463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)
In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Jerry Helm was convicted in South Dakota of third-degree burglary.1 In 1972 he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, in 1973 of grand larceny, and in 1975 of third-offense driving while intoxicated.2 All six offenses were nonviolent and alcohol contributed to each.3
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a no-account check for $100.4 He told the trial court he had been drinking in Sioux Falls, ended up in Rapid City with more money than he started with, and did not remember the incident, then pleaded guilty.5 Because he had three prior felony convictions in addition to the principal felony, the South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under the recidivist statute.6
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in a 3-2 decision.7 After Helm served two years, he asked the Governor to commute the sentence so he could become eligible for parole after serving three-fourths of a fixed term; the Governor denied the request in May 1981.
Helm filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, which denied relief.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment question.10
Whether the Eighth Amendment proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony?11
The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments prohibits not only barbaric punishments but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime.12 The principle that a punishment is excessive if it is not graduated and proportioned to the offense has been reiterated in cases involving the death penalty but has been recognized also in the context of other noncapital punishments.13 When sentences are reviewed under the Eighth Amendment, courts should be guided by objective factors including the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.14 The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.15
Yes. In applying the principle of proportionality to the facts of this case, the Court first notes the details of Helm's criminal record and the current offense.
Jerry Helm's criminal history began with convictions in 1964, 1966, and 1969 for third-degree burglary in South Dakota. Subsequently, in 1972 he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, followed by a conviction for grand larceny in 1973 and third-offense driving while intoxicated in 1975. All of these six offenses were nonviolent, with alcohol contributing to each incident.
Upon being charged in 1979 with uttering a no-account check for $100, Helm explained to the trial court that he had been drinking in Sioux Falls and ended up in Rapid City with more money than he started with, not remembering the details of the incident. He then pleaded guilty to the charge. Because he had three prior felony convictions in addition to the principal felony, the South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under the recidivist statute.
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in a 3-2 decision. After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a fixed term of years so that he could become eligible for parole after serving three-fourths of the term, but the Governor denied the request in May 1981.
Helm then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, which denied relief on the basis of Rummel v. Estelle. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment question.
The gravity of Helm's offense is minimal as it was one of the most passive felonies a person could commit, involving no violence or threat of violence.16 His prior crimes were all nonviolent and relatively minor.17 The sentence of life without parole is the most severe punishment the State could impose on any criminal for any crime.18 In addition, the State has conceded that the sentence is unique in the State.19 The sentence is far more severe than those generally imposed in the State for more serious crimes and more severe than those that would be imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense.20 Therefore, the sentence is significantly disproportionate to the crime.21
The respondent's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.22
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the principle of proportionality is not a fixed formula that can be applied mechanically but rather a general principle that leaves substantial discretion to the legislatures.23 He contended that in Rummel v. Estelle the Court upheld a life sentence for a recidivist who had committed three nonviolent felonies and that the differences between that case and this one are not sufficient to justify a different constitutional result.24 Burger emphasized that the Court's decision will have the effect of constitutionalizing the length of criminal sentences, a task for which the federal judiciary is ill-suited, and that the states are entitled to broad discretion in determining the appropriate punishment for recidivist offenders.25
He would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.26
Justice O'Connor joined the Chief Justice's dissent and added these additional observations.27 She argued that the Court's proportionality analysis lacks objective standards and will lead to arbitrary and unpredictable results.28 O'Connor noted that the Eighth Amendment was not intended to give federal judges a roving commission to second-guess the wisdom of state sentencing policies.29
She observed that the respondent in this case is a habitual offender who has demonstrated a repeated unwillingness to abide by the law and that the state legislature could reasonably conclude that such an offender poses a significant danger to society and should be permanently incapacitated.30 O'Connor concluded that the Court's decision today undermines the ability of states to protect their citizens from recidivist criminals.31