establish the rights of employees whose own suit would be barred.78
Because the justification rests on federal executive accountability, a private party who borrows the government’s name does not borrow the consent. The same line explains why a private party’s administrative proceeding before the Federal Maritime Commission against a nonconsenting state agency is barred.79 Alden left related questions open. It may be impractical for the United States to sue in every instance where a State violates a federal law such as the FLSA, which raises the question whether the exception for suits by the United States would apply if Congress authorized private parties to sue the State on behalf of the federal government, as it has from time to time through qui tam actions.80 Other open questions include whether the United States may recover compensatory damages for the benefit of individuals injured by state violations and whether it may deputize private lawyers to pursue such suits.81 Whether EEOC suits can provide remedies for individuals also remains open.82
A suit by another State rests on the same consent. A State may sue another State or the United States.83 The Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of money damages when one State sues another in an original action before the Supreme Court, because the Amendment applies by its terms to suits by citizens against a State.84 The exception stops at the edge of the Union. A foreign state lies outside the constitutional structure, and no State’s consent runs to it.85
A fact pattern that combines a valid federal claim with a nonconsenting State invites the answer that immunity ends the inquiry. Identify the plaintiff before giving that answer. If the United States is suing through its own officers, or a State is suing another State, the immunity does not apply, and what remains is the ordinary question of jurisdiction and the merits.
Local Governments
The Eleventh Amendment protects “one of the United States,” and each extension of the immunity discussed so far has kept the protected defendant fixed: the State.88 Alden v. Maine names the corollary as the second important limit on the principle. Sovereign immunity bars suits against States but not lesser entities, so it does not reach a suit against a municipal corporation or any other governmental entity that is not an arm of the State; see, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning.89 Suits against political subdivisions therefore appear among the recognized exceptions to the bar.90 The checklist begins with the defendant. If it is neither the State nor an arm of the State, consent, abrogation, and officer suits never come into play.
The federal courts have not given local governments federal constitutional status against their States, either as government entities or as holders of rights the Constitution guarantees against state incursion.91 That treatment fits the scope of the immunity. The protection belongs to the State, and the federal courts have not accorded a city or county comparable standing. The test is whether the entity is an arm of the State.
The cases apply the line consistently. In Howlett v. Rose, a state court could not refuse to hear a § 1983 suit against a school board on the basis of sovereign immunity. The school board was not an arm of the State, so it could not assert any constitutional defense of sovereign immunity to which the State would have been entitled.92 The Court has applied the same line outside civil rights litigation; see also Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. Chatham County. The consequence for money claims is sharp. The State, in contrast to municipalities, is absolutely immune from suit in federal court for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment.93 Broader statements of sovereign immunity can mislead here. Maritime treatises, for example, describe the doctrine as generally prohibiting suits against governmental entities, including local governments, unless immunity has been waived.94 The Eleventh Amendment doctrine is narrower and does not extend to entities that are not arms of the State.
Labeling a defendant local does not end the inquiry, because some entities are neither plainly cities nor plainly state agencies. A city or county does not receive Eleventh Amendment immunity, while a governmental entity that is an arm of the State does. Whether a state university or department of public health is a non-immune subdivision or an immune arm of the State can be quite complex and often turns on the entity’s treatment under state law.95 The question is fact-bound; see, e.g., Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (a bistate planning agency). The issue that matters is the entity’s potential legal liability for judgments. An agreement by the federal government to indemnify a state instrumentality against litigation costs does not divest the agency of immunity, because the question is whether the entity is legally liable, not whether a third party can be made to reimburse it.96
The payoff for plaintiffs is concrete. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar private recovery of monetary relief against entities that are not an arm of the State, so suits against local entities can often proceed even where the same claim against the State could not.97 Clearing the immunity question opens the courthouse door and does not establish liability, so the merits remain to be tried.