377 U.S. 184 (1964)
In 1927 the State of Alabama acquired and began operating the Terminal Railway through its State Docks Department.1 The railway consists of approximately 50 miles of tracks serving the State Docks at Mobile and nearby industries while also interchanging with privately owned railroads.2 It operates for profit under authority from the 1940 Code of Alabama, Title 38, § 17.3 It engages in substantial interstate commerce activities, including compliance with the Railway Labor Act, the Federal Safety Appliance Act, and Interstate Commerce Commission requirements.4
Citizens of Alabama employed by the Terminal Railway filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.5 They alleged that the railway was a common carrier by railroad engaging in interstate commerce and sought damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for personal injuries sustained during their employment.6
The State of Alabama appeared specially and moved to dismiss the action, asserting that the railway was a state agency and that the state had not waived its sovereign immunity from suit.7 The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in 311 F.2d 727.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 375 U.S. 810.9
Whether a State that owns and operates a railroad in interstate commerce may successfully plead sovereign immunity in a federal-court suit brought against the railroad by its employee under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act?10
A State that enters the field of interstate commerce by operating a railroad necessarily consents to federal regulation of that activity, including private suits authorized by Congress under statutes such as the FELA.11 The Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity do not shield the State from such suits when it has accepted the conditions attached by Congress to the exercise of the commerce power.12
No. Alabama acquired and has operated the Terminal Railway since 1927.13 The State left the sphere exclusively its own and entered an activity subject to congressional regulation, thereby subjecting itself to that regulation as fully as a private person or corporation.14 Because the FELA creates a cause of action against every common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama cannot successfully plead sovereign immunity.15 The Eleventh Amendment and the expanded immunity recognized in Hans v. Louisiana do not alter this result.16
Those protections remain intact, yet they yield when a State voluntarily engages in regulable conduct to which Congress has attached the condition of amenability to suit.17
The State of Alabama may not successfully plead sovereign immunity in the federal-court suit brought by its employees under the FELA.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan, And Stewart
Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart, dissented on the ground that any waiver of sovereign immunity must be effected by Congress with unmistakable clarity rather than inferred from general statutory language.19 He emphasized that the legislative history of the FELA reveals no consideration of state immunity and that the Act’s purpose was merely to alter common-law defenses available to employers.20 In his view, requiring Alabama’s immunity to yield on the basis of the phrase “every common carrier” improperly treats a constitutional right as equivalent to statutory or common-law defenses that the statute expressly removed.21
Justice White further insisted that waiver of a constitutional privilege must be knowing and intelligent. This standard was not met when Congress failed to bring home to the State the precise nature of the option it was being given.22
Whether Congress in enacting the FELA intended to subject a State to suit in these circumstances?23
Congress intended the FELA to apply to every common carrier by railroad engaging in interstate commerce, including those owned and operated by States, because the statute employs all-embracing language without exception and because parallel federal railroad statutes have consistently been held to reach publicly owned carriers.24
Yes. The statutory text makes every common carrier by railroad liable in damages to injured employees.25 It authorizes suit in federal district court.26 That language is at least as broad as the Safety Appliance Act and the Railway Labor Act, both of which this Court has held applicable to state-owned railroads.27
The consistent congressional pattern of using inclusive terms without suggesting exclusion of state railroads confirms that Congress meant the FELA to reach state-owned carriers as well.28 Reading a sovereign-immunity exception into the Act would leave one class of railroad workers without remedy, a result Congress could not have intended.29
Congress intended the FELA to subject a State operating a railroad in interstate commerce to suit by its employees.30
Whether Congress had the power to subject a State to suit under the FELA as against the State’s claim of immunity?31
By granting Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, the States surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would obstruct the exercise of that power.32 Therefore Congress may condition a State’s operation of a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to private suit under the FELA.33
Yes. The Commerce Clause is plenary as to the objects within its scope.34 When a State operates a railroad in interstate commerce it must do so in subordination to federal regulatory power.35 Imposition of the FELA right of action is within that power, and the State’s claim of immunity cannot preclude application of the Act.36
Alabama’s decision to operate the Terminal Railway after enactment of the FELA constituted acceptance of the condition of amenability to suit that Congress attached to the privilege of engaging in regulated interstate commerce.37
Congress possessed the constitutional power to subject the State to suit under the FELA.38