530 U.S. 466 (2000)
On December 22, 1994, Charles C. Apprendi, Jr., fired several .22-caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey.1
Apprendi was promptly arrested and, at 3:05 a.m., admitted that he was the shooter.2 After further questioning, at 6:04 a.m., he made a statement—which he later retracted—that even though he did not know the occupants of the house personally, "because they are black in color he does not want them in the neighborhood."3
A New Jersey grand jury returned a 23-count indictment charging Apprendi with four first-degree, eight second-degree, six third-degree, and five fourth-degree offenses.4 The charges alleged shootings on four different dates, as well as the unlawful possession of firearms and other weapons.5 None of the counts referred to the hate crime statute, and none alleged that Apprendi acted with a racially biased purpose.6
The parties entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which Apprendi pleaded guilty to two counts (3 and 18) of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4a (West 1995), and one count (22) of the third-degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb, § 2C:39-3a. The prosecutor dismissed the other 20 counts. As part of the plea agreement, the State reserved the right to request the court to impose a higher "enhanced" sentence on count 18 on the ground that that offense was committed with a biased purpose, as described in § 2C:44-3(e).7 Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement on the ground that it violates the United States Constitution.8
After the trial judge accepted the three guilty pleas, the prosecutor filed a formal motion for an extended term.9 The trial judge thereafter held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi's "purpose" for the shooting on December 22.10 Apprendi adduced evidence from a psychologist and from seven character witnesses who testified that he did not have a reputation for racial bias.11 He also took the stand himself, explaining that the incident was an unintended consequence of overindulgence in alcohol, denying that he was in any way biased against African-Americans, and denying that his statement to the police had been accurately described.12 The judge found the police officer's testimony credible and concluded that the evidence supported a finding "that the crime was motivated by racial bias."13 Having found "by a preponderance of the evidence" that Apprendi's actions were taken "with a purpose to intimidate" as provided by the statute, the trial judge held that the hate crime enhancement applied.14 The judge sentenced him to a 12-year term of imprisonment on count 18, and to shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts.15
Apprendi appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.16 Over dissent, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld the enhanced sentence.17 A divided New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.19
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?20
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.21
Yes. The Due Process Clause requires that any fact increasing the maximum penalty be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.22 In this case, the hate crime enhancement increased the maximum from 10 to 20 years for the second-degree offense.23 The judge found the bias by a preponderance of the evidence after the plea, not by a jury.24 This procedure violates the constitutional requirement as applied to the facts of Apprendi's case.25
The New Jersey procedure is unconstitutional.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joins the opinion of the Court but writes separately to underscore the fundamental nature of the jury-trial guarantee.27 He explains that the Constitution protects the right to have a jury determine all facts that increase the penalty beyond what the jury's verdict alone would authorize.28 In his view, the New Jersey statute violates this guarantee by permitting a judge to find the essential bias factor by a mere preponderance.29
Scalia rejects any efficiency-based defense of judicial factfinding, noting that the jury right was designed precisely to prevent leaving criminal justice entirely to the State.30 The Framers understood that the jury provides an indispensable check against arbitrary power, ensuring that no defendant receives more punishment than the facts found by twelve citizens beyond a reasonable doubt would permit.31 This protection, he concludes, is not subject to legislative recharacterization as a mere sentencing factor.32
Joined by Scalia, J., Joined As To Parts I And Ii
Justice Thomas joins Parts I and II of the Court's opinion but writes separately to advocate a broader constitutional rule.33 He argues that the Constitution requires every fact that increases punishment to be treated as an element of the offense and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.34 Drawing on extensive historical evidence from the founding era through the nineteenth century, Thomas demonstrates that common-law practice treated any fact legally authorizing greater punishment as an element that must be alleged and proved.35
He contends that the Almendarez-Torres decision was wrongly decided and should be overruled because recidivism, like any other aggravating fact, is an element when it increases the statutory maximum.36 Thomas emphasizes that the distinction between elements and sentencing factors lacks historical foundation and that legislatures cannot evade the jury-trial right by labeling facts as sentencing considerations.37 His analysis would require jury determination of all such facts, not merely those that raise the statutory maximum.38
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Kennedy And Breyer, Jj.
Justice O’Connor dissents, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.39 She argues that the majority's rule represents a watershed and unwarranted departure from precedent that will cast doubt on countless sentencing schemes.40 In her view, the New Jersey hate-crime enhancement is a traditional sentencing factor that may constitutionally be found by a judge under a preponderance standard.41
The statute does not create a new offense but merely guides the judge's discretion within the range authorized by the jury's verdict.42 O’Connor criticizes the majority for misreading history and prior cases such as McMillan and Almendarez-Torres, which permitted judicial factfinding even when it affected punishment.43 She warns that the new rule will disrupt determinate-sentencing systems nationwide and that legislatures retain broad authority to define what constitutes an element versus a sentencing factor.44
O’Connor would affirm the New Jersey Supreme Court's judgment upholding the enhanced sentence.45
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J.
Justice Breyer dissents, joined by the Chief Justice.46 He contends that the practical consequences of the majority's decision are deeply troubling for modern sentencing reform.47 Breyer explains that determinate-sentencing systems, including the federal Guidelines, rely on judicial factfinding regarding numerous offense and offender characteristics that affect punishment within statutory ranges.48
Requiring jury determination of every such fact would render these systems unworkable and undermine the goals of uniformity and proportionality that motivated sentencing reform.49 He notes that judges have traditionally exercised discretion to consider relevant facts without jury intervention, and that the Constitution permits legislatures to guide that discretion through sentencing factors.50 Breyer argues that the majority's rule sacrifices workable compromise for an unattainable procedural ideal and would leave mandatory minimum statutes untouched while invalidating more flexible enhancements.51
He would uphold the New Jersey statute as consistent with historical practice and constitutional precedent.52