466 U.S. 668 (1984)
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft.1
After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode.2 The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.3
Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts.4 In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family.5
Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty.6 Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history.
The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts.7 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal.8
Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report.9 He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist.10 The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.11
Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.12 After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.14
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding requires a defendant to show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense?15
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Yes. The Court applied this two-component requirement directly to the established facts of Washington's case.16 Washington pleaded guilty to three capital murders after a ten-day crime spree involving brutal stabbings and other violent felonies.17 His appointed counsel spoke with him about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but elected not to seek character witnesses or a psychiatric examination.
Counsel instead relied on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress while successfully excluding Washington's rap sheet and declining a presentence report. The state trial court and Florida Supreme Court denied collateral relief. The District Court found errors in judgment but no prejudice after an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed on a different standard.
Because both deficient performance and prejudice must be shown, the Court held that Washington's claim failed on the facts presented.18
A defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim in a capital sentencing proceeding.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan agreed that the two-prong test was the appropriate framework for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance but parted from the majority on the application of the prejudice prong in capital cases.20 He would require a somewhat different showing of prejudice in the capital sentencing context to account for the unique gravity of the death penalty and the need for heightened reliability in sentencing proceedings.21 Brennan concurred in the judgment only to the extent it established the general standards and would have vacated the death sentence on broader Eighth Amendment grounds.22
He emphasized that counsel's duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence takes on supreme importance in capital cases.23 Claims of ineffective assistance in developing such evidence should be considered with commensurate care to ensure the sentencer has all possible relevant information about the individual defendant.24
Justice Marshall dissented from the adoption of the two-prong test itself, arguing that it was too deferential to counsel and would rarely result in relief for defendants even when representation was inadequate.25 He would have adopted a more searching standard, particularly in capital cases where the stakes involve life and death.26 Marshall believed that Washington had demonstrated both deficient performance and sufficient prejudice to warrant relief and would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.27
He objected that the performance standard was excessively malleable.28 Instructing judges to apply an objective standard of reasonableness would lead to excessive variation in outcomes.29 This would abdicate the Court's responsibility to articulate clearer constitutional requirements.30
Whether the proper standard for judging attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms, with judicial scrutiny highly deferential and a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance?31
The proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstances.32 When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.33 Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Yes. The Court measured counsel's conduct in Washington's case against this deferential standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.34 Counsel made a strategic choice to rely on the plea colloquy for evidence of emotional stress and remorse rather than presenting additional character or psychological evidence, thereby preventing the State from cross-examining Washington or introducing its own psychiatric testimony. Counsel also excluded the rap sheet and declined a presentence report to avoid undermining the claim of no significant criminal history.
The Court concluded that these decisions were reasonable strategic choices made after considering the information available at the time and that nothing in the record indicated counsel's sense of hopelessness had distorted his professional judgment.35
The standard for judging attorney performance is reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms, with highly deferential scrutiny and a strong presumption favoring counsel's strategic decisions.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall rejected the majority's performance standard as excessively malleable and unlikely to provide meaningful guidance to lower courts or lawyers.37 He argued that instructing judges to apply an objective standard of reasonableness would lead to excessive variation in outcomes and would effectively abdicate the Court's responsibility to articulate clearer constitutional requirements.38 Marshall favored more particularized standards that could better ensure adequate representation, especially in capital cases.39
He noted that the Court of Appeals had made one sound attempt to develop particularized standards designed to ensure that all defendants receive effective legal assistance.
Whether the required showing of prejudice demands that the defendant demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different?40
With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the proper standard requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.41 A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.42
Yes. The Court applied this prejudice standard to the established facts and found the claim lacking.43 Washington submitted fourteen affidavits from friends and relatives willing to testify to his good character and two psychological reports indicating chronic frustration and depression short of extreme emotional disturbance.44 The Court determined that this evidence would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the trial judge.45
Given the overwhelming aggravating circumstances found for each murder, including that the crimes were heinous, atrocious, and cruel and committed during other felonies for pecuniary gain, there was no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating factors.46
A defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.47
Whether in a capital sentencing proceeding the prejudice inquiry focuses on whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death?48
When a defendant challenges a death sentence, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.49 In making this determination, a court must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.50
Yes. The Court focused the prejudice inquiry on the capital sentencing context by examining whether the sentencer would have reached a different balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.51 The trial judge had found multiple aggravating circumstances for each of the three murders and no mitigating circumstances of any significance.52 The Court concluded that the evidence Washington claimed counsel should have presented would not have altered that balance, especially since the psychological reports would have contradicted the claim of extreme emotional disturbance and the rap sheet would likely have been admitted.53
The overwhelming aggravating factors meant there was no reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome.54
In a capital sentencing proceeding the prejudice inquiry focuses on whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.55
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan agreed with the general framework but emphasized that the prejudice inquiry in capital sentencing proceedings must account for the unique seriousness of the death penalty.56 He stressed that counsel's duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence takes on supreme importance in capital cases. Claims of ineffective assistance in developing such evidence should be considered with commensurate care to ensure the sentencer has all possible relevant information about the individual defendant.
Brennan noted that the consequences to the defendant of incompetent assistance at a capital sentencing could not be greater and that the standards should be applied with concern for the special considerations that must attend review of counsel's performance in a capital sentencing proceeding.57