Also known as: ultimum supplicium · ultima supplicia · extreme punishment · capital punishment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional principle that categorically bars imposition of the death penalty on intellectually disabled offenders and for non-homicide child rape. The principle rests on the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and renders such defendants and offenses ineligible for capital punishment regardless of aggravating facts.
Ulysses Ulrich was convicted of capital murder after a jury found he had planned and carried out a fatal shooting. Defense experts presented IQ scores, school records, and evidence of lifelong adaptive deficits showing intellectual disability. The trial court applied the maxim and precluded the death penalty, holding Ulysses categorically ineligible for execution.
Ugo Uberti was convicted of raping a child after the victim survived without fatal injury. The prosecution sought capital punishment under a state statute authorizing death for the offense. The court invoked the maxim and ruled the sentence unconstitutional because the crime produced neither death nor intent to kill.
Uriah Urban participated in an armed robbery during which his co-defendant killed the victim. Uriah did not shoot anyone and lacked intent to kill. The sentencing court applied the maxim and declined to impose death, finding the Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement unsatisfied.
In June 1966, a jury convicted Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. of murder in a Maine state court. The prosecution introduced Wilbur's pretrial statement describing how he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room after a homosexual advance, together with circumstantial evidence of the killing. Although the defense presented no evidence at trial, it argued that Wilbur lacked criminal intent or that the homicide amounted at most to manslaughter because it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the advance. The trial court instructed the jury that an intentional and unlawful homicide would support a finding of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. After the jury twice returned for additional instructions on implied malice and the definition of heat of passion, it convicted Wilbur of murder. Wilbur appealed his conviction to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment. Wilbur then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that decision. After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in State v. Lafferty reaffirming its view of state law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to consider the constitutional question presented by the Maine homicide law as applied to Wilbur's case.
View caseUma Upadhyay faced capital charges. During voir dire the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove all male venire members. The trial court sustained the defense objection under the maxim and ordered a new panel, recognizing that the selection process violated equal protection principles embedded in capital sentencing safeguards.
The State of Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against J. E. B. on behalf of T. B., the mother of a minor child, in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama. On October 21, 1991, the matter was called for trial and jury selection began with a panel of 36 potential jurors, 12 males and 24 females. After the court excused three jurors for cause, only 10 of the remaining 33 jurors were male. The State then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, while petitioner used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, resulting in an all-female jury. Before the jury was empaneled, petitioner objected to the State's peremptory challenges on the ground that they were exercised against male jurors solely on the basis of gender. The court rejected the objection and empaneled the all-female jury, which found petitioner to be the father of the child and ordered him to pay child support. On postjudgment motion, the court reaffirmed its ruling. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment at 606 So. 2d 156 (1992), and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 508 U. S. 905 (1993) to resolve the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.
View caseUliana Ustinova, a civilian contractor, was charged before a military commission with offenses carrying the death penalty. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the capital charges. The court granted the motion, applying the maxim to hold that the commission lacked statutory and constitutional authority to impose capital punishment.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured by militia forces in Afghanistan in November 2001 during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban regime that then governed the country. The militia turned him over to the United States military, which transported him to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in June 2002. Over a year later, on July 3, 2003, the President determined that Hamdan was eligible for trial by military commission for then-unspecified crimes. Subsequently, on July 13, 2004, the government charged Hamdan with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by military commission. The charging document alleged that from February 1996 to November 2001 he had joined an enterprise with al Qaeda members and committed four overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy. Hamdan then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge both the authority of the military commission and the procedures it would employ. The District Court granted Hamdan's habeas petition on November 8, 2004, stayed the commission proceedings, and concluded that the commission lacked authority under the law of war and violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforceable and that the commission's jurisdiction and procedures were lawful. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 7, 2005. On December 30, 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, after which the government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court postponed ruling on the motion and later denied it, retaining jurisdiction over the appeal.
View caseUnity Underhill was convicted of murder after evidence showed she suffered from a severe psychotic disorder at the time of the offense. Psychiatric testimony established that the disease prevented her from appreciating the wrongfulness of her conduct. The sentencing court applied the maxim and imposed life imprisonment rather than death.
Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court of the District of Columbia sitting without a jury. The prosecution proceeded on a charge arising from an incident on July 13, 1951, in which Durham was found in a house. Durham's history included discharge from the Navy in 1945 at age seventeen following a psychiatric examination revealing a profound personality disorder rendering him unfit for service. In 1947 he pleaded guilty to violating the National Motor Theft Act and was placed on probation for one to three years. In January 1948, as a result of a conviction in the District of Columbia Municipal Court for passing bad checks, the District Court revoked his probation and he commenced service of his Motor Theft sentence. His conduct within the first few days in jail led to a lunacy inquiry in the Municipal Court where a jury found him to be of unsound mind. Upon commitment to St. Elizabeths he was diagnosed as suffering from 'psychosis with psychopathic personality.' He experienced multiple discharges and readmissions to St. Elizabeths between 1949 and 1951, including a conditional release in June 1950 that he violated, and a further lunacy finding in 1951. Following the July 1951 housebreaking, Durham was indicted in October 1951 and adjudged of unsound mind based on psychiatrists' affidavits diagnosing psychosis with psychopathic personality. He underwent subshock insulin therapy during a six-month commitment ending in February 1953, after which Dr. Silk certified him mentally competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel. At the ensuing trial, the prosecutor expressed a plan to allow Durham to raise an insanity defense on this charge. The court accepted waivers of jury trial and additional competency proceedings despite Durham's expressed desire for further hospitalization. Testimony included that of Durham's mother regarding his post-May 1951 behavior and a psychiatrist who examined him in September 1951 and opined on his mental condition around the time of the offense. The trial court found the defense of insanity not established under the prevailing standards. The appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
View caseThe maxim creates a categorical bar. Once a defendant is found intellectually disabled or the offense is shown to be non-homicide child rape, the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment outright without further balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Standardized IQ testing, school records, and proof of severely limited adaptive functioning in independent living skills are sufficient. When such evidence is credited, the court must preclude the death penalty regardless of the crime's planning or brutality.
No. Legislative attempts to authorize capital punishment for adult rape through specialized statutes or aggravating circumstances cannot override the categorical Eighth Amendment prohibition when the victim survives without homicide or life-threatening injury.
The maxim requires admission of evidence showing that mental disease or defect substantially impaired the defendant's capacity to appreciate criminality or conform conduct to law. Such evidence must be considered in favor of a life sentence rather than death.
…the Constitution places on the power of the States to punish the practice. I The morality, legality, and practicality of capital punishment have been the subject of debate for many years. In 1976, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the practice in cases coming to us from Georgia, Florida, and Texas. In those cases we…