Also known as: summae potestatis · supreme power · sovereignty
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The supreme or final authority within a governmental system.
Congress imposed preclearance on only some states using 1970s data. Samuel Soto, a state election official, refused to seek federal approval for a new polling rule. The court held that the selective regime exceeded federal power because states retain final authority over their internal voting procedures absent current justification.
Mitchell obtained a judgment against nonresident Neff by publication in Oregon. Neff later sued in federal court to recover land sold to satisfy the judgment. The court ruled that Oregon lacked final authority to bind Neff without proper personal jurisdiction.
In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.
View caseMaryland imposed a tax on the Second Bank of the United States. Bank cashier McCulloch refused payment. The Supreme Court held that the states lack final authority to tax an instrument created by Congress under its enumerated powers.
In April 1816, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States." The Bank organized in Philadelphia pursuant to the act and in 1817 established a branch in the City of Baltimore that from that time until May 1, 1818, transacted business by issuing bank notes, discounting promissory notes, and performing other customary operations under the authority of the corporate body established at Philadelphia. On February 11, 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed an act entitled "An act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature." The Maryland statute provided that any such branch could not lawfully issue notes except upon stamped paper of specified denominations furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, or could relieve itself from that requirement by paying annually in advance to the Treasurer the sum of $15,000. Officers offending against the provisions forfeited $500 for each offense, and persons circulating unstamped notes forfeited up to $100, with penalties recoverable by indictment or action of debt. James W. McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch, on the days set forth in the declaration issued bank notes to George Williams in Baltimore in part payment of a promissory note discounted by the branch, and those notes were not issued on stamped paper as prescribed by the Maryland act; neither the bank nor its branch had paid the $15,000 in advance before or since the issuance of those notes. John James, who sued as well for himself as for the State of Maryland, brought an action of debt against McCulloch in the County Court of Baltimore County to recover the penalties. The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts to the court, which rendered judgment against McCulloch; the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed that judgment, and McCulloch brought the cause to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error.
View caseWest Virginia required public school students to salute the flag. The Barnette children refused on religious grounds. The Court ruled that the state lacked final authority to compel speech when it conflicted with individual constitutional rights.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
View caseCongress passed a statute allowing one house to veto an INS deportation suspension. Chadha challenged the veto after the House acted. The Court held that Congress lacks final authority to alter legal rights through a one-house legislative veto.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View caseTennessee voters sued state officials over grossly unequal legislative districts. The state argued the matter was nonjusticiable. The Court held that federal courts possess final authority to decide whether state apportionment violates equal protection.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseIt identifies the location of ultimate governmental authority. In the United States, that authority is divided between the federal government and the states under the Constitution, with neither possessing complete supremacy over the other in all matters.
Equal sovereignty limits Congress from treating states unequally without extraordinary justification. When Congress attempts to single out some states for special oversight using outdated data, it improperly assumes final authority over state functions reserved by the Tenth Amendment.
Congress holds enforcement power under those amendments, but that power is remedial and must respect state sovereignty. Legislation that commandeers state officials or relies on stale data exceeds the final authority Congress may exercise.